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PREFACE 
This is written primarily to aid the electric and 
gas consumer in understanding the rationale behind the forces 
which shape utility rates in Montana. But it is also in­
tended to impart some knowledge of the interaction and 
impact of political "pressure" or interest groups in 
Montana and to aid students in understanding the political 
process in Montana, 
I want to thank Senator Lee Metcalf, Vic Reinemer, 
Harry L. and Gretchen G, Billings, Mrs. Francis Logan, and 
Jerome J, Gate for getting me interested in the utility rate 
issue. It is hoped that this study will supplement work 
already done by them in this area. 
The suggestions of Dr. Thomas Payne, my advisor, 
and Edmund L. Freeman have greatly improved the writing 
style. And as members of the Board of Thesis Examiners, 
Drs. Brad E. Hainsworth and Richard E. Shannon helped 
resolve inconsistencies in political theory. 
The people interviewed during the writing of this 
have corrected privately many of my mistakes. I admire 
their candidness and appreciate their help. 
To Dad and Mom who financed it and to Janet who 
shared it. 
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CMPTER I 
THE DYNAMICS OP GROUP THEORY 
In Through the Looking Glass Alice remarked to 
the twins, "Really it's coming on very dark," and 
asked if they thought it might rain. 
Tweedledum spread a large umbrella over himself 
and his brother, and looked up into it. "No, I don't 
think it is," he said: "at least not under here, 
nohow." 
"But it may rain outside?" 
"It may—if it chooses," said Tweedledee, "we've 
no objection, contrariwise,"^ 
The Montana Power and Anaconda Copper Mining com­
panies were the twins, Tweedledum and Tweedledee, in Joseph 
Kinsey Howard's analogy describing the political power 
struggle in Montana prior to 1944. He thought that for all 
practical purposes their alliance had controlled the alloca­
tion of resources in the vast Treasure State, 
The Anaconda Copper Mining Company (ACM), as 
Montana's largest business, had exerted varying influence 
on Montana political institutions. For example, Anaconda 
owned seven of Montana's fourteen daily or almost-daily 
2 newspapers in four of its five major cities. In addition. 
^Joseph Kinsey Howard, "The Montana Twins in 
Trouble?" Harper's Magazine, CLXXXIX(September, 1944), p, 342, 
quoted from Lewis Carroll, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland 
(New York: Heritage Press, 1941), pp. '76-77'V 
2 ACM owned The I"'issoulian-Sentinel in Missoula, 
The Livingston Enterprise in Livingston, The Independent 
Record in Helena, The Ballings Gazette in Billings, and 
1 
2 
Anaconda^s president, John D. Ryan, had organized the Montana 
Power Company as a privately owned utility to insure the 
sale of cheap electricity and gas to ACM's plants and mines 
at Butte, Anaconda, and Great Falls, which by 1940 used more 
power than the entire U.S. airplane industry. Ryan was also 
interested in the electrification of the Milwaukee & St. 
Paul Railroad. Because it supplied energy to the mines and 
railroads, Montana Power grew until it served the western 
two-thirds of Montana and had the largest service area of any 
electric utility in the United States. 
Because it is a public utility, Montana Power is 
granted a natural monopoly over its service area. It is 
subject to gas and electric rate regulation by the Montana 
Railroad and Public Service Commission, a state government 
agency of three elected officials. One of the first actions 
the Public Service Commission took after its creation in 
1913 was to order the Montana Power Company to lower its 
3 electric rates. 
The commissioners said that consolidation of the 
smaller companies into Montana Power had made more efficient 
The Montana Standard in Butte. The major city that had 
a newspaper not owned by ACM was Great Falls, where 0. S. 
Warden ran the Great Falls Tribune-Leader. 
^Montana, R. R. & Pub. Serv. Comm'n., Seventh 
Annual Report. 1913-14, pp. 17I-I9O. 
service possible. Then they ruled that the monopoly profit 
that Montana Power had made before regulation was too much. 
Between 1912 and 19^7, the Public Service Commission 
reduced Montana Power residential electric rates eight times. 
The biggest reduction came in 1923 when the Company reduced 
the average residential electric light bill (20 KWH) by 
16 per cent and reduced by an even larger percentage the 
price on usage of greater amounts of power. 
In 1964, the rates were again lowered to pass on to 
the consumer a utility tax cut the federal government ha,d 
granted to stimulate a recessive economy. It was the first 
of nine federal tax reductions since World War II to be 
passed on to Montana Power patrons. In 1948, the Commission 
granted a $0 per cent increase for all kilowatt hours con­
sumed over 1,000 a month. And as can be deduced from Table 1, 
Montana Power customers discovered their bill had also increas 
in 1957 and 1969. 
As Table 2 illustrates, Montana Power was ordered 
to reduce its gas rates in 1933 and 1935* The Commission 
granted natural gas rate increases in 1953, 19^2, and I969. 
Gas price increases have ranged from 66 to 150 per cent 
(depending upon the amount of gas used) since the last rate 
reduction in 1935. And electric price increases have ranged 
from 16 to 50 per cent (depending on the amount of electricity 
used) since the last meaningful rate reduction in 19^7. 
(The 1964 reduction merely passed on a federal tax cut to 
4 
TABLE 1 
MONTANA POWER COMPANY RESIDENTIAL ELECTRIC RATES 
REGULATED AFTER 1912 
YEAR 250 KWH 500 KWH ?^0 KWH 
1912 (small towns) 133.25 #66.50 §99.75 
1913 (large towns) 23.00 43.00 58.00 
1913 (small towns) 24.23 43.23 57.48 
I923& 8.00 13.00 18.00 
1929 15 KWH bill reduced from $2.00 to $1.20. Larger 
usage rates unchanged. 
1935 7.93 11.93 15.68 
1939 7.75 11.75 15.50 
1941 7.61 11.36 15oil 
1944 7.08 10.83 14.58 
1947̂  6.83  ̂ , 9.33 11.83 
1948 The price went from 1^/KWH to 1^^/KWH for electricity 
used in excess of 1,000 KWH, a 50 per cent 
increase. 
1957 7.53 10.78 14.03 
1964 6.91 10,16 13.41 
1969 7.95 11.45 14.95 
Per Cent of Rate Reduction 
from 1923 to 1947^ 15^ 28^ 34# 
Per Cent of Rate Increase 
from 1947 to 1969 16# 23# 26% 
^In 1922, the average residential customer used 
20 KWH of electricity each month at a cost of $1.90. In 
1923, the Public Service Commission asked for a rate reduc­
tion. The Company complied, setting the price of 20 KWH 
at $1,60 and reducing the rates for greater amounts of 
electricity used more drastically. Company officials said 
they hoped that the reduction in these categories would 
increase consumption. Average consumption today is 450 
KWH/month. Montana R.R. & Pub. Serv. Comm'n., Montana Utili­
ties Reports. XVI (1923), 229-30. 
^The 1948 raise, which affected 400 customers, was 
decided on in a conference between Company officials and the 
Public Service Commissioners. No public hearing was held, no 
advance publicity about the conference was given. The Com­
mission said a hearing would be held if opposition to the new 
5 
rates de/eloped. The Western News, September 7, 19^8, p. 4, 
The 50 per cent 19%raise is often ignored by Montana 
Power, Note, for example, the following quote from a letter 
which J, E. Corette wrote to Company stockholders on 
August 12, 1957: "Now for the first time in 4-5 yearsj your 
Company finds it necessary to raise its rates to electric 
customers." See also The Missoulian. February 14-, 1968, p. 1, 
°The efficiency of electric generating plants has 
increased tremendously in the last 50 years. In 1917, for 
example, it took 2.69 pounds of coal to produce a kilowatt 
hour of electricity. In 1967, it took only .87 pounds of 
coal to produce the same amount of electricity, Edison 
Electric Institute, EBI Pocketbook of Electric Utility 
Industry Statistics (15th ed,; New York: Edison Electric 
Institute^ 1969), P» 21. 
TABLE 2 
MONTANA POWER COMPANY GENERAL SERVICE GAS RATES^ 
YEAR 1 Mcf^ 100 Mcf 300 Mcf 1000 Mcf 5000 Mcf 
1931 11.70 #46.25 $128.25 #313.25 # 993.25 
1933 1.70 46,25 106,25 260,75 940.75 
1935 1,00 45.55 105.55 259.55 939.55 
1953 1.30 59.71 143,41 360.71 1360.71 
1962 2,00 66,35 158,35 410.35 1690.35 
1969 2,50 75.76 183,76 477.76 1997.76 
Per Cent of Rate Increase 
from 1935 to 1969 
150fo 66% 74^ 84^ 112^ 
Per Cent of Net Rate Increase 
from 1931 to 1969 
^7% 6k% 43^ 52% 101^ 
^'Montana Power fought the gas rate reduction order in 
1935. Montana Power Co. v. Public Service Comm'n., 12 P. 
Supp. 9^-6" (1^5") « Commission findings in other cases may be 
found in the Public Utilities Reports available at many county 
law libraries. Citations to these cases may be found in the 
bibliography. 
In 1953, the average residential user's gas bill 
6 
increased 32 to 4? per cent. This is compared to a 10 per 
cent increase in the costs of the American Smelting and 
Refining Company in East Helena (from 25^ to 27§^ per Mcf). 
A few large companies like American Smelting and Refining 
negotiate separate contracts with Montana Power and are 
able to get lower prices or keep rate raises front hitting 
them as hard as the rest of Montana's businesses because 
Montana Power realizes they might choose to use competing 
forms of energy if gas and electric prices become too high. 
Small general service customers are charged 7^^ 
per Mcf for gas, while large industrial users who negotiate 
contracts with the Company are charged an average of 3^^ per 
Mcf, The Cut Bank Gas Company buys gas for as little as 
22j%^ per Mcf, Montana Power Co., Applicant ' s Exhibits, Re 
The Montana Power Co., Docket No, 5^98 (Montana R.R. & Pub. 
Serv. Comm'n., I968), exhibit I5. 
^1 Mcf = 1,000 cubic feet of gas, A cubic foot of gas 
is that quantity of gas which, at a temperature of sixty 
degrees Fahrenheit and at a pressure of 1^,73 pounds per 
square inch absolute (psia), occupies one cubic foot. 
the consumers.) These increases came at a time when the 
U, S, electric utility industry was boasting a decrease in 
prices.^ This record has brought forth criticism of Montana 
Power for alleged influence over her sole rate restraint, the 
Montana Public Service Commission. 
The most recent test of the extent of Montana Power 
influence arose on February I3, 1968, when the Company 
petitioned the Public Service Commission for permission to 
raise electric and gas prices. 
J, E, Corette, Montana Power board chairman and 
chief executive officer, said a three-year investment of 
$98.6 million in new facilities plus "extraordinary expenses" 
In 1966, 32 electric companies instituted rate 
reductions and only one asked for and received a rate increase. 
Robert H. Short, vice president of Portland General Electric 
Co., in Commercial & Financial Chronicle. March 2, I967, p. 1. 
7 
totaling $11.8 million led the Company to seek a rate 
increase.-^ Corette said that during the last ten years 
wages had increased ^9 per cent, all state and local taxes 
had gone up 96 per cent, and the Montana corporation license 
(income) tax had increased 5^3 per cent,^ He said that cur­
rent interest expenses (based on interest rates ranging from 
6,5 to 6 per cent), increased depreciation charges, and 
the cost of acquiring and developing additional natural gas 
supplies also accounted for the boost in operating expenses.? 
Ten witnesses presented the Company's story to the 
Public Service Commission on May 1, 2, and 3, I968. At that 
time the Commission did not cross-examine the Company wit­
nesses. Nor did it allow protestants, the people who oppose 
the rate increase, to cross-examine. The Commission did, 
however, permit questions to clarify testimony and exhibits 
submitted by the Company. Cross-examination was permitted 
during a second hearing which commenced on August 7, 19^8, 
and terminated on August I6, I968. The testimony and cross-
^The Mi s soul i an, February 14-, I968, p. 1.' 
^Montana Power paid a I967 corporation license tax 
of $1,419,767. In 1967, the corporation license tax rate 
was 5è per cent of a company's net income, which is defined 
as revenues less legitimate business expenses. The I967 
rate increased only one-fourth of one per cent over the 1957 
rate. So the 5^3 per cent increase in Montana Power's corp­
oration license tax may largely have been due to increased 
net income (profit). Montana Power Co., 196? Form 1 Report 
to FPÇ, p. 222. ~ 
^Montana Power Co., press release. May 1, I968, 
pp. 1, 2. 
8 
examination of Dr. R,' Hayden Howard and Dr. George P. Hess, 
utility experts hired by the Public Service Commission, was 
allowed at the second hearing. The testimony and examination 
of Dr. David a Kosh, a rate expert hired by the consumers, 
was heard September 3, 19&8. Attorneys for all sides were 
allowed three months to prepare briefs in support of their 
positions. On January 30, 1969, the Commission decided that 
the rates should be increased. 
Montana Power's rate increase request seemed a 
particularly bold move for at least two reasons. First, the 
Company told the press it wanted a 15 per cent increase in 
electric and gas revenues. This statement was true, but 
an increase in revenue was confused in the minds of news­
paper readers with an increase in costs to the consumer. 
When the rate schedules were actually computed, the requested 
increase amounted to more than 25 per cent in most resi­
dential utility bills,' l-Zhen the revenue obtained from a 
25 per cent cost increase in residential rates is averaged with 
the revenue obtained from commercial sources, the result is 
a 15 per cent increase in revenue. 
Second, Montana Power displayed confidence by 
requesting a substantial election year increase at a time 
when Senator Lee Metcalf had been publicly alleging for 
several years that an average yearly overcharge of $10 million 
was being paid by Montanans to the utility, ^ 
Indeed, according to Electric Power and Light, the 
9 
electric industry*s house organ, Montana Power was number 
one in the nation with a 196? net income that was 25.37 per 
O 
cent of its gross revenue. 
Reacting on the basis of Metcalf's allegations of 
overcharge, consumers formed two groups, the Concerned 
Consumers' Council and the Montana Consumers' Council, 
which arose to oppose the utility rate raise request. Their 
effectiveness in preventing the increase is the topig of this 
thesis. Harvard economist John Kenneth Galbraith has pos­
tulated that: "As a common rule, we can rely on counter-
Q 
vailing power to appear as a curb on economic power," If 
the postulate is correct, we would assume that the consumer 
groups would be able to mobilize enough countervailing 
opinion to keep Montana Power from obtaining the increase. 
What actually happened, however, was that the Montana Public 
Service Commission authorized an increase in electric and 
gas bills that averaged 15 per cent—most of what the Company 
requested. This would suggest that one should seek an 
alternate hypothesis to Galbraith's,' At least one should 
seek a more complete understanding of the political process 
in this particular situation. Group theorist David B, Truman 
has said that in such situations 
®"The Top 100 Electric Utilities," Electric Light 
and Power, June, I968, p. 75» 
^J. K. Galbraith, American Capitalism: The Concept 
of Countervail inn: Power (2d ed.' rev.; Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Co., 195^), p. 11.3. 
10 
the behaviors that constitute the process of 
government cannot be adequately understood apart from 
the groups, especially the organized and potential 
interest groups, which are operative at any point 
in time.lu 
If Truman's argument is correct, we should arrive at a more 
adequate understanding of the Montana Power Company rate 
raise by focusing this study on the group interaction in 
the regulatory process. But, before we proceed to a hypoth­
esis about such group interaction, some explanation of group 
theory will be necessary. 
Group Theory 
By asking, as a corporation, for a rate increase, 
Montana Power fits David B. Truman's definition of a politi­
cal interest group, A group, writes Truman, is "any 
collection of individuals who have some characteristic in 
common. When the individuals become aware of the shared 
characteristics, attitudes, or interests, they may interact 
on the basis of their awareness. The frequency of such 
interaction produces more shared attitudes or interests and 
uniformities of behavior. Presumably, the more interaction 
between group members, the more cohesive will be their shared 
attitudes, the stronger their interests, and the more uniform 
their behavior. 
^^David B.' Trumaji, The Governmental Process : Political 
Interests and Public Opinion (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1951), p.' 502. 
l^Ibid., p, 23. 
11 
A group (e.g., the Montana Power Company) becomes 
an Interest group, says Truman, when because of one or more 
shared attitudes between group members, it organizes to make 
"certain claims upon other groups /consumers and taxpayers/ 
in the society for the establishment, maintenance, or en­
hancement of forms of behavior /higher rate^Z that are implied 
12 by the shared attitudes." As a corporation, Montana 
Power is a group whose members include directors, officers, 
employees, and bond and stockholders. These people have 
mobilized in quest of a utility rate increase as a common goal. 
When a group organizes to seek a goal and "makes its claim 
through or upon any of the institutions of government 
/Railroad and Public Service Commission or city councils/, 
TO 
it becomes a political interest group." 
Professor Truman believes that his definition of 
political interest groups has more advantages than other 
definitions because "it permits the identification of various 
potential as well as existing interest groups.Interest 
groups arise when widely held attitudes are expressed through 
interaction. If these attitudes are not expressed in 
interaction but merely held in a state of readiness by their 
possessors, the people holding the shared attitude comprise 
a -potential interest group.' For example, all of the taxpayers 
l^ibid., p.' 33. ^^Ibid.. p. 37. 
l^Ibid., p. 34.' 
12 
and consumers affected by the rate raise proposal may be 
included in a potential group which wants lower electric 
rates and lower taxes.- Thus, the power of the utility 
company allegedly will be tempered, checked, or kept in 
"balance" by a countervailing force of consumers and tax­
payers. 
"The possibility," says Truman, "that severe dis­
turbances will be created if these submerged, potential 
interests /consumers/ should organize necessitates some 
recognition /by Montana Pov/erZ of the existence of these 
15 interests and gives them at least a minimum of influence," 
Such a disturbance might result in restriction or elimina­
tion of the group that caused the potential interest to 
react. According to this rationale, a private power com­
pany, which set its rates too high, might find its service 
area invaded by lower cost public utility districts or by 
some other power supplier. 
This does not mean that widespread unorganized 
interests are always dominant. "Nor does it mean," writes 
Professor Truman, "that the slightest action in violation 
of any of them inevitably and instantly produces a restrictive 
response. . .' .Mobilization of these unorganized 
interests depends upon many factors, including: the means 
of communication existing within a society, the quality of 
^5lMd., p/ 512. ^^Ibid., p. 514. 
13 
leadership generated within the emerging group, the degree 
to which the group members' tolerance is exceeded, the degree 
to which the group's members' attitudes are frustrated or to 
which the rules of the game are violated, and the obstacles 
to mobilization which organized groups place in the way. 
In addition, citizens who generally do not vote or participate 
in the political process are hard to arouse to action. 
Nevertheless, Professor Truman believes that in 
relatively vigorous political systems, unorganized interests 
are dominant with sufficient frequency in the behavior of 
enough important segments of society that, despite their 
restrictions, they serve as balance wheels to keep the 
activity and methods of organized interests within broad 
17 
limits. 
Even when the threat that potential interests might 
mobilize is not apparent to members of existing pressure 
groups, the existing group's action is tempered by multiple 
and overlapping group memberships. "Multiple membership" 
refers to a situation in which a person belongs to two or 
more groups. And "overlapping membership" occurs when a 
group contains a person who is also a member of another, 
perhaps competing, interest group. 
Political groups in America do not have monolithic 
memberships. No single individual accounts for all the 
policy of any group, and no single group affiliation accounts 
l^Ibid.. p. 515.' 
14 
for all of the attitudes or interests of any individual 
(except a fanatic or neurotic). Individual group members 
participate in a variety of activities and bring their 
unique frames of reference to the policy-making process of 
the groups to which they belong. Thus, when a group is 
making policy, it must listen to a variety of ideas and 
interests. If the group wishes to maintain its membership, 
the group policy must to some degree reflect all of these 
interests. Otherwise, members who disagree with the policy 
might cease their support of the group. 
For example, the leaders of the Montana Chamber of 
Commerce may be indebted to the Montana Power Company for one 
of their largest (if not the largest) membership contributions 
of $4,844' paid in I967, but they cannot parrot the Company 
position on every issue.Only 39 per cent of the 
Chamber's total income is derived from contributions above 
$100.^9 If the Chamber took an overt stand favoring the 
electric and gas rate raise, it would likely encounter 
internal dissension and cohesion problems among smaller 
members whose taxes and business expenses might be increased 
^^Montana Power Co., 196? Form 1^ Report to the F PC, 
p. 427. The largest membership contribution to the Montana 
Chamber of Commerce was in the neighborhood of 3_$,000, accord­
ing to the Chamber's executive vice-president Del H. Siewert. 
He declined to divulge the names or amounts of contributors. 
^^Interview with Del H.- Siewert, executive vice-
president, Montana Chamber of Commerce, August I6, I968. 
15 
because of zhe action. Members of the Chamber are also 
consumers, and this overlapping membership prevents the 
Chamber from bringing its power to bear in one urited effort 
favoring the rate raise/ 
Because multiple and overlapping membership exists 
among the personnel of every group, Professor Truman thinks 
it "is more important as a restraint upon the activities of 
organized groups than the rarely aroused protests of chronic 
20 
nonparticipants." He thinks both factors are important 
in checking the political power of organized vested interests, 
however. And he contends that "multiple memberships in 
potential /Emphasis added/ groups based on widely held and 
accepted interests . . * serve as a balance wheel in a going 
political system like that of the United States," 
The traditional meaning of "balance" in the sense 
of "balance of power" has been that the political power and 
influence in a society were distributed equally among groups 
in the society.' This traditional meaning has carried with 
it the notion that these balanced political groupings could 
lay equal claim to the resources of a society. This notion 
is misleading, 
A society may be stable or essentially free from 
overt conflict and disruption, but the resources of the 
society may not be distributed equally—as in the case of 
20 91 
Truman, oq, cit., p. 510, IMA., p. 514, 
16 
countless different political sycterns. They may be controlled 
by the few for the benefit of a few. Yet the political power 
is said to be "balanced" because the forces that precipitate 
social change are more or less static, A close look at this 
type of situation indicates that political force is not 
always met by an equal but opposite reactionary political 
force. A preponderant amount of force may be yielded by one 
side so that the opposition may be incapacitated or suppressed 
completely. 
It is true that the political power or resources of 
the participants will not change much relative to each other 
until something intervenes to alter the relationship. But 
we cannot say that these powers are balanced in the sense of 
being equal. 
What we can say is that at any given point in time 
the political system is at rest and an equilibrium or 
"balance" of sorts is in effect. But as we move in time 
the equilibrium changes; technology, natural resources, 
political attitudes, and leadership are the precipitant 
factors. This is the concept of a "moving equilibrium" 
used by Arthur P. Bentley and others who have viewed the 
political action as a constantly changing "process." 
"The pressures never do . , , work themselves 
through to a final balance," says Bentley. Even the 
status quo of law is "a forming, a systematization, a 
17 
struggle, an adaptation, of group interests, just as govern­
ment is."22 
Because this process appears to be one of constant 
adjustment, David Easton has suggested we call it "perpetual 
23 
disequilibrium" rather than "moving equilibrium." 
Then the idea of equilibrium can apply to a balanced 
condition which, even though it never materializes, can be 
used as a norm for comparing several disequilibrium condi­
tions, The task of the political scientist is to identify 
and describe and quantify (if possible) the disequilibrium 
in the light of what would have happened if the equilibrium 
norm had emerged. The reasons for the failure of the 
equilibrium to materialize are then sought. 
An equilibrium condition or one closely approxi­
mating it has been suspected as a necessary correlate to a 
free and peaceful society. Where all groups are in balance, 
it is hypothesized, the abuse of power by any one group is 
2k 
thereby restrained. A contrary hypothesis could be 
posited here that "where strong combinations of groups, 
^^Arthur P, Bentley, The Process of Government 
(first published in I908; Chicago; University of Chicago 
Press; San Antonio, Texas; Principia Press of Trinity Uni­
versity, 1949), p. 272, 
^^David Easton, The Political System: An Inquiry 
into the State of Political Science"TNew York: Alfred A, 
Knopf, 1963), pT 2W, 
24 
Ibid., p. 294. 
18 
relatively equal in strength, have each poised against the 
other, this has usually been a sign of the threatened 
2 4 disintegration of the going political system. . , 
But for the moment we will accept the first hypothesis that 
greed must be balanced to be restrained. 
How do the groups adjust their power? Apparently 
each group will become as powerful as possible in order to 
gain as much as possible. Then there will be a give-and-take 
compromising adjustment. The collective bargaining situation 
offers a good model for this type of adjustment. Once the 
compromise is completed, according to the theory, a point 
of equilibrium is reached, the differences or conflict 
resolved, and stability restored. 
The model for this study will be a political system 
in which change is customarily produced not by violence, 
but by a government based for the most part upon political 
equality, popular sovereignty, popular consultation and 
majority rule. Citizens who are aware of their common 
interest form groups to coordinate consistent activity 
in an effort to gain favor from or control of government, 
the authoritative allocator of resources. 
Hypothesis and Methodology 
The hypothetical equilibrium condition of this model 
that will be reified for this study is an equilibrium where 
2%bid., p. 303. 
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the consumers and taxpayers groups are able to muster enough 
countervailing force to prevent the Montana Power Company 
from receiving a rate raise» 
It will be postulated that although potential inter­
est groups occasionally arise to oppose organized interests, 
unless they are helped, potential groups are rarely effec­
tive in routing the organized groups/ The rarity of their 
effectiveness means that they cannot be relied on to counter­
balance the activity of organized groups. 
Three reasons why these potential interest groups 
fail to mobilize effectively are apparent.' First, over­
lapping memberships, such as interlocking directorates, 
often hinder the rise of effective countervailing power 
more than they temper the actions of institutionalized power. 
As an example of this, it must be pointed out that the same 
multiple and overlapping memberships that prevent the Chamber 
of Commerce from favoring the rate raise also prevent it 
from opposing the rate raise,- The Chamber in this case is a 
political eunuch that cannot take a stand on either side of 
the issue if it wants to maintain internal harmony. It is 
dubious to argue, however, that the stalemate in this sit­
uation indicates a perfect balance of power." A stalemate 
favors the Montana Power Company because small business members 
of the Chamber of Commerce usually look to it for political 
leadership and action in their interests. If that action 
is effectively thwarLed, small businessmen will have to form 
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an organization outside of the framework of the Chamber to 
represent them by advocating low utility rates. The task of 
forming an extra organization is made more difficult because 
some small members of the business community believe that no 
extra organization is necessary in this instance. They 
think the Chamber will represent them as it has done in other 
matters. Also, some businessmen have already budgeted for 
Chamber of Commerce dues and are reluctant to give a new 
organization funds to do the job they expect the old one to 
do. And finally, even if businessmen do realize their 
interest in lower utility rates and the Chamber's inability 
to advocate them, they will be reluctant to participate in a 
new interest group because Montana Power might cancel its 
business with firms participating in anti-rate raise activities. 
Thus, the foregoing example also illustrates the 
second and third reasons why potential interest groups fail 
to mobilize,! Potential groups lie dormant because the 
interests of potential opponents are obscured by the or­
ganized groups and are not generally perceived by the op­
ponents (even though perception is sometimes possible).• 
Thirdly, the interests that are recognized by potential 
opponents of existing groups are often overshadowed by con­
flicting interests that destroy the incentive of the 
potential opponents to mobilize. 
To determine whether these assumptions about group 
action within the model are valid, documents and interviews 
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were obtained from members of the press, representatives of 
the Montana Power Company, its proponents and opponents, and 
representatives of Montana's Public Service Commissioners, 
The two-week rate hearing where Montana Power's requested 
increase was considered was also attended and some of the 
material presented there was included in this analysis. 
CHAPTER II 
THE MONTANA POWER COMPANY AND 
ITS REGULATOR 
The company will present its accounts as a record 
of established facts. And the representatives of 
the public will seldom be equipped to challenge the 
propriety of the items they contain. Upon occasion, 
certain items may be disallowed /in the rate base/. 
But such control, at best, is indirect and v;ea.k.̂  
At the beginning, the question arises: Why do some 
Montanans want to challenge the propriety of items in Montana 
Power's rate base, oppose utility rate increases, or "beat" 
the Company? For the answer, one must look to Montana 
Power's creation. 
Montana Power 
Creating an Electric Utility 
Montana Power was organized by the president of the 
Anaconda Copper Mining Company, John D. Ryan. Ryan entered 
the electric power business in August of I9O8 when he bought 
for $1,538,246.46 all the stock of the Great Falls Water Power 
and Townsite Company from Great Northern Railroad magnate 
Ĉlair Wilcox, Public Policies Toward Business 
(Chicago: Richard D. Irwin, 'Inc., 1955), pp. 520-521. 
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James J. 
With these power sites under his control, Ryan bar­
gained for low Anaconda Copper electric rates from the Butte 
Electric & Power Company, one of Montana's most successful 
electric producers, Butte Electric's general manager, 
Î , Turner, said that Ryan told him that unless an amalgama­
tion with Butte Electric could be arranged, Ryan, "would 
develop the Great Palls power, transmit it to Butte, do their 
/Anaconda Copper'£7 own power business, and . . . take on 
/residential̂  light business also."̂  
Concerned about possible competition, C, W, Wetraore, 
Butte Electric's President, requested Copper & Powelson, 
consulting engineers, to prepare an analysis of consolida­
tion. The Consultants said the commendable profit record of 
Butte Electric's general manager was "possible only because 
he has been able so fa.r to keep out competition and to 
ward off regulative legislation." To protect this monopoly 
situation, the consultants advised Butte Electric, "Ally 
yourself with the Ryan interest at once. , . ,Butte 
Electric followed this advice. In May, 1909, Ryan sold one-
2 Re The Montana Power Co., 57 P.U.R. (n.s,) at 207, 
n. 22 (Federal Power Commission, 19̂ 5)» 
3lbid.. p. 109. 
Îbld., p. 210 n. 26, quoting from December 31, 1908, 
report by Copper & Powelson, consulting engineers to Presi­
dent C, W, V/etmore of the Butte Electric & Power Company. 
Îbid., p. 209. 
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half of his stock in his Great Palls operation to the Butte 
Electric & Power Company for $2,500,000, of which $150,000 
was cash and the rest stocks and bonds of the Butte Company.̂  
Since one-half the original value of Great Palls Water 
Power was $750,000, Ryan's one-year profit from the trans­
action was $1,750,000. As a result of the transaction, Ryan 
also became the largest single stockholder in the two companies. 
His profits continued to increase when Butte Electric 
& Power merged with the Madison River Power Company, the 
Billings and Eastern Montana Power Company, and the Missouri 
River Electric and Power Company on December 12, 1912, to 
form the Montana Power Company, On the morning of consoli­
dation, common stock held by the owners of Butte Electric & 
Power and its subsidiaries was worth approximately $6,55̂ ,000. 
During the merger, it split four-to-one and each stockholder 
was issued four shares of 100-par Montana Power stock for 
each 100-par~value share of Butte Electric. Because of this 
transaction, the "on-paper" value of Montana Power stock was 
set at $26,217,000, of which $19,663,391.11 was self-created 
value or fictitious writeup.? 
Pour days after consolidation, Ryan took over as 
president of the Montana Power Company when the Butte Electric 
president retired because of illness. 
As president, Ryan further inflated Montana Power's 
worth by selling the company his remaining half of the Great 
Îbid.. p. /lO. Îbid., pp. 202-207. 
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Palls properties for $22,500,000 in common and preferred 
8 stock. The original cost of this half of the property was 
$750,000 when Ryan purchased it in i9o8. So its worth was 
inflated by $21,750,000 when he sold it five years later on 
February 11, 1913. 
On the same day in 1913, he sold for $5,000,000 in 
Montana Power stock the Thompson Falls and Pish Creek power 
sites that he had purchased two and one-half months earlier 
for $928,887.10 from the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Rail­
way, of which he was a director. Of course, the resulting 
$̂ ,071,112.90 of self-created value was included in the Com­
pany's rate base as the "original" acquisition cost of utility 
property.9 
"Original" Acquisition Costs 
in a Utility Rate Base 
The rate base is an accounting figure that represents 
the total value of all of a utility's property. State utility 
regulatory commissions ratify the value and thus the rate 
base of the utilities within their jurisdiction. The commis­
sions then allow a rate of return to the oivners of the utility 
on the value of the investment they have made. This means 
Îbid.. p. 207. 
Îbid,. p. 217, citing testimony of J. D, Ryan before 
the Interstate Commerce Commission in i926 (Federal Power 
Commission Docket No. IT-5825, Exhibit No, 145, 1944). See 
also. The People's Voice, April 28, 1944, p. 1, and issues 
of The People's Voice from March 31 to May 26, 19̂ 4, and 
Howard, loc. cit.. pp. 338-3̂ 0 for reports on these Montana 
Power overvaluations. 
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that the utility can charge enough for its product to cover 
costs of operation and to pay the stockholders a profit. If 
either the rate base or the rate of return can be increased, 
more profit will accrue to the investors, 
Ryan increased the "original" acquisition cost of 
utility property and thus the rate base by selling his own 
property to himself for more than it was worth. He also in­
creased the rate base by neglecting to retire property from 
the rate base which was no longer used by the Company, All 
totaled, the series of write-ups pumped at least $̂ 6,891,597.̂ 1 
of "water" into Montana Power's capital structure. 
This amount includes write-ups occurring in 1892, 
1899» and 1901 when through reorganization and exchange of 
securities Butte Electric & Power, the immediate predecessor 
of Montana Power, increased book assets by #2,605,795.89 
without increasing the real value of the Company's property. 
Commenting on the suggestion that the books of Butte Elec­
tric' s predecessor be stamped over and used by the reorganized 
company, Butte Electric's C.P.A., H, A. Niles, advised, 
"Entirely new books should be opened for the new company. 
You have deliberately watered the stock of the company and 
therefore you should . , . prevent reference to the old 
books. 
Once the rate base was watered and thus inflated, the 
^̂ Re The Montana Power Go., 57 P.U.R. (n.s.) at 235. 
^̂ Re The Montana Power Co., 57 P.U.R. (n.s.) at 202 
and 203, 
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consumer had to pay a higher electric bill that included a 
rate of return to the Company for money that was never really 
spent to enhance the service given. The extra amount that 
customers had to pay is illustrated in the following example. 
Suppose that the state regulatory commission allowed 
electric utilities a six per cent return on their investment. 
If a utility increased its rate base or the net worth of its 
investment by $̂ 6,891,597.̂ 1, the consumers would have their 
light bills increased enough so the Company could receive 
$2,813,496 each year as profit on the investment (rate base 
of $46,891,597 times the rate of return of six per cent). 
But if the capital investment was never in reality made to 
build more electric generating or transmitting facilities, 
the consumer would be paying for something he never received. 
The fact that Montana consumers were being overcharged 
was not generally known until Mr, Ryan's efforts to pyramid 
Montana Power's assets finally attracted the attention of 
Federal Power Commission (PPC) auditors who were enforcing 
12 the Federal Power Act of 1935. The 1935 Act was the cul­
mination of a resolution first introduced into the United 
13 States Senate in 1927 by Thomas J, Walsh of Montana. 
After it was amended, the Walsh resolution authorized the 
Federal Trade Commission (PTC) to investigate the electric 
12 U.S . ;  Codes Annotated, c, I6, sec. 301  (a ) ,  
l̂ U.S,, Congress, Sena.te, S.R. 83. 70th Cong,, 
1st Sess,, 1927. 
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power trust. Investigating utilities from 1928 to 1932, 
the FTC brought to light more than one and one-half billion 
1'+ dollars of watered electric company stock. At the time 
of this investigation, the Montana Power Company refused to 
let the PTC look at its books. To correct such evasion and 
other improprieties 5 Congress passed the Federal Power Act 
of 1935, requiring the Federal Power Commission to enforce the 
use of proper accounting methods by the nation's electric 
1s utilities. During the next nine years the PPC discovered 
$̂ 00f000,000 in inflated values in U.S. utilities. Most of 
this was dropped from the respective rate bases without 
opposition from the utilities involved and even without a 
hearing. 
Investigation of Montana Power began in 19̂ 1 and 19̂ 2 
when the field staff of the Federal Power Commission made an 
extensive reclassification study of the Company's books, 
records and documents. The Public Service Commissions of 
Idaho and Montana were invited to participate in this 
reclassification study. The Idaho Commission did not 
^̂ Re The Montana Power Co., 57 P.U.R. (n.s.) at 195. 
•̂̂ The People's Voice, April 7, 1944, p. 1; Ernest 
Gruening, The Public Pays . . . and Still Pays : A Study of 
Power Propaganda (2d. ed. rev.; New York: The Vanguard 
Press, Inc., 19̂ 4), pp. 3-17; Burton K. Wheeler and Paul F. 
Healy, Yankee from the West (New York: Doubleday & Co., 
1962), pp. 306̂ :31̂ . 
1 A The People's Voice, April 7, 1944, p. 2, and Re The 
Montana Power Co., 57 P.U.R. (n.s.) at 196. 
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respond to the PPG's offer, and the Montana Commission sait? 
it would be unable to participate because of lack of 
appropriations.̂  ̂ The reclassification study culminated on 
March 27, 1944, when the PPG began seven weeks of hearings 
in Butte, Montana, by asking the Company to "show cause" why 
it should not be required to eliminate $53 million in excess 
capitalization and fictitious writeups from its rate base by 
adopting the bona fide "original cost" of utility property 
accounting provided for in the Federal Power Act of 1935. 
PPC attorney Reuben Goldberg also asked for reclassification 
of $6,000,000 that was in the Company plant accounts. At the 
federal agency's invitation, the Montana Railroad and Public 
Service Commission, which has jurisdiction over the rates 
charged by Montana Power, sat jointly with the PPC in these 
hearings. The two commissions maintained independent rules 
for the acceptance of evidence, however. This independence 
was exhibited when the PPG examiner, John J, O'Neill, ruled 
that the Butte Electric stock split was irrelevant evidence 
and did not increase the original $6,55̂ ,000 cost of the 
utility's facilities, 
"The same plant and property was there in the after­
noon /after the consolidationT" as was there in the morning 
/before consolidation/ and the same people owned it," he 
l̂ Re The Montana Power Co., 57 P.U.R, (n.s.) at 196. 
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said, 
The Montana Public Service Commission Chairman, 
Austin B. Middleton, whose son-in-law, Kendrick Smith, was 
a Company counsel at the hearing, disagreed with the PPG 
examiner, Middleton accepted Montana Power's estimate of 
its worth after the merger as admissable testimony and a 
valid determination of utility investment. Because Middle-
ton's decision has never been changed, Montana consumers 
have had to continue paying a return to the Company for money 
that was never really spent to enhance the service given. 
The Montana Public Service Commission disagreed with 
the PPC on a number of other matters. In its reclassification 
order, the Montana Commission said, "The evidence clearly 
shows that the transactions were hard-fought and at arm's 
19 length. , , ," Furthermore, the Commission said, "Ryan 
and his associates did not devote any property to a public 
use" before the final transactions with the utility com-
20 
panies involved. And since the Montana Commission ruled 
that the "original cost of the property is defined by the 
system of accounts as the cost to the persons first devoting 
it to public use," Montana Power was allowed to retain in its 
rate base part of what the federal commission considered 
l Ĥoward, loc. cit., p. 339, quoting John J, O'Neill, 
assistant chief accountant in the Federal Power Commission's 
division of original cost, 
^̂ Re The Montana Power Co.. ̂ 6 P.U.R, (n.s.) at 224 
(Montana Railroad and Public Service Commission, 19̂ 4), 
Ẑ Ibid,, p. 219. See also p. 213. 
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"water," In defense of this classification, the Montana 
Commission said: 
The Federal Power Commission staff, in reaching its 
conclusions, disregarded state laws; and their /sic/brief 
argues that the Federal Power Act supersedes state law. 
We do not believe that this Federal Agency has the right 
to disregard state laws. ... We consider this a fund­
amental question of states rights, and we cannot agree 
with a Federal agency which refuses to recognize a 
transaction carried out under state law,2l 
The Montana Commission did ask Montana PoweaMfo write 
22 
off some $28,793,̂ 95*33 of its excess rate bass, however. 
In part, this decision was based not on the original cost of 
utility property but on the difference between the par-value 
of stock and_ the actual market value a.t the time of stock 
issuance. For example, in the Thompson Falls power sites 
deal, John D. Ryan received ̂ 0,000 shares of $100 per share • 
par-value common stock in the Montana Power Company, Because 
of dividend restrictions, however, this stock was worth only 
$35 per share. The Montana Commission ruled that |65 of 
each $100 worth of this stock issued "represents stock . , . 
for which no value was received and, therefore, the amount 
of $3,250,000 must be placed in Account 10? and disposed 
of. , , ."23 
Except for Montana Power's Mystic Lake properties, 
the Federal Power Commission and the Montana Public Service 
21lbid., p. 206. A recent U.S. Supreme Court ruling 
in Northwestern Electric Go. v. Federal Power Comm'n,, 321 
U.S. 119, held that state law is not controlling. 
^̂ Ibid.. p, 237. ^̂ Ibid.. p. 236. 
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Commission have agreed on the value of Company plant addi­
tions and retirements since 1944. But the Montana Commis­
sion's 1944 decision still accounts in part for the current 
#21.6 million difference in utility plant valuations made by 
the Montana Public Service Commission and the Federal Power 
*?ll Commission, In addition to disagreeing on the original 
acquisition cost of the utility, the two commissions use 
different formulas to determine the value of utility property. 
"Fair Value" and Reproduction 
Cost New in a Utility Rate Base 
The Federal Power Commission uses the original cost 
depreciated rate base to determine utility value. This is 
the original cost of the property plus the cost of improve­
ments less the accrued depreciation shovm on the utility 
? 5 books from year to year," In other words, the original 
cost (OC) of property is what it cost the utility to build 
its plant or purchase its land. The original cost depreci­
ated (CCD) is what the original plant and property are worth 
after they have been in use. A utility's OCD gets smaller 
as its plant gets older and its machinery wears out. There­
fore, as time passes, any rate base will ̂ et smaller if it 
is determined by using a utility's original cost depreciated. 
9h Montana Power Co., 196? Report to Stockholders, 
p. 14- (Montana Public Service Commission accounting] com­
pared to p. 16 (Federal Power Commission accounting). 
•̂̂ U.S., Federal Power Commission, Statistics of 
Privately Owned Electric Utilities in the United States, 
196b, pp. 651-653. 
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Thirty states and the District of Columbia have joined 
the FPC in its use of the original cost depreciated rate base. 
Montana is one of 13 states that still uses the so-called 
"fair value" system of determining rate bases, 
Montana's "fair value" is arrived at by adding a per­
centage of the original cost of the property depreciated to 
a percentage of the reproduction cost new depreciated. This 
figure is added to one-half the value of the company's 
materials and supplies (inventory)» Also, in place of work­
ing capital permitted by some commissions, Montana allows 
the reserve that has been accrued through accelerated depre­
ciation to be included in the rate base. Reproduction cost 
new (RCN) is what it would cost a utility to build its 
original plant today. Reproduction cost new depreciated 
(RCND) is what the utility would be worth today if it had 
been originally built at today's prices and the plant had 
been allowed to depreciate until today. 
Reproduction cost valuation is accomplished by making 
plant valuations change to correspond with the changes in 
construction costs. For example, if a company was valued 
at $10 million in 1930 and construction costs doubled by 
^̂ Michigan uses average net investment to figure 
utility rate bases. Four states, Minnesota, Nebraska, South 
Dakota, and Texas, do not have commissions authorized to 
regulate electric utilities. The recently established com­
missions in Alaska and Hawaii have not established firm 
policies yet. U,S., Congress, Senate Committee on Government 
Operations, State Utility Commissions, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1967, Senate Doc. '56, insert VII. Cited hereinafter as Senate, 
State Utility Commissions, I967. 
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1970, the company would be revalued at #20 million, the rate 
base inflated, and the investors paid a rate of return on 
$10 million they never really invested. 
The rate base or method of valuating a utility's 
property should not be confused with the operating costs 
that a utility incurs while paying for its labor or adver­
tising, while paying taxes, or while maintaining and repair­
ing its plant. Operating costs are not included in the rate 
base, which is the total value of a utility's property. A 
utility, however, is allowed to charge the customer for all 
of its operating costs. The use of either the reproduction 
cost new or the original cost depreciated methods of calcu­
lating a rate base will have no effect upon the utility's 
ability to pay its operating expenses. Operating costs a.re 
figured independently from rate bases (value of utility 
plant). A utility should, be allowed a rate of return only 
on its rate base and not on its costs of operation. These 
costs of operation are completely paid for by the consumers. 
Those who support reproduction cost valuation say 
that it is needed to keep earnings in regulated industries 
in line with those in other industries and with cost of 
living changes. 
They say that stockholders expect to see their invest­
ments grow over time, at least at the rate of inflation. 
Those who oppose reproduction cost valuation say that the 
"change in construction costs index" used to figure RCN is 
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not the same as the "change in cost of living index," 
Furthermore, they contend that, under RON valuation, divi­
dends on common stock rise more than prices do. Public 
utility expert, Clair Wilcox, explains how this can happen: 
Assume a company with a valuation of $10 million and a 
return of 6 per cent, producing earnings of #600,000. 
On $3 million of bonds at 4 per cent, it pays $120,000. 
On $3 million of preferred stock at ̂  per cent, it pays 
$150,000, It has 1330,000 left. On $4 million of com­
mon stock, it can pay % per cent. Assume that the 
price level doubles. The company is revalued at #20 
million* With its return still at 6 per cent, it now 
earns $1,200,000. It still pays #̂ 70,000 on its bonds 
and its preferred stock /because interest on bonds or 
dividends on preferred stock do not change as prices 
change/. But it now has $930,000 left for its common. 
This gives it a yield of 23% per cent. Prices have 27 
doubled, but dividends on common stock have tripled. 
In 1966, as Table 3 illustrates, the return to Montana 
Power stockholders on their equity was 17.7 per cent. Only 
two other U.S, electric utilities granted a higher return on 
common stock equity in i966 than did Montana Power. In 
addition, "the value of the stock in The Montana Power 
Company increased five times in the years 1950-60," according 
27 Wilcox, loc. cit.. p. 529. See also the dissent in 
Southwestern Bell Tel. Go. v. Public Serv. Comm'n., 262 U.S. 
276, 305 (1923) where Justice Brandeis writes, "To follow a 
reproduction-cost-new rate base, especially in times of 
inflation, is to take no cognizance of the immense resulting 
windfall to stockholders arising from the fact that the 
interest obligation on the bonds remains static." 
^̂ Federal Power Commission, Statistics of Pri­
vately Owned Electric Utilities in the United States. 1966, 
pp. 655-656. 
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29 to evidence accepted by the Monta:ia Supreme Court. 
TABLE 3 
MONTANA POWER'S RATE OP RETURN ON 
COMMON STOCK EQUITŶ  
1965 1966 1967 
Montana Power rate of return on 
Common equity . . 17.7̂  17>7% 16.4̂  
Number of major electric utilities 
paying a higher return than 
3 2 8 
Number of companies compared in 
above ranking 204 205 207 
T̂he FPC offers the following clarification about 
this data: "The presentation of the rates of return on 
common equ_ity is not intended_̂ as an evaluation of the reason­
ableness /or unreasonablenes£7 of the returns under the appli­
cable regulatory standards," However, they do serve as a 
useful and valid comparison between companies since the cri­
terion they are figured on is standardized by the PPG for 
all companies. U.So, Federal Power Comm'n., Statistics of 
Privately Owned Electric Utilities in the United States 
(1966 and 1967")', pp. 655'-̂  ̂
Montana consumers have opposed this rate of return to 
Montana Power's investors, because not only is the return 
high, but most of it goes out of state. Only 13.7 per cent 
Ĉascade County Consumers Ass'n. v. Public Serv. 
Comm'n. , 1% Mont. I69, iTJI One share of Montana F̂ er 
stock purchased for $17.50 in 19̂ 9 could be sold for #78 in 
1959—before the stock split three-for-one. Immediately 
after the split, the price dropped to $22 per share. Then 
the market price rose to a high of $45*37 per share in 1965. 
Three shares (originally bought as one for $17.50 before 
the stock split) could now be sold for $136.11—a 778 per 
cent profit in 16 years. Due to the recently depressed market, 
the price of Montana Power common stock fluctuated around 
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of Montana Power's stock is owned by Montanans.̂  ̂ And the 
dividends paid to out-of-state stockholders shrinlc Montana's 
disposable personal income and thus lower the buying power of 
its inhabitants by at least $7 million. 
Some Montana consumers contend that such high monopoly 
earnings may be kept in line with prices by varying the rate 
of return without manipulating the rate base. In Wilcox's 
example, earnings were raised from $600,000 to #1,200,000 
by raising the rate base from #10 million to #20 million and 
keeping the rate of return constant at six per cent. Wilcox 
points out that a utility could have gotten the same increase 
in earnings by leaving the rate base at $10 million and 
raising the rate of return to 12 per cent. A public utility 
would not allow its earnings to be increased in this way, 
says Wilcox, "Public opinion would be outraged if the rate 
of return to investors in regulated industries were doubled. 
, , But it does not complain when the 'same effect is 
achieved through revaluation," because valuation is a mystery 
$26 a share in June of 1970. Earnings per share (which are 
not to be confused with dividends per share which are less 
than the earnings since not all of the earnings are paid out 
but some retained) increased from 98 cents per share in 19̂ 5 
to $3»85 per share in 1958 when the stock split three-for-
one. Since 1970, after-the-stock-split earnings are esti­
mated to be $2.50 per share, the earnings per 19̂ 5 share have 
gone from $.98 in 19̂ 5 to #7.50 in 1970. Data from Standard 
& Poor's Corporation, Standard Listed Stock Reports, and 
Moody's Investors Service, Inc., Moody's Public Utility Manual 
(New York: Moody's Investors Service, 1927-69), 
^̂ Letter from Colin W. Raff, vice president of The 
Montana Power Co,, July 15, 1966, 
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to the public and "it does not realize what is going on. 
It is indeed hard to find out how a "fair value" rate 
base is set in Montana. As was stated previously, "fair 
value" is arrived at by adding a percentage of the OCD to 
a percentage of RCND, Exactly what percentages of the OCD 
and the RCND are to be used is not clear under Montana law. 
According to W, M. Johnson, auditor for the Public 
Service Commission of Montana: 
There is no mathematical formula for determining fair 
value. The commission arrives at a fair value deter­
mination as a matter of judgment, after carefully con­
sidering a.ll the valuation elements mentioned above.32 
The elements which the Commission considers in addition to 
RCND and OC are prudent investment theory and certain public 
records. 
The Courts "Legislate" 
a Utility Rate Base 
The RCND guidelines were determined not by the Montana 
legislature but by the Montana Supreme Court. The guidelines 
evolved when the Montana legislature empowered the Commission 
to determine property values. The law specifically provides: 
The Commission may, in its discretion, investigate 
and ascertain the value of the property of every 
public utility actually used and useful for the con­
venience of the public. In making such investigation 
the Commission may avail itself of all information 
contained in the assessment rolls of various counties, 
^̂ Wilcox, loc. cit. 
^̂ Letter from W. M. Johnson, auditor, Montana 
Public Service Comm'n,, April 10, 1§69 
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and the public records of the various branches of the 
state government, or any other information obtain­
able, and the Commission may at any time of its own 
initiative make a revaluation of such property 
/emphasis added/. 
This legislative mandate says nothing about "fair value" or 
original cost methods of valuation. The law does not say 
that the Commission must consider "fair value" and it does 
not say that it cannot. The Montana Supreme Court has ruled, 
however, that the Commission must relate rates to the finding 
of "fair value," The Court said; 
While our statute does not establish a formula for 
arriving at fair value, it does require such value 
be found and used as the base in fixing rates. The 
reasonableness and justness of the rateg must be 
related to this finding of fair value,̂  
This legislation by the Court has evolved from the 
19̂ 0 Tobacco River Power Co, v. Public Service Comm'n. 
35 decision. The circumstances leading to this decision 
started on July 7, 1936, when, after a hearing, the Montana 
Public Service Commission ordered the Tobacco River Power 
Company in Eureka, Montana, to lower electric rates charged 
its 225 customers. Upon seeing that its rate base was not 
big enough to justify the rates, the Tobacco River Power 
Company invested in an electricity-producing diesel engine 
^̂ Montana, Revised Codes (19̂ +7), sec, 7O-IO6, 
34 State ex rel. Olsen v. Public Serv. Comm'n,, 131 
Mont. 272, 2TB~( 195717 
35 Tobacco River Power Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n., 
109 Mont. 521, 98 P. 2d '886 (1̂ 0), 
1̂-0 
so that its rate base (investment) would increase. It 
then asked the Montana District Court to enjoin the rate 
schedule set by the Public Service Commission and to order the 
Public Service Commission to set a new schedule figured on 
the new base and upon reproduction cost new less depreciation. 
The schedule was enjoined and the Public Service Commission 
appealed to the Montana Supreme Court, 
The Supreme Court observed that 
considerable latitude is allowed the Public Service 
Commission in determining value. Neither the Public 
Service Commission nor the utility company is limited 
to or bound by any particular method in arriving at 
the solution of the question of value. 
Since nobody was limited to 8.ny particular method of 
ascertaining value, the Supreme Court said, the utility could 
use "fair value" if it wanted to. Indeed, the Court ruled: 
The cost of reproduction new, less depreciation, is 
usually regarded as one of the most important, if 
not the dominant factor, in the determination of 
value (51GJ17).37 
The Montana Supreme Court upheld the lower court's 
injunction and ordered the Public Service Commission to con­
duct a new hearing. Ironically, this ruling has had the 
effect of limiting the Commission's freedom in determining 
utility value. The ruling meant that the utility could de­
termine its ov.Ti method of valuation and the Commission 
^̂ Tobacco River Power Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n.. 
109 Mont. 521, 529. 
37lbid., p. 530. 
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would have to accept that method and apply it subject to the 
rules of inspection the Court outlined for determining 
reproduction cost new. Since the Public Service Commission 
had to accept the utility's method of valuation, the utility 
could, to a large degree, regulate itself,The Montana 
courts have had difficulty reconciling the two mutually 
contradictory principles that evolved from the remedy in 
the Tobacco River Case, In one statement the Montana 
Supreme Court has ruled: 
The language of the statute is clear that the Com­
mission shall determine "the value of the property 
of every public utility actually used and useful 
for the convenience of the public" 2®mphasis by 
the CourtTT This30urt has previously determined 
that this means the present fair value of the utility's 
property /citing Tobacco Hiver Case/. 
And then in the very next statement the Court said; 
Neither the Public Service Commission nor the utility 
company is limited to nor bound by any particular 
method in prriving at the solution of the question 
of value. 
This is rhetoric, of course, since the ruling in 
the first statement makes the situation described in the 
second statement impossible to achieve. Writing in the 
Montana Law Review. James V. Bottomly comments on the Court's 
Âlthough the Commission believes it has to use the 
so-called "fair value" to establish a rate base, it does not 
have to include everything the utilities request in the base. 
The Commission has not allowed the utilities to include non­
productive gas leases and other things that the utilities 
would have liked in the rate base. See Cascade County Con-
sumers Ass 'n. v. Public Serv. Comm.'n., l44 Mont, I69 {196T), 
^̂ State ex rel, 01sen v. Public Serv, Comm'n,, 
131 Mont. 272, 27b, 309 P. 2d 1035~TW7). 
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inconsistency. 
How or why the imperative shall is read into the per­
missive may of the statute is never explained by the • 
court. It is submitted . , . that the court should at 
least treat the matter with consistency. Only two 
pages later in answer to the contention of the pro­
testant that Revised Codes of Montana, 19̂ 7, section 
7O-IO6, makes it incumbent upon the commission to make 
an independent investigation of its own /and not blindly 
accept Company testimony without doublechecking it7 
before increasing rates, thê court stated that the 
statute was permissive only. 
The fact that utilities believe the Commission is in 
reality limited in its method of determining value is illus­
trated by the following assumptions made in Montana Power's 
utility rate increase arguments: 
Montana law requires, however, that Applicant /Montana 
Power/ be allowed a fair rate of return on the "present 
fair value" of its property used and useful in its 
utility business. The law does not relate a fair rate 
of return to depreciated original cost 
He /rate expert for the consumers/ justifies the above 
with mystic calculus formulas and then frosts the cake 
by recommending a fair rate of return based upon net 
original cost rate base, which this Commission is barred 
by law from applying.̂ 2" 
The Montana Public Service Commission adheres to the 
utilities' interpretation. Commissioner Louis G. Boedecker 
has said that because of the Tobacco River decision, "the 
^̂ James V. Bottomly, "The 'Pair value' Test in Montana 
Public Utility Rate Regulation," Montana Law Review, XXII, 
No. 1 (Pall, i960), p. 71. 
4l Montana Power Co,, Applicant's Brief, Re The 
Montana ̂ wer Co., Docket No. 5698 (Montana R.R. & Pub. 
Serv. CormiFii., 1968), p, 36, 
Ẑlbid., p. 53. 
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Commission must use the present fair value of the utilities' 
property. 
Strangely enough, the Court seems to disavow its own 
legislative function in requiring the so-called "fair value" 
rate base to be used in Montana. It said: 
This Court has pointed out that it is a legislative 
function to regulate public utilities and that the 
legislature can do so through an administrative agency. 
Too that the acts of this agency are legislative and 
not judicial. 
And: 
The elected officials of the Commission . . . are 
accountable ... to the people only, . . . and this 
court will not interfere so long as they follow the 
law. . . . The forum in which their actions are to be 
judged is in the minds and consciences of the people, 
whose servants they are, and who alone can hold them 
responsible. . , ,̂ 5 
The Court, of course, as well as the people, has 
held the Public Service Commission accountable for its actions. 
In so doing, the Court has exercised legislative authority. 
On the other hand, the Commission has made judicial as well 
as legislative decisions while regulating utilities. To 
deny it, as the Court seems to want to do, only muddles the 
political picture. And the system of checks and balances 
does not require such self-deception. Indeed the system 
of checks and balances may be enhanced by a realistic 
^̂ Address by Louis G. Boedecker, "Public Utility Rate 
Increases and Consumer Protection," Montana Farmer-Labor 
Institute, Missoula, Montana, February 1, 1970, p. 9. 
^̂ Cascade County Consumers Ass'n. v. Public Serv. 
Comm'n., 144 Mont. 1̂ 1̂92~TÎ9̂ . 
43lbid.. at 193. 
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appraisal of the political picture. Then the proper functions 
of government will not be as clouded by contradictory legal 
rhetoric. The fact that the Court has legislated a guide­
line that limits the Commission's determination of utility 
value should be seen clearly. Whether or not that guideline 
is proper or even constitutional, however, are questions 
that are still open to debate. 
Consumers Want So-called 
"Fair Value" Abolished 
The consumer advocates, for example, contend that so-
called "fair value" should not be used in Montana. They say 
that in Maryland, Michigan, Nevj Jersey, Oregon, and Washing­
ton statutes that require the use of fair value in rate base 
valuation are ignored in recent court decisions that usually 
have been based on depreciated original cost. In some of 
these states, the old reproduction cost new concept of "fair 
value" has been discarded because the courts have accepted 
original cost depreciated figures as a valid method of deter-
mining "fair values," Also, in arguing against a rate 
increase granted to the Montana Power Company in 1969 the 
utility opponents said: 
The Commission's Order No. 3295 utilizes as its 
basis the Tobacco River Case, . . . which in fact 
relies upon an I898 decision of the United States 
^̂ Senate, State Utility Commissions, I967, 
insert VII. 
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Supreme Court which is not the law of the United ̂  
States at this time, and has not been since 19̂ 1. ' 
So-called "fair value" was required by the 1898 
Supreme Court to obtain a fair return on the value of 
property in Smyth v, Ames. This method of valuation was 
originally intended to protect utility consumers from valuation 
claims based on inflated prices of the past—claims, for 
example, like those made by John D. Ryan about the inflated 
worth of Montana Power. As the United States Supreme Court 
has pointed out: 
Those were the days before state legislation prohibited 
the issue of public utility securities without authori­
zation from state officials; before accounting was pre­
scribed and supervised; when outstanding bonds and 
stocks were hardly an indication of the amount of capi­
tal embarked in the enterprise; when depreciation 
accounts were unknown; and when book values, or property 
accounts, furnished no trustworthy evidence either of 
cost or real value. Estimates of reproduction cost were 
then offered, largely as a means, either of supplying 
lacks in the proofs of actual cost and investment, or of 
testing the credibility of evidence adduced or showing 
that the cost of installation had been wasteful. ̂  
With the advent of modern accounting and record keep­
ing procedures, the Supreme Court overruled Smyth v. Ames 
Ĉ.W. Leaphart, Jr., _et al., Montana Consumers' 
Council, Protestants' Petition for Rehearing, Re The Montana 
Power Go., Docket No. 5̂ 98 (Montana R.R. & Pub. Serv. Comm'n., 
Î9WT, p. 2. 
48smyth v. Ames. I69 U.S. #6 (I898). 
ziq 
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n.. 
262 U.S. 276 (1923)1 For an excellent understanding of the 
difficulty inherent in reproduction cost new valuation see 
cross examination by and testimony by Mr. George P. Hess, 
Montana Public Service Commission expert in Docket No. 5698. 
4-6 
in Federal Power Commission v, Hope Natural Gas Company. 
The utilities clung to the "fair value" rate base whenever 
they could, however, because the economy had shifted from 
depression to inflation. When prices rise during inflation, 
so does reproduction cost new and the "fair value" rate base, 
which is figured from reproduction cost new, Montana has 
continued to valuate utility property using the "fair value" 
rate base because the Montana Supreme Court has ruled that 
Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Ga,s Company did not 
<1 change the law in the state. 
Montana Power Return on 
Net Plant Investment 
Because the Montana Public Service Commission con­
tinues to use a different rate base (fair value) than the 
Federal Power Commission (original cost depreciated), the two 
commissions quite naturally arrive at different rates of re­
turn actually accruing on utility investment. In I967, as 
Table 4 will show, the FPC calculated that the Montana Power 
Company was receiving a 10.66 per cent return on net electric 
^̂ Federal Power Comm'n. v. Hope Natural Gas Go., 320 
U.S. 591, 88 L, Ed. 333 (19̂ 2). Prior to the Hope case, four 
states used original cost or prudent investment as the rate 
base (Massachusetts, California, Wisconsin, a,nd possibly 
Washington). During the ten years following the decision, 
19 states explicitly changed from fair value to original 
cost or prudent investment, and eight more employed original 
cost as the measure of fair value. Joseph R, Rose, "The Hope 
Case and Public Utility Valuation in the States," Columbia 
Law Review, LIV (195̂ ), 190-212. 
^̂ State ex rel. 01sen v. Public Serv. Comm'n., supra, 
note 39; Cascade County Consumers Ass'n. v. Public Serv, 
Comm'n., 1% Mont. lo9, 39̂  P, 2d 856 (1964), cert, denied 
table 4 
PERCENTAGE RATES OF RETURN ON NET ELECTRIC PLANT INVESTMENT̂  
(All rates of return are calculated on net electric plant investirient) 
Year̂  1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 196? 
Montana Power's Rate 
of Return 9.78̂  10.12$ 10.24% 10.92# 11.37̂  11.33# 10.66# 
Rank of Montana 
Power's Rate Corn= 
pared with Rates of 
Major Companies 6/183 3 / 1 Û Ô  3/l87 2/138 3/192 3//f9 3 / ^ ? y  
: : fr 
-c 
The F?C offers the following clarification about this data: "It should 
be noted that this review of rates of return as calculated by the Commission's 
staff is not intended as an evaluation of the reasonableness of the earnings of 
any electric utility company under the applicable State or local regulatory 
standards. In many jurisdictions the statutory rate base differs fron; that used 
in the present calculations. Also, the treatment of income taxes differs among 
the various jurisdictions, as does the treatment of certain other elements of 
cost of service," However, they do serve as a useful and valid comparison between 
companies since the criterion they are figured on is standardized by the FPC for 
all companies. Source: U.S. Federal Power Commission, Statistics of Privately 
Owned Electric Utilities in the United States (1963-196777'PP• 651-Ô53» 
P̂rior to 1961 Montana Power's percentage return on net electric plant 
investment was: I960, 9.4#; 1959, 9.2#; 1958, 9.3#; 1957, 9.1#; 1956, 9.7#. 
Source: Ronnie J. Straw, A Report on Overcharges of 38 Major Electric Utilities, 
based on Statistics of Electric Utilities (Privately Owned) in the United 
States ) Fed era 1 P o w er Commission, 1 955-6D ( V: a s hingt on, " D. C. : Rati. iiicT" Rural 
Electric Cooperative Association, 1963), pp. 6, 7, and 1f. 
TABLE 4 (Cont'd.) 
Year 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 
Aggregate Average 
Rate of Return of 
Major Companies 6.96% 7.08; 7.33#f 7.39$c 7.42^ 7.44$ 
Major Companies 192 192 187 187 1 86 187 199 
Number of Companies 
with a Rate of 
Return above 
10 Per Cent 4 3 3 
/ 
6 5 7 8 
Per Cent of Companies 
with a Rate of 
Return above 
10 Per Cent 2.2$ 1,6% 1.6$ 3.2^ 2,1% 3.7$ 4.2^ 
M̂edian rate of return. 
See also, Owen Ely, "Financial News and Comment: Frank Chutter 
Reviews State Rate Regulation," Public Utilities Fortnightly (January 3, 1963)j 
p, 49; Arnold H, Hirsch, "Effective Rate Regulationj Pact or Fiction?" Public 
Power (May 1962), pp. 11-13, for different method of calculating rate of return 
that all show Montana to allow a larger rate of return than any other state* 
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plant investment—the third highest rate of return in the 
nation. At the same time, the Montana Public Service 
Commission reported the Company had a 5»21 per cent rate of 
return on a "fair value" electric rate base of $296,950,000,-̂  ̂
By federal standards, Montana Power was enjoying a 
prosperous year despite the fact that a copper strike had 
reduced company revenue, and the state legislature had 
decided to start daylight savings time in 1967. The Company's 
10.66 per cent return was well above the near 6 per cent 
63 return usually prescribed by law. The actual rate of 
return, however, usually averages more than that which is 
legally valid. In 1967, the I89 major U.S. electric utilities 
had an average rate of return on net plant investment of 7.44 
52 Montana Railroad and Public Service Comm'n., Order 
No. 3296. Re The Montana Power Co., Docket No. ̂ 698 (January 30, 
19691TP'. 
^̂ The legally prescribed rate of return reported by 
state public service commissions averaged 6.14 per cent in 
1966—the last year for which figures a.re available—ac­
cording to Senate, State Utility Commissions, 196?, p. 25. 
The 6 per cent prescribed rate of return figure may 
be revised upward if utilities are forced to continue borrow­
ing at the current 8§ per cent interest rate. At present 
the overall interest most utilities pay to service their 
borrowed capital is still below 6 per cent because many of 
their bond financing projects were launched during the de­
pression when interest rates were substantially below 6 per 
cent. According to E, W, Clemens, Economics and Public 
Utilities (New York: Appleton-Century-Groft, Inc., 1950), 
pp. 105 and 108, there had been, "a steady decline in cost 
of utility bond financing from per cent in 1921 to 
less than 6 per cent in 1922, with a gradual and continuous 
decline thereafter to less than 5 per cent as late as 1931. 
From 1921 to 1924, the simple average yield of new public 
utility interest-bearing securities dropped below that of 
other utilities (excluding railroads) by one-half of one per 
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per cent. And Montana Power's rate of return was well 
above this average. 
Long-term - low-interest financing can increase rate 
of return.—Theoretically, this rate of return should be set 
to allow utilities to meet obligations on old financing and 
to attract capital to finance new expansion at current 
(inflated or deflated) rates of interest. But if a utility 
does little expanding and does not have to refinance its 
current debt at .a higher interest rate, it will not need more 
money to service its long-term capital since it may continue 
to pay the old rate of return until the bonds expire. A 
utility, as any business, will finance at the lowest rate 
possible and will generally finance through long-term 
investments, bonds, preferred stock, etc., only when the 
rate is low. It will finance using short-term investments 
during a time of high interest rates and then liquidate the 
short-term investment in favor of long-term investment as 
soon as the interest rate drops. Montana Power, for example, 
cent or more," Despite the fact that interest was lower on 
utility securities than on other securities, the demand for 
utility securities increased. This was due not only to the 
fact that utility securities were secure, but also to the 
fact that new laws were adopted permitting savings banks to 
invest in utility securities. 
-̂ It should be noted here that if company insiders are 
in a position to invest in the company, there may be little 
incentive for company managers to finance at the lowest pos­
sible rate. Instead, they may try to sell bonds or stock to 
company insiders at as high a rate as possible, thus insuring 
themselves a high rate of return on their investment, often 
for a very long period. Some stockbrokers, for example, 
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issued |30 million in four-year bonds that will mature in 
19?̂ . Therefore, a utility like Montana Power that is 
granted a rate increase to cover current interest rates might 
soon find that it no longer needs that much money to service 
its capital because it has refinanced at a lower rate. 
When refinancing occurs, the utility is rarely asked to 
reduce its rates and the "extra" money continues to accrue 
in company coffers. This "extra" money is not always paid 
to company stockholders. In I968, for example, the nation's 
private electric utilities paid out only 70 per cent of the 
earnings they had available for the servicing of common stock 
equity.This left them with a retained earned surplus of 
wondered why Montana Power did not wait for a month or so 
for interest rates to decline before issuing its last bonds. 
Perhaps the answer lies in the fact that Montana Power could 
obtain after-the-rate-raise justification for its increase 
by financing at higher interest rates. In addition, Company 
insiders could make good money by investing in Montana Power 
securities. And all this manipulation would not harm the 
Company financially since it passed the cost of attracting 
capital on to the consumers in their light bills. An example 
of long-term, high interest rate financing occurred recently 
when the American Telephone and Telegraph Company issued 
30-year AAA bonds at 8 3/4 per cent, 
•5%ederal Power Commission, Statistics of Privately 
Owned Electric Utilities in the United States (I968), p. xxvi. 
In 1968, after paying ->280 Million dividends to preferred 
stockholders, and $1,360 million interest on long-term debt, 
privately owned electric utilities in the United States had 
$2,700 million available for the servicing of common equity. 
The utilities paid out #1,900 million of that $2,700 million 
and kept $800 million in retained earnings. The utilities 
retained $400 million more in 1968 than they did in 1958. So 
retained earnings have increased by 100 per cent in the last 
decade. 
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about #800 million—enough to run Montana's entire state 
government at the current level of expenditure for the next 
10 years. 
Retained earnings finance extra-utility activitiesr-
Sometiraes utilities use this "extra" money to finance new 
construction. Then the value of the resulting plant is in­
cluded in the rate base. And the consumers are required to 
pay a rate of return on money that in reality they, not the 
stockholders, invested in the utility. Senator Lee Metcalf 
of Montana has recently testified to the Senate's antitrust 
subcommittee that utilities are buying real estate companies 
and setting up housing subsidiaries that competing fuel com­
panies are not allowed to serve. Such tax-sheltered ven­
tures, often financed from the retained earnings of a 
utility, yield more than 20 per cent annually on their 
equity,-5̂  
Another example of retained utility earnings used to 
finance activities not related to the public utility business 
o&curred in Missoula, where in 19̂ 6, the Montana Power Company 
owned stock in the Florence Hotel, a parking corporation, 
and a skiing facility. Including these Missoula activities, 
MEG- had non-utility property and investments valued at 
5&"Metcalf Says Utilities Use Tax Shelters to Buy 
Houses," The Missoulian, June 12, 1970, p. 22, 
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nearly $4- million in 1966.̂ "̂  In addition, Montana Power had 
invested $15i million in associated companies such as gas 
pipelines and gas, oil and coal exploration ventures. 
Montana Consumers' Council laifyers found that by using retained 
earnings to finance what is alleged to be natural gas ex­
ploration, Montana Power can in reality finance oil explor­
ation and charge the cost of "dry hole operations" off as an 
operating expense. If the Company "accidentally" strikes oil 
while looking for gas, the consumers do not benefit from the 
strike because the revenue from the oil well is transferred 
to a "non-utility" account. Montana Power has $2.4 million 
Kg 
in its "non-utility" oil properties account. If, on the 
other hand, the Company has bad luck and drills a dry "gas" 
well, the expense of the drilling is considered to be an 
operating expense that may be included in the consumer's 
light bill. 
Retained earnings provide stock option plans.— 
Sometimes, retained earnings are used by company insiders to 
finance stock option plans. In Montana, this started in 1956 
Montana Power Co,, I966 Form 1 Report to the FPC 
(accounts 121 and 124), pp. 201, 202A, and 202. 
^̂ Ibid., (account 123), p. 202A. 
^̂ Ibid., (account 121), p. 201. See also C. W. Leap-
hart, Jr., £t al., Montana Consumers' Council, Protestants' 
Brief, Re The Montana Power Co., Docket No. 5698 (Montana R. R. 
& Pub» Serv. Comm'n., I969), p. 12. Some of these wells were 
designated as oil wells before they were drilled. And if they 
were, the cost of drilling them is charged to the "non-utility" 
account so the consumer does not pay for drilling them. 
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when the Federal Power Commission authorized issuance of 
100,000 Montana Power common stock shares to Company of­
ficials. The price was not to be less than 95 per cent of 
the stock's closing price on the dates the options were 
granted and the plan was to expire in June of 1959. In 
May, 1959, the PPC authorized a three-for-one Montana Power 
stock split that increased the stock option authorization to 
300,000 shares. During June of 1959, Montana Power stock­
holders (without PPG approval) extended, for 10 years, the 
expiration date of the stock option plan to June l6, I969, 
and authorized options on an additional 450,000 shares to 
123 employees. Then in I96I, before the PPC had reviewed 
the action, Montana Power relinquished its corporate registra­
tion in New Jersey and became a Montana-based corporation.̂  ̂
This move exempted the Company's securities from PPC 
scrutiny and placed them under the control of the Montana 
Public Service Commission. The Montana Commission has never 
investigated the options on the additional 450,000 shares or 
passed on the validity of them. 
Once stock options are authorized by stockholders, 
they are then issued or granted by the company, A company 
may not issue all of the authorized options at one time. Once 
the option is issued the stock is said to be "under option" 
which means that the person granted the option may at a 
later date of his own choosing exercise the option by paying 
^̂ Letter from Joseph C. Swidler, chm,, PPC, to Lee 
Metcalf, U.S. Senator from Mont., June 24, 19d4. 
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the company the market price the stock sold at on the day 
the option was granted. (Ninety-five per cent of market price 
if option is granted before 1964.) This should not bo con­
fused with the price of the stock on the day the option is 
exercised which is higher than the price on the day the option 
is granted or the option would be forfeited and not exer­
cised. Once an option is exercised the stock may be sold 
for immediate profit or held for future speculation. 
By 1964, eight Montana Power executives had re­
ceived $655,000 profit through the exercise of stock options. 
In some cases, Company officials had paid less than 30 per 
cent of the option-exercised-day market value for the stock. 
And none of the officiais had to pay brokerage fees on his 
buying transactions. The Federal Power Commission staff 
estimated that when options on all 750,000 shares were exer­
cised, the Company's cost (probably paid from retained 
earnings) would be |9 million. In addition, the equity of 
the ordinary stockholder would be diluted by $9 million. 
Montana Power defended its options as being necessary 
to attract "competent, dedicated personnel," 11 per cent of 
whom were made eligible to benefit under the stock option 
plan. Senator Metcalfs assistant, Vic Eeinemer, countered 
^̂ U.S., Congress, Senate, "lOU No. 24: Stock Option 
Windfall For Company Insiders—Ordinary Stockholders, Con­
sumers Unknowingly Provide Multimillion Dollar Windfall," 
Congressional Record, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., Vol. 110, No. 95, 
May 13,"19557 pp. 10422-25. 
^̂ The Independent Record. May 27, 1964, 
56 
that the eight officials who had. received $655,000 by exer­
cising options were already making an average yearly salary 
of 130,000 before the options were exercised,J, E, Cor-
ette, Montana Power's president, said that 704 United States 
companies had similar plans in 1962. Metcalf said that 
24 of the nation's 224 private electric utilities had re­
stricted stock option plans in 1961,̂  ̂ And only one of 
those—the original 100,000 share option of Montana Power— 
had been approved by the Federal Power Commission,He also 
pointed out that in 1964 the PPC had reversed its earlier 
position on the approval of stock options and denied the 
Black Hills Power and Light Company authority to issue com­
mon stock options. 
According to a Company official, who did not want to 
be:quoted by name, Montana Power has enough options avail­
able to "last for the next 100 years," In 1969, the Com­
pany's stockholders voted to extend the expiration date of 
the present stock option plan to 1979. Stockholders also 
^̂ Vic Reinemer, "A Montanan's Washington Notebook," 
newsletter from the office of Senator Lee Metcalf, July 13, 
1.964, p. 2, 
^̂ The Independent Record, May 27, 1964, 
%̂enate, "lOU No, 24," loc, cit. 
^̂ Letter from Vic Reinemer to Harry L. Billings, 
editor of The People's Voice, no date.. 
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U.S., Federal Power Commission, Opinion No. 433. 
Re The Black Hills Power and Light Co., Docket No. E-704d 
TJune 30, I95ÎTT 
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authorized an additional 200,000 shares of stock to be op­
tioned, bringing the total available shares to be optioned 
between 195̂  and 1979 to 950,000—13 per cent of the 
Company's outstanding stock and four and one-half per cent 
of the Company's total shares of no par value common stock 
authorized for issuance. Apparently, the Company intends to 
continue modifying the present plan and extending the ex­
piration date, thereby avoiding the need for Public Service 
Commission approval of new stock option issues. Presently, 
because of new Internal Revenue Service rules, the stock in 
option plans must be at 100 per cent of market price at the 
time of the acceptance of the option. And no capital gains 
treatment is given unless the stock is held three years and 
the option exercised within five years. 
The stock option plan has not always meant short-run 
profit to Company officials. Recently, some options were 
exercised at 135* The price of the stock has since dropped 
to about $26, leaving the officiais with a short-run net 
loss of $9 per share—a phenomenon which will attract 
"competent, dedicated" workers for the Company only if short­
-term loss can be turned into long-term gain. Indeed, mostly 
because of the depressed value of the stock, options on 
294,206 shares were forfeited and not exercised by the 
option holders in 1969. The total number of option shares 
exercised from 1954 to 1970 is 260,193. 
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Allegations of excessive stock options and utility 
overcharges continued to mount in Montana, Many of these 
charges emanated from the office of Senator Lee Ketcalf. So 
Montana Power defended itself. In 1966, the year Senator 
Metcalf was running for re-election, Montana Power doubled 
its advertising budget and spent more than $216,000 to sup­
port its business practices, Metcalf, who could not afford 
to match this advertising with counter-advertising, soft-
peddled the utility issue. And during his campaign he con­
centrated on other issues. Once Metcalf was re-elected, he 
resumed his criticism by co-authoring, with his assistant, 
Vic Reinemer, a book called Overcharge, The book, made 
possible by a grant from the American Political Science 
Association, assailed utility overcharges and resulted in 
some consumer awareness of utility practices in the United 
States. In Montana, the book did not cause a furor over 
Montana Power's rates. 
But informed opinion leaders such as Clyde T, Jarvis 
and Gordon R, Twedt of the Montana Farmers Union, James W, 
Murry of the Montana APL-CIO, Dr. M. P. Keller and State 
Senator Herbert J. Klindt of the Republican Party, State 
Senator John L. McKeon of Anaconda, and Gordon R. Bennett, 
campaign manager for Governor Forrest H. Anderson, Senator 
Lee Metcalf, and Roland R. Renne, remained concerned about the 
situation. They said, however, that they had little hope 
that Company influence could be overcome enough to change the 
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situation,' They said they thought that a majority of the 
people they represented %ere frustrated because they could 
not benefit from low-coŝ  electricity that should accompany 
a state with the vast hydro-electric generating and water 
resources of Montajia.' But they also said that some of their 
people were consoled by Montana Power advertising that pointed 
out that its electric rates were often lower than rates 
charged in other areas, Riley Wm. Childers lamented that this 
advertising did not point out that Montana Power was comparing 
its rates with those charged in areas that must use an ex­
pensive coal-steam method of generating electricity. Since 
this and other facts about utility rates were not widely 
understood, he thought that, by and large, Montanans had learned 
to live with their electric and gas bills. This uneasy truce 
was broken when on February 13, 1968, Montana Power pe­
titioned the Public Service Commission to increase its 
. 68 rates. 
The Montana Railroad and Public 
Service Commission 
Compensation, Education 
and Function 
The Montana Railroad and Public Service Commission 
has always consisted of three members who are elected for 
six-year terms, one member coming up for election every 
 ̂3 Montana Power Co., Applicant's Petition, Re The 
Montana Power Co., Docket No, 5o9S"TMontana R.R. & Pub. Serv. 
c3ii"'lî:,'T9~6ïï)7" 
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two years. 
By 1975» Montana's three Public Service Commissioners 
will be paid $11,500 a year.̂  ̂ They also are reimbursed 
for actual and necessary traveling expenses while away from 
70 Helena—provided such expenses do not exceed #4-0 per day. 
As nearly as can be determined from available re­
ports, Montana pays its commissioners a lower yearly 
salary than that received by commissioners for any of the 
71 other 52 fulltime utility regulatory agencies. 
This meager compensation has not attracted the most 
highly educated personnel to run for the office of Montana 
Railroad and Public Service Commissioner. Only one of 
Montana's present commissioners has attended college, 
Louis G,' Boedecker has a B.A. degree. In contrast to this, 
at least two-thirds of the nation's public service commis­
sioners have had some college, and more than a third have 
law degrees. 
Created in I907 to regulate the operation of rail­
roads, the Board of Railroad Commissioners of the State of 
^̂ Montana, Revised Codes (19̂ 7), sec, 25-501, 
70 Montana, Revised Codes (19̂ 7), sec, 59-538, 
71 Senate, State Utility Commissions. 1967, p. 6 insert. 
Since state law provides that a commissioner cannot have a pay 
raise during his terra, each commissioner must wait six years 
until he is elected to a new terra before his wage is increased. 
Under this system, all commissioners are paid a different 
salary. Commissioner Smith is being paid less than #10,000, 
His successor will be paid at the current rate, 
f̂ ibid. 
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Montana was delegated additional authority in 1913 to 
"supervise and regulate the operations of the public 
utilities, . . ."73 The legislature provided that a newly 
created body, called the Public Service Commission of Mon­
tana, would conduct its business of auditing utility accounts, 
insuring quality service, and setting public utility rates 
separately from the business of the Railroad Commission, But 
the railroad commissioners were made ex officio members of 
the Public Service Commission and the Public Service Commis­
sion was to use the Railroad Commission's staff personnel. 
The Commission was granted authority to hire "examiners, 
experts, clerks, accountants or other assistants as it may 
deem necessary," but its existing staff absorbed most of 
the extra workload. 
The Commission hired only an engineer and an audi­
tor, each at $200 a month, to help regulate l49 electric, 
75 gas, phone, water, streetcar, and telegraph utilities. 
The engineer has since been dropped from the payroll. 
In 1961, the Commission was again asked to accept 
additional responsibility—this time to control the issuance 
"̂ M̂ontana, Revised Codes (19̂ 7), sec. 70-101. 
7̂  Montana, Laws Resolutions and Memorials of the State 
of Montana Passed by the Thirteenth Regular Session of the 
Legislative Assembly (held January 6-March 6, 1913), ch. 52, 
sec. 16, p. 95, 
^̂ Montana, R.R.' & Pub, Serv, Comm'n,, Sixth Annual 
Report, I912-I913» p. 166, and Seventh Annual Report, 1913-
1914.pp, 226-234, 
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of utility securities and stock option plans.No 
securities analyst has been retained by the Commission to 
aid in the scrutiny of these stock issuances. 
Also, the Commission often arbitrates disputes be­
tween utilities azid their customers. These disputes con­
cern service shutoffs for non-payment of bills, meter and 
billing accuracy, and feasibility studies for expanded 
service. 
Staff and Budget 
To help in its regulatory efforts, the Commission 
retains an l8-meraber staff that includes two attorneys, a 
rate analyst, an executive secretary, an accountant, a 
77 hearings reporter, eight inspectors, and four secretaries. 
Only occasionally has it hired experts to help it make 
utility plant or cost of capital valuations.'̂  
The Montana Railroad and Public Service Commission 
spent 1213,355 in 1968 to regulate 664 transportation utili-
79 ties and 194- non-transportation utilities. In that year, 
^̂ Montana, Revised Codes (19̂ 7), sec, 70-117.1. 
^̂ Senate, State Utility Commissions. 1967, p. 16 insert; 
Interview with Bruce Tomko, Montana Railroad Comm'n. staff, 
April 17, 1970, 
"̂ T̂he Commission has hired the following rate experts: 
1961 Montana Power gas rate case, J, W. Kushing (̂ :4,106.9̂  
fee); I965 Montana-Dakota Utilities Rate Case, Oregon firm 
of Cornell, Rowland, Hayes and Merryfield (̂ 6̂,̂ 84- fee); 1967 
Mountain Bell rate case» Dr. Thatcher, professor of business 
economics at the University of Wisconsin ($4,765 fee). 
^̂ Ibid,, p. Z2 insert, and p. 3̂  insert. See also. 
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the Montana Power Company spent almost half that much, 
$82,914,20, while pursuing only one rate increase request. 
(The Montana Consumers' Council spent #15,000 opposing that 
increase,) 
The number of utilities the Commission must regulate 
is rapidly increasing. In 1970, Commissioner Louis G. Boe-
decker said, "The total number of utilities under our juris­
diction is in excess of 225. Under the motor carrier act, 
we regulate approximately 1,000 motor carriers, , , , Each 
year the Montana Commission performs over 200 desk audits 
and several detailed field audits 
Perhaps one of the reasons the Commission has not 
hired more staff to better scrutinize utilities is that it 
is often thought of as a court. The Montana Supreme Court 
reflected this train of thought in a 1957 rate increase 
case when it ruled: "The Public Service Commission is a court 
Montana, Executive Budget 1969-1971, p. 23.' Electric and 
telephone cooperatives have been exempted from regulation by 
the legislature because cooperatives are customer-owned and 
are regulated by the people they serve. 
^̂ Letter from W. M. Johnson, auditor, Montana Public 
Service Comm'n,, April 10, I969. Montana Power is also 
reported to have spent $300,000 preparing for this rate case. 
See U.S,, Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, 
Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations, Hearings' on 
S, 607, To Establish an Office of Utility Consumers' Counsel, 
91st Cong,, 1st Sess,, 1969, p. 151. Cited hereinafter as 
Senate, S_, 607 Hearings, I969. 
0-1 
Louis G, Boedecker, "Public Utility Rate Increases 
and Consumer Protection," Speech to the Montana Farmer-Labor 
Institute, Missoula, Montana February 1, 1970, pp, 7, 14-, 
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and does not need to make an independent determination of 
whether a utility is presenting proper figures for rate-
Op 
making purposes," This means that the Public Service Com­
mission can blindly accept the evidence presented it by a 
utility if nobody appears in opposition. The Commission 
does doublecheck some utility figures, however. During the 
1968 Montana Power rate raise request, some members of the 
Commission staff spent several days reviewing Company oper­
ations in Butte, 
Because of the small Public Service Commission budget 
and the lack of utility experts employed by the Commission, 
directors of the Montana Consumers' Council felt that they 
needed help in determining the validity of utility rate 
raise requests. They filled this void by hiring an expert 
of their own. The mobilization of resources to hire a con­
sumer representative in the I968 Montana Power rate case is 
discussed in the following chapter. 
The People's Voice, March 22, 1957. Note the Court's 
inconsistency by comparing this statement with that cited in 
footnote 4-4, Chapter II. 
CHAPTER III 
CONSUMER INTERESTS MOBILIZE 
Consumers Determine Effect of Rate Raise 
Rate Raise Effects on Resi­
dential Electric and Gas 
Customers 
Consumer concern in the Montana Power Company rate 
raise case was first stirred when the utility's February 14, 
1968, news release carried by the Associated Press claimed 
the proposed "increase would be about 15|- per cent, based 
on anticipated 1969 revenues,"̂  Eugene P, Pike, general 
manager of the Missoula Electric Cooperative, wrote the 
Public Service Commission for a copy of Montana Power's 
petition and discovered that the percentage increase would 
not fall evenly on all of the utility's customers. 
Power companies generally maintain different rate 
schedules governing the sale of energy to residential, com­
mercial, and industrial customers. Street and yard lighting, 
and irrigation pumping charges are figured independently 
of these schedules. 
Pike found that Montana Power's average residential 
T̂he Missoulian. February 14-, I968, p, 1. 
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electric user (4̂ 0 kilowatt hours) would have his bill 
increased by 27f per cent or #31.68 a year. The commercial 
consumer or small businessman would witness his electrical 
costs rise by 23 per cent,̂  And gas consumers using less 
than 5,000>000 cubic feet of gas per month would experience 
a cost increase of 26 per cent or more.̂  
Pike's findings, published in The People's Voice, 
gave Montanans who were already predisposed to mistrust the 
Company reason to believe Montana Power was bending statis­
tics to mislead the public about the extent of the proposed 
increase,̂  If residential and small business users were 
being asked to bear the burden of most of the increase, they 
reasoned, energy cost increases of industrial users must be 
very slight. Other Montanans, working independently of Pike, 
thought it might be a good idea to find out why. 
Concerned Consumers' Council 
The first group opposition to the rate raise appeared 
in Billings, Montana, where Jerome J, Cate, a lawyer, 
p 
Montana Railroad and Public Service Commission, The 
Montana Power Company Schedules GS-64 and R-68a (proposed). 
Docket NoT 3̂ 9̂  
M̂ontana Railroad and Public Service Commission, The 
Montana Power Company Schedules GS-64 and GS-68a (proposed), 
Docket No. 5698. 
4 Montana Railroad and Public Service Commission, The 
Montana Power Company Schedules GSG-62 and GSG-68 (proposed), 
Docket NÔI 35̂ 9̂  
T̂he People's Voice, March 15, 19̂ 8, p. 2. 
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spearheaded the Concerned Consumers' Council, Cate, whose 
opposition to Montana Power crystalized during an intern­
ship he served in Senator Lee Metcalf's office, worked with 
the Consumers' president, Erail Sewell, to raise money and 
circulate anti-rate raise petitions. The efforts of this 
group were aborted because of a lack of sustaining leader­
ship, Mr, Cate, who was already busy with his law practice 
and his position as Montana Civil Rights Coordinator, became 
involved in presidential politics as Montana coordinator 
of the Robert Kennedy campaign. îlr. Sewell also encountered 
health problems that pre-empted him from devoting much time 
to the Consumers' efforts. The Concerned Consumers raised 
only $2̂ .̂  Its main achievement was to distribute the 
anti-rate raise petitions and to act as the Billings branch 
of a more active group that was forming—the Montana Consumers' 
Council, 
Rate Increase Effects 
on a Town 
Strangely enough, the Montana Consumers' Council got 
its leaders because of a poorly executed Montana Power 
public relations program that v;as designed to break the news 
gently to local officials about how much they could expect 
their energy budgets to increase. As part of this program, 
Montana Power personnel met with municipal officials in 
several places to explain the rate increase request. The 
Telephone interview with Jerome J. Cate, lawyer 
from Billings. Montana. September S. 1968. 
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Company official who contacted Mayor William E, Hunt of 
Chester failed to engender good will, however. 
Hunt, whose small town of 1,158 people is located 
between Shelby and Havre on Montana's "high line," said he 
was told by a Company official, not asked, to increase 
Chester's electric energy budget by 15 per cent. Hunt 
resented the Company official's order as premature, especi­
ally since hearings had not yet been held on the merits of 
the rate increase request, 
"The rate increase does not bother me as much as our 
lack of political freedom and I intend to fight for that as 
well as the dollars involved," Hunt wrote to Senator Lee 
Metcalf on April 24, 1968.̂  
Hunt began a close examination of the rate increase 
application filed with the Montana Public Service Commission, 
He discovered that the Company was asking for a general 
electric schedule (GS-68) rate increase of 25 per cent. Yet 
the Company official had suggested that city electric rates, 
which are figured under this schedule, would only increase 
by 15 per cent. Mayor Hunt said that this indicated that 
the 25 per cent increase was neither needed nor expected by 
the Company, and that Company officials were "just going 
to give the commission/er̂  something to cut off there 
"̂ Letter from Hon. William E. Hunt, mayor of Chester, 
Montana April 24, I968. 
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so they could go to the voters . . and claim they had 
g 
trimmed the fat from Montana Power's request. 
As part of his examination, Mayor Hunt reviewed 
Chester's energy budgets. He found that the tovm was 
paying the Company 15 per cent more for electricity than it 
had 10 years previously. He said, "Between I966 and I968 
the amount Chester paid Montana Power for utility facilities 
used by the tovm increased about $1,700 from $8,300 to 
o 
$10,000," Hunt determined that this increase in Company 
revenue was due not to increases in investment by Montana 
Power, but "to a small but steady growth in the town," 
He said the city was using more power because of "additions 
to the sewer system with more lift stations with their 
electric pumps; greater use of water that had to be 
lifted out of Tiber Reservoir to settling basins near town, 
/ând7 then to the water tank, , , 
Hunt said, "Our activities, the people's activities, 
the consumers' activities, not the Power Company's, enlarged 
the use of electricity." Hunt could not remember seeing 
the Company "so much as put in a new insulator in the 
last 10 years. , . 
Ŝenate, 607 Hearings, 1969, p. 148. 
Q 
Înterview with Hon. William E, Hunt, mayor of 
Chester, Montana, July 24-, I968. 
^̂ Senate, 607 Hearings, 1969, pp, 148-49. 
l̂ Ibid, 
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He said he could not understand why the Company now 
needed more money from Chester's citizens when it had not 
done anything to deserve more. The Company's revenue from 
the city of Chester had already increased 15 per cent between 
1957 and 1967 because of increased electricity usage. 
Mayor Hunt, however, said, "I am not a rate expert 
12 nor do I pretend to be." And realizing that the Company's 
situation might be different in places other than Chester, 
Hunt, acting in the consumers' interest, began calling for 
an investigation by qualified personnel to see if the rate 
increase was necessary, 
Montana Consumers' Council 
Chester Town Council Seeks 
Allies to Help Investigate 
Need for Rate Raise 
First, Mayor Hunt presented the problem to the Chester 
Town Council. The Council adopted a resolution requesting 
investigation of the rate increase request. It asked the 
other 126 incorporated Montana cities to join Chester by 
helping pay the cost of hiring a qualified rate expert to 
represent the consumers when the request was heard by the 
Railroad and Public Service Commission, The response to this 
plea resulted in the formation of the Montana Consumers' 
Council, the major opponent to Montana Power's rate in­
crease request. The details of the Council's formation and 
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its effectiveness in combatting the increase are the major 
topics of this study and will be investigated in this and 
later chapters. 
On April 2, 1968, the Chester, Montana, Town Council 
resolved that its "duty was 
to investigate and report to the people matters 
of concern that affect the well being of the town 
and its inhabitants including any act which increases 
taxes on the state and county as well as the town 
level,13 
It found that if the Montana Power Company raised its rates 
the resulting increase in Chester's gas and electricity costs 
would require "an additional tax of more than one and 
three quarters (1 3/̂ ) mills . " before the toim' s energy 
bill could be paid. 
Chester's mayor, William E. Hunt, said that in tax 
dollar terms the increase would 
cost more than #1.00 per year for each man, 
woman and child for the tovm alone. In the past, 
the increase to the /non-government/ individual 
user has been much more. Only a rate expert can 
tell how much more.̂  ̂
The council felt the town of Chester lacked the 
resources to investigate the need for Montana Power's 
requested gas and electric rate increase. Nor could the 
^̂ Chester Tovm Council, "Resolution to Investigate 
Power and Natural Gas Rates," Chester, Montana, April 2, I968. 
^̂ Ibid. One mill equals one-tenth of one cent (#.001). 
•̂̂ Letter from Hon, William E. Hunt, mayor of Chester, 
Montana, to 126 Montana Cities, April 22, I968, 
council, by itself, effectively oppose any increase not 
shovm to be in the public interest. But a combination of 
cities and towns could muster the resources to hire an 
independent rate expert to conduct such an investigation. 
So in a resolution, the Chester Toivn Council urged other 
cities to join it in underwriting the cost of an independent 
investigation. 
"No stronger force can be developed than the 
local municipal governments," Mayor Hunt wrote on April 22, 
1968.̂  ̂ He was relaying the Chester Council's message to 
Montana's 126 incorporated tovms and cities, asking them to 
form a phalanx of query, capable of probing the need for any 
utility rate increase. "If the rates were justified," said 
Hunt, "we would have to be satisfied and adjust our budget 
17 accordingly." But first, he said, consumers should 
determine whether or not the requested rates can be justified. 
Support for an Independent Rate 
Investigation Is Sought from 
Montana Municipal League Members 
Mayor Hunt said he planned to gain support for an 
independent investigation of Montana Power's rate increase 
request during a meeting of the Montana Municipal League on 
l̂ Ibid. 
17 Senate, S_̂  607 Hearings, 1969, p. l49. 
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May 10, 1968.̂  ̂ He hoped the League would pass a resolu­
tion calling for an independent investigation. And he told 
a Billings Gazette reporter that he had "received encourage­
ment from Butte Mayor Tom Powers, Great Palls Mayor John 
19 McLaughlin and Havre Mayor Pete Hamilton, . , ," 
Mayor Thomas F, Powers was president of the Montana 
Municipal League. His support would greatly aid the passage 
of any resolution proposed to the League, Hunt tried to 
jell Powers' support by sending him an advanced copy of the 
letter Hunt was composing to request money from the cities. 
In a note that accompanied that advance, Hunt outlined his 
strategy for forming a Consumers' Council and restated his 
belief that Powers would back the forming of such a coali-
tion.20 
As mayor of Great Falls, Montana's second largest 
city, and as second vice-president of the Montana Municipal 
League, John J, McLaughlin would also be a valued ally to 
the consumer effort. In the 1966 Democratic primary 
McLaughlin had sought nomination to the Montana Railroad and 
Public Service Commission and lost by 904 votes to incumbent 
®̂The Montana Municipal League changed its name to 
the Montana League of Toi-ms and Cities in August I968, 
^̂ The People's Voice, April 26, 1968, p. 1 (reprinted 
from The Billings Gazette). 
20 Letter from Hon. William E, Hunt, mayor of Chester, 
Montana, to Mayor Thomas Powers of Butte, Montana, president 
of the Montana Municipal League, April 16, 1968. 
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Louis G, Boedecker. In that election McLaughlin had been 
supported by persons who were now emerging as leaders and 
supporters of the consumers' movement. Persons, for example, 
like consumers' lawyer Leo C. Graybill, Jr.-, and public 
relations man, Joseph A. Renders. 
Mayor Powers' role at the League meeting.—The support 
Mayor Hunt had anticipated from the Municipal League's May 
meeting did not materialize, however. Mayor Powers describes 
the League meeting as follows: 
Mr, Hunt was granted every courtesy and ample time 
to present his proposal at G1endive. He spoke for at 
least twenty (20) minutes but failed to arouse much 
sympathy from any of the mayors present. Five dele­
gates were on their feet vying for permission to move 
for referral of the entire matter to the Railroad and 
Public Service Commission, . . 
Powers was not active in organizing mayoral support for the 
consumer coalition/ He said: 
My interest at the Glendive Meeting of May 10th, 
1968, was directed entirely toward my personal goals 
of reorganizing the League of Cities, relocating its 
offices in Helena, getting a neŵ director at the helm 
and achieving fiscal stability. 
Mayor McLaughlin's role at the League meeting.—Mayor 
McLaughlin, whom Hunt said had encouraged a consumers' plea 
to the League, did not favor Municipal League investigation 
of the rate increase/ McLaughlin said he desired to avoid 
Montana Power opposition to important city programs that the 
Letter from Hon. Thomas P. Powers, former president 
of the Montana Municipal League, to the author, January 13, 
1970. 
^̂ Ibid, 
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23 Leagu.e vrould present to the I969 Montana Legislature, 
League support of an independent investigation could have 
sparked reprisal against League-sponsored legislation by 
powerful Company lobbyists, 
McLaughlin apparently experienced a conflict of 
interest about whom he should represent at the Municipal 
League meeting. He later said of his non-support of the 
Consumers• Council: 
I am Mayor of all the people in Great Palls, not just 
the Democrats.' The Montana Power Company is our 
county's largest taxpayer. The City of Great Palls . 
trades land and does much other business with them. 
One observer speculated that the reason Mayor McLaugh­
lin refused to support the Consumers' Council was that he 
was in line to become president of the Montana Municipal 
League and did not want Montana Power to oppose his candi­
dacy, McLaughlin declined to comment upon this speculation, 
^̂ Telephone interview with Hon, John J. McLaughlin, 
mayor of Great Palls, Montana, May 9» 1968. 
2U Letter from Hon. John J. McLaughlin, mayor of Great 
Falls, Montana, to the author, January 3, 1970. Mayor 
McLaughlin's reference to Montana Power as Cascade "county's 
largest taxpayer" can be more correctly stated "county's 
largest tax-collector." Public utilities are allowed an 
after-tax rate of return on their investment because taxes 
are considered to be an operating expense by the Public Ser­
vice Commission. Also, Montana Power has a clause in its 
rate order that states, "The Company may increase the bill 
for electric service supplied under this Schedule by an amount 
equal to the proportionate part of any taxes other than those 
in effect on February 13, 1968, subject to the prior approval 
of the Montana Public Service Commission." The underlined 
portion was added to the rate schedule in 1968. The date is 
changed whenever a new order is issued. The tax-shifting 
clause and the allowing of taxes to be included as an operating 
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saying only, "It has been my experience in public life that 
it is best not to go on the defensive in regard to such 
2 5 matters. It is always a case of 'who believes who?'" 
McLaughlin is now president of the Municipal League's suc­
cessor, the Montana League of Cities and Towns. But this 
fact alone is not enough to substantiate the innuendo that 
McLaughlin's motivations were self-seeking. With or without 
Montana Power's support, McLaughlin, as second vice-president 
of the League and head of Montana's second largest city, was 
a strong contender for the League presidency. The League 
often moves its officers up the ladder into its top offices. 
The voting members of the Montana League of Cities and Towns 
must be elected officials of a paid-up city or town. The 
Montana Power Company influences many decisions in the state, 
but it is doubtful that it could control a majority of the 
126 mayors who would ballot for the League's president. Un­
less such control could be demonstrated, McLaughlin would 
have no need to fear Montana Power's opposition. 
Before too much significance is attached to the roles 
expense work together to enable Montana Power eventually to 
shift to the consumer the full anount of any tax levied upon 
it. Since the Company's taxes are shifted 100 per cent to 
the consumer, in the long run the Company is really a tax 
collector, not a taxpayer. Thus, "tax the company" politi­
cians are only taxing the Company for short periods when 
they levy a new tax on it. The tax will be shifted to the 
consumer at the first opportunity and Montana Power will get 
the credit for providing the taxes which the consumer 
actually pays, 
Ẑ ibid. 
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of Powers and McLaughlin, it should be noted that their in­
action alone could not have killed the resolution calling for 
support of a Consumers* Council. As Mayor McLaughlin points 
out, "I didn't act alone in this matter. The League has 
many Republican Mayors as well as Democrats. 
Mayor Hunt's analysis of the League's inaction.—• 
Mayor Hunt said he feels that much of this inaction by 
League mayors is due to their conservative attitude that 
government should be run like a business not to hurt busi­
ness. "Montana Power lobbyist, Robert D. Corette, plays 
this conservative sentiment like a symphony conductor," he 
said. "Often Corette does not even have to talk to a public 
official about a subject. He knows the man will vote in the 
Company's interest because of his conservative leanings. A 
Company bought lunch every two years is enough to keep these 
people in line." Hunt said, "The mayors would be indignant 
if somebody suggested that Montana Power controlled their 
vote. They sincerely think they vote independently."^^ And 
Montana Power does not destroy this belief. Instead, the 
Company relies upon the conservative tendencies of these 
officials because conservative officials generally vote 
"right" without being lobbied or prompted. 
The League's many voting members are not the only 
Ẑ Ibid. 
^^interview with William E. Hunt, Helena, Montana, 
March 27, 1970. 
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people who can exert influence on it. Private individual^' 
and organizations may also exert influence by paying $100 
dues each year and affiliating with the League as non-voting 
associate members. Mayor Hunt said he had been told the 
Montana Power Company was a paying associate member of the 
Montana League of Cities and Towns, And, at one time, he 
thought the Company's opposition as an associate member was 
the reason "the League failed to act" on his resolution call-
28 ing for an independent rate investigation. 
If Montana Power did influence the League's decision 
on Hunt's resolution, it was not because of the reason men­
tioned by Mayor Hunt, The Montana Power Company is not a 
paying associate member of the Montana League of Cities and 
Towns, Dan K. Mizner, executive director of the Montana 
League of Cities and Towns, said: 
To my knowledge no industry or company has ever 
approached the League for or against any support for 
legislation. Rather it has been the League asking for 
their help, , , , 
Our relations with the Montana Power Company and 
other industries, as well as labor organizations, have 
been and will be strictly on a basis of support for 
improved and good local government laws, , , , Sometimes 
to get good legislation passed we have to call on 
industry, labor unions and other local government 29 
organizations to , , , assist us in the legislature. 
Letter from the Hon, William E. Hunt, mayor of 
Chester, Montana, to Rev. Robert J. McEwen S.J,, Department 
of Economics, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts, 
July 2, 1968, 
29 Letter from Dan K. Mizner, executive director of 
the Montana League of Cities and Towns to the author, 
December 31, 19d9. The associate members of the League are: 
Thomas, Dean & Hoskins; Dain, Kalman and Quail; Washington 
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The League's monthly newspaper, The Montana League of 
Cities and Towns, did not report Mayor Hunt's request for 
help or his speech at the May 10 meeting. This non-
reporting, though, probably cannot be attributed to Montana 
Power pressure. The Company does not advertise in this pub­
lication and therefore would not be able to withhold adver­
tising if the editor did not do the Company's bidding. 
Consumers' Council Organizes 
Even though the Montana League of Cities and Towns 
failed to support Mayor Hunt's resolution for an independent 
rate investigation, the May 10 meeting provided an oppor­
tunity for public officials who questioned the rate increase 
request to find each other and to organize. Ten of these men 
resolved that their association known as the Montana Con­
sumers' Council should become a non-profit corporation. They 
elected Mayor William E, Hunt of Chester, president; Mayor 
E, 0, Pike of Superior, vice president; Mayor Victor E. 
Jones of Hingham, secretary; and Mayor Roger H, Elliot of 
Columbia Falls, treasurer. The other members were made 
directors of the Montana Consumers' Council, They included 
Mayor Thomas A. Pairhurst of Three Porks, Mayor W, E. Munce 
of Harlowton, Mayor John L. Dunckel of Choteau, Mayor Clay H, 
McCartney of Chinook, County Commissioner Pred C. Vanisko of 
National Insurance Co., and Morrison-Mairele. Basil 
Andrikopoulos recently quit his job as Montana Power lob-
biest to work for Dain, Kalman and Quail in Billings, 
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Deer Lodge County, and Councilman Owen P, McNally of Ana-
, 30 conda. 
Mayor Hunt did not limit his support-seeking efforts 
just to members of the Montana Municipal League. To expand 
his coalition, Hunt sent letters to the boards of trustees 
of 164- school districts, and on June 18, to the commis­
sions of all 56 Montana counties. He invited all groups 
interested in consumer affairs to join the Council, including 
"hospitals, industry, and the individual taxpayer who 
31 eventually has to pay the entire increase." 
Hunt appealed to the presidents of 65 Democratic 
Women's clubs to start a "Housewives for Reasonable Rates" 
organization. It would be, he said, "as important as a 
Mothers March. The money saved for your community means 
money saved for education, health, community betterment, 
recreation, and in many cases, . . . the very basic needs of 
life."32 
Hunt tried to attract the allegiance of the Montana 
^^Mayor Munce resigned from the Council for health 
reasons. Mayor McCartney resigned as mayor because of his 
health, but he is still on the Council. McCartney apparently 
oivns part of a natural gas interest—High Crest Oil—which 
competes with Montana Power in the Bear Paw Mountains near 
Havre. 
31 Letter from Hon, William E. Hunt, mayor of Chester, 
Montana, to 126 Montana cities, April 22, I968, 
^^Letter from Hon, William E. Hunt, president of the 
Montana Consumers' Council, to 65 Democratic Women's Clubs 
in Montana (no date). 
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Freight Rates Association headed by Robert Pester of Hingham, 
Montana. He told Pester: 
The Consumers ' Council lias devoted all of its re­
sources to the immediate goal of investigating the 
Montana Power Company rate increase request. But 
after we have completed what we can do on gas and 
electric rates, we will certainly join with you and 
do what we can to lower freight rates,^3 
Specifically, Hunt encouraged assistance from the 
Montana APL-CIO, the Montana Farmers Union, the Montana 
Associated Utilities (composed of rural electric coopera­
tives), and the Montana Trial Lawyers Association. 
Although Consumers' Council membership is open to all 
persons or groups interested in consumer affairs. Council 
officers and directors must be elected officials of a city, 
county, or other bona fide governmental organization. Finan­
cial contributions to the Council are accepted from anyone. 
Consumers' Council Seeks 
Money to Hire a Rate Expert 
To raise money for an independent investigation of 
Montana Power's rate increase request, the Council asked 
that all cities, counties, and school districts pay dues of 
10 cents for every person within their governmental boun­
daries if these boundaries were also in the Montana Power 
Company's service area. Local governments in areas not 
served by Montana Power were asked to donate five cents for 
^^Interview with Hon, William E, Hunt, president of 
Montana Consumers' Council, Helena, Montana, August 8, I968, 
82 
each person within their boundaries. Statewide consumer sup­
port was sought because taxpaying Montanans who are not in the 
Montana Power Company service area are affected by a utility 
rate increase. To pay an increased state energy bill, state 
taxes are raised uniformly for all taxpayers regardless of 
their location in or out of a utility's service area. 
Mayor Hunt told the people from whom he was seeking 
money that he planned to retain Dr. David A, Kosh as the 
Consumers' Council rate expert. In the early spring of 1968, 
Hunt had flown at his own expense to Washington, D.C., to 
find a rate expert. He asked the advice of U.S. Senator Lee 
Metcalf and his administrative aid, Vic Reinemer. They were 
able to suggest names of several utility rate experts for 
Hunt to contact. 
The first expert Hunt contacted was John W, Cragun, 
He had helped the Confederated Salish and Kootenai tribes of 
the Flathead Indian Reservation increase by $700,000 Montana 
Power's rent for tribal land use. He said that since one of 
Montana Power's justifications for a rate increase was its 
increased cost of leasing Indian lands, it would be embarrassing 
for the consumers to have him fight such an increase. This 
expert said that somebody should fight the increase, however, 
because in his opinion Montana Power did not need it. He 
also gave Hunt another list of experts to contact. Hunt com­
pared that list with the one given him by Vic Reinemer and 
found that the name of Dr. David A. Kosh was on both lists. 
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Dr, Kosh told Hunt that he knew and liked Metcalf and 
Reineraer, but that he had no ax to grind about Montana 
Power's alleged overcharge as they did. He said he did not 
represent just one type of client such as consumers, but that 
he had represented all types including public service com­
missions, companies and consumers. He said he would work 
for the Consumers' Council if he would be free to examine 
the Company books and let the facts speak for themselves, 
and if the consumers would accept the outcome of such an 
investigation. Mayor Hunt agreed and Kosh was hired at a 
3̂  fee of between $5»000 and $25,000, depending on the work. 
Hunt recalls that "After an examination of Montana 
Power's records, Kosh told me 'It is unconscionable that a 
company would ask for a rate increase under these circum­
stances. ' " 
Mayor Hunt said, "I probably would not have continued 
with the consumer movement if either of the experts I con­
tacted had said the increase was justified.' But they both 
egged me on. 
The Consumers' Council directors had originally hoped 
to raise |150,000, Mayor Hunt wrote to Roger H. Elliot, 
^^The name of George P. Hess, the engineer who was 
later hired for $5,000 by the Montana Railroad and Public Ser­
vice Commission, was also on the list Cragun gave to Hunt. 
Kosh, the consumers' expert, was sought after by the Montana 
Railroad and Public Service Commission, but it decided it 
could not afford his fee of $15,000. 
^•^Intervievj with Hon. William E, Hunt, president of 
the Montana Consumers' Council, Helena, Montana, August 8, 1968. 
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the Council's treasurer, "I would judge that the total cost 
of this hearing will be somewhere in the vicinity of $35,000 
to $40,000,"^^ Any leftover money was to be used for appeals 
and legislative lobbying. 
Early attempts to gain money were unfruitful, however, 
and on May 27, 1968, Senator Lee Metcalf wrote to Hunt: 
I am sorry that the support you sought to generate for 
the rate case did not develop as hoped, but am pleased 
to see that you and Bill Leaphart /consumer lawyer/ r,n 
and a few others are going to follow through anyway. 
By June 4-, Hunt announced "We have actually organized drives 
in four counties and . • . expect to have organizations in 
thirty to forty counties by June twentieth with the help of 
several groups that have contacted me—mostly farm and labor 
organizations with several individual businessmen indicating 
they will help."^^ 
He wrote 24 interest-group leaders and asked them to 
attend a June 7 meeting in Helena, Montana. To those 10 to 
12 people who attended the meeting, he outlined the following 
instructions on how to organize their counties: 
^^Letter from Hon, William E, Hunt, president of the 
Montana Consumers' Council, to Hon, Roger H. Elliott, mayor 
of Columbia Falls, Montana, June I3, I968. 
^^Letter from Sen, Lee Metcalf to Hon, William E, 
Hunt, president of the Montana Consumers' Council, May 27, 
1968. " 
^^Letter from Hon. William E, Hunt, president of the 
Montana Consumers' Council, to 24 interest group leaders asking 
them to attend a June 7 meeting in Helena, Montana, June 4, 
1968, 
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1. Call a public meeting to organize a county 
A, Form a group to circulate petitions door to 
door at every business and house in county 
B. Form telephone committee to call persons and 
tell them of the petitions and need for 
signatures and donations 
2 .  Make sure people understand the need for action 
A. There will be an increase in property tax if 
the increase is granted whether or not a person 
is served by Montana Power 
B.' Tax greatest in areas served by Montana Power 
C. Increase will stunt economic growth 
3. Many people will contribute because: 
A. The rate increase is to pay for cost of MPC*s 
expansion into areas adequately served by other 
utilities 
B, Customers not only have to pay a reasonable 
rate of return to MPC investors but have to 
supply those investors through retained earn­
ings with the capital which they must pay the 
return on 
C. MPC needs money to build gas import lines from 
Canada, but it can be served by Montana develop­
ment 
D, Rate of return is already high 
E/ Return is going out of state 
Consumers' Council Seeks 
More Time to Organize 
Organization of the counties did not progress as 
planned. By mid-June it became apparent that the consumers 
needed more time to raise money to pay their advocates. 
Also, consumer rate expert Dr. David A. Kosh and consumer 
attorneys C.W, Leaphart, Jr., Leo C. Graybill, Jr., and 
Oscar Hendrickson needed more time to prepare their case be­
cause Montana Power had not yet provided some information 
Dr. Kosh had requested. That information would require 
time to analyze. 
Hunt summarized the situation: 
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We had about three months to prepare our case and 
counted completely upon free will donations. Robert D, 
Corette said after the first day of hearings that it 
took them three years to prepare Montana Power's case. 
And the |300,000 he said it cost for preparation and 
presentation can be passed on to its customers in 
the electric bill. Under state law, this is considered 
an operating cost of doing business which can legally 
be included in the rate structure. Unfortunately, 
there is no provision for financing preparation and 
presentation of the public's case.^" 
In addition to needing more time, the Council members 
realized that a delay in the hearing would cause a delay in 
the increase if the Company was successful in getting one. 
Such a delay would forestall increased utility bills and be 
"worth from a few dollars to the pensioner to several 
hundred dollars to businessmen, , , . town, county, and 
state," according to Mayor Hunt, 
Taking all these things into consideration, Leaphart 
asked the Montana Railroad and Public Service Commission for 
a delay in the second half of the hearing. The Commission 
delayed cross-examination one month, from July 9 to August 7, 
to give Montana Power time to submit some requested informa­
tion. Kosh wrote the Public Service Commission that he would 
have difficulty appearing for a public hearing on August 7 
39 Interview with Hon, William E, Hunt, president of 
the Montana Consumers' Council, Helena, Montana, July 24, 
1968, 
^^Letter from Hon, William E, Hunt, president of the 
Montana Consumers' Council to Willis M, McKeon, Malta, 
Montana, attorney, June 13, 1968, 
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because of prior commitments in Colorado and Puerto Rico,^^ 
So Kosh could appear, Leaphart tried to reschedule the 
hearing for August 19. 
The Commission's counsel, William E, O'Leary, replied 
to Leaphart on July 2, 1968, "The Board /of Public Service 
Commissioner^Z is unwilling to continue the date for 
cross-examination because of the delay which such a con­
tinuance would occur /sic/ in these proceedings," Also, 
Leaphart's request was denied because Public Service Com­
missioner Paul T. Smith had planned to attend the Democratic 
National Convention during the time Leaphart had suggested 
for the hearing. 
Leaphart wrote Kosh that the hearing was still set 
for August 7 and explained, "I am aware of the fact that 
quite often there is an extended interval between cross and 
direct examination, , • . but in Montana this is quite an 
42 
acquiescence to modern rate making," 
On August 7) Dr. Kosh was in Colorado on a rate case 
as he said he would be. Leaphart again asked for a delay 
until September when Kosh could be present. Montana Power 
counsel, Robert D. Corette, protested Leaphart*s request as 
^^Letter from Dr. David A. Kosh, Montana Consumers' 
Council utility consultant, to Montana Public Service 
Commission, June 21, I968. 
llO 
Letter from C, W, Leaphart, Jr,, Montana Consumers' 
Council lawyer, to Dr. David A, Kosh, Montana Consumers' 
Council utility consultant, July 8, I968, 
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"unfair, unusual, auid completely unwarranted."^3 Leaphart's 
request for a delay was denied, but the Commission did 
schedule a time in September for Kosh to appear. 
In the event that his request would be denied, Leap-
hart had gone over some to the cross-examination that Kosh 
wanted undertaken, Kosh also sent his associate, Mr, Glass-
man, to help Leaphart during part of the August hearing. 
The timing of the second half of the split rate hear­
ing was advantageous to the Montana Power Company, It was 
conducted during the National Republican Presidential Nomi­
nating Convention when many of Helena's newsmen were in 
Florida and when the attention of the nation was pre-empted 
from following the reporting of cross-examination and rebut­
tal of Company witnesses. The Company had gotten its side 
to the press and the people in May when there was little to 
detract from it. But in August, when the protestants had a 
chance to challenge Company testimony, they had to compete 
for attention with many exciting events. Also, the pro­
testants were handicapped by the denial of a hearing delay 
because their chief rate expert. Dr. Kosh, was not able to 
attend any of the 11 days of testimony or cross-examination, 
Kosh did, however, prepare from the transcript of testimony 
and cross-examination, a statement which he read on behalf 
of the consumers at a short hearing September 3. Kosh was 
ho 
^John J. Morrison (Associated Press), The Missoulian. 
August 8, 1968, p. 20. 
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the only expert testifying on any of the hearing dates who 
conducted a computer analysis of Montana Power's rate 
structure. 
J.D. Holmes, reporter for the Associated Press, wrote 
an account of the September 3 hearing and devoted 12 column 
inches to Dr, Kosh's testimony,' On September 4, 1968, the 
story appeared on page seven of the Great Falls Tribune. 
During the first three days in May, the Tribune had carried 
four front-page stories (5^ column inches of print) about 
Company experts' testimony. Another 26 column inches of 
print, continuing these front-page stories,were printed on 
other pages of the paper. 
The Montana Standard of Butte played the Kosh story 
prominently on the front page and continued it to page two. 
May stories on Company rate experts were positioned, page-
wise, in the same manner as the story on Dr. Kosh, But, 
Company experts were given three times the space that the 
44 consumers' expert was given. 
The Billings Gazette ran the AP story at the bottom 
of page one, but edited out six column inches of Dr. Kosh's 
testimony.' On that day. Gazette editors played stories on 
the Czechoslovak insurrection, Mayor Daley of Chicago, a 
Turkish earthquake, and Montana's then emerging New Reform 
Political Party ahead of the consumer expert's testimony. 
^^The Montana Standard, September 4, I968, p. 1, 
and May 2 and 3» 1968, p. 1. 
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The story on testimony for the consumer was positioned better 
than May accounts of Company testimony, which appeared on 
pages 12 and 17 of the Gazette. But, Company experts garnered 
three times the newspaper space alloted to the consumer 
expert. 
The extra time to prepare testimony granted the Con­
sumers* Council did little to help organizational efforts 
that continued to bog down. On July 10th, Roger H. Elliot 
reported to Hunt that the Council had only received $1,179» 
Hunt traveled to Butte, Missoula, and Great Falls to meet 
with businessmen in continuing fund-raising efforts. He 
also asked Francis J. McCarvel, a Kalispell attorney, to 
raise some money. McCarvel made a few contacts, but did not 
have time to do much. 
At the suggestion of the Farmers* Union, the Council 
finally decided to hire Charles A, Banderob of Huntley, 
Montana, to travel the state as a professional fund raiser. 
Banderob was hired in August, and it was agreed that he would 
get approximately 25 per cent of what he collected to help 
defray his expenses and to pay his wages. By the final day 
of hearings testimony on September 3, it was reported that 
Banderob had collected an after-commission net total of 
$210.36 for the Council. When Banderob was finished, he had 
traveled for three weeks, and put more than 5,000 miles on 
^^The Billings Gazette, September 4, 1968, p. 1; 
May 2, 1968, p. 12; and May 3» 1968, p. 17. 
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his car. He had raised about |5,000—one-third of all the 
46 
money the Consumers' Council finally collected. Banderob's 
commission did not pay his expenses because he had to hire a 
man to run his farm while he traveled. 
Reception of Consumers' Council 
Request for Aid 
Consumer Council efforts to raise money and gain mem­
bers were disappointing to Mayor Hunt. Only 21 of Montana's 
126 municipalities, none of its $6 counties, and three of 
its l64 school districts donated to the Council. 
Support for Council 
One town sent Mayor Hunt a blank claim in which the 
dues amount was not filled in." He returned the claim and 
asked the town clerk if she would fill in the amount of money 
the town wanted to give to the council. 
Raymond Hokanson, superintendent-clerk of Livingston 
School District Number Four, wrote Hunt that the district 
trustees had met at their annual budget meeting on June 24, 
1968, and "voiced their wholehearted support of your cause. 
However, it is impossible for our school board to set aside 
^^Interview with William E. Hunt, president of Montana 
Consumers' Council, Helena, Montana, September 3, I968; and 
Senate, S. 607 Hearings, 1969, p. 151. 
47 The names of the cities and individuals who donated 
to the Consumers' Council have been withheld at Mayor Hunt's 
request. He said he wants the names withheld to prevent any 
reprisal Montana Power may take against its known opponents. 
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money for this purpose," Although the Consumers* Council 
was made aware of the Livingston School trustees' feelings, 
this sentiment was never communicated to the body that had 
to judge on the rate request—the Montana Public Service 
Commission, 
Mr. T, L, Forehand, mayor of Joliet, Montana, did not 
communicate with the Consumers' Council, but he did send a 
letter on April 22, 1968, to the Montana Public Service Com­
mission opposing the rate raise. He said the increase would 
be a hardship on schools and complained that Montana Power's 
service to his town had been poor. Other governments that 
were not in close contact with the consumers but that wrote 
the Public Service Commission opposing the rate raise in­
clude: The Columbia Falls School District Trustees, the 
Hill County Board of Commissioners, Sanders County School 
District Number Two, and the Anaconda City Council. 
Mayor Hershel M, Robbins wrote the Public Service 
Commission that the Roundup City Council was unanimously 
opposed to a Montana Power rate raise. But he wrote Mayor 
Hunt that he did not want to use city or Montana Municipal 
League funds to hire an independent rate expert. Robbins 
said the state already had "sufficient experts" on its pay­
roll who would listen to the citizens' protests and act 
according to their wishes. It is interesting to note that 
^^Letter from Raymond Hokanson, superintendent-clerk 
of Livingston School District Number Four, to Mayor William E. 
Hunt, president of Montana Consumers' Council, June 25, 1968. 
93 
Bobbins communicated his feelings to Hunt on April 23, I968, 
before the Public Service Commission had hired an expert to 
help determine the validity of Montana Power's rate increase 
request. Indeed, the Public Service Commission did not even 
hire its consulting engineer, George P. Hess, until the end 
of June—a month and a half after the first part of the rate 
hearing was over.^^ 
Opposition to Council 
Two municipalities wrote Hunt expressing opposition 
to the Council, One of these, West Yellowstone, Montana, is 
not supplied with energy from the Montana Power Company 
according to the town's mayor, Billie B. Smith, Smith wrote 
that his tovm council "feels that the Montana Public Service 
Commission will not allow an unfair rate increase, 
Mayor Walter H. Myers of Virginia City, Montana, wrote 
his opposition to the Consumers' Council idea: 
Our city Council any myself personally believe 
that when we become smart enough to manage the Mon­
tana Power Co., we will then have reason to believe 
we can tell them when to raise or lower their rates,^ 
kg 
The People's Voice, June 28, I968, p. 4. 
^^Letter from Hon, Billie B, Smith, mayor of West 
Yellowstone, Montana, to William E, Hunt, president of the 
Montana Consumers' Council, June 21, I968, 
^^Letter from Hon. Walter H.' Myers, mayor of Virginia 
City, Montana, to William E. Hunt, president of the Montana 
Consumers' Council, received by Hunt on April 29, 1968, 
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The rest of the local governments let the issue melt 
into oblivion. At its May 9» 1968, meeting, the Red Lodge, 
Montana, council considered the Consumers' Council's request 
for aid and referred it to the Montana Municipal League for 
action. 
The Whitefish, Montana, council wrote Mayor Hunt on 
May 8, 1968, that it was holding off action on the consumers' 
aid request for one week while it studied the matter. The 
Whitefish Council's final decision was never relayed to 
Mayor Hunt. 
The Ronan city clerk informed Mayor Hunt on July 2, 
1968, that as part of the only government retail power sell­
ing outlet in Montana, the Flathead Irrigation Project, 
Ronan citizens enjoyed the lowest rates in the state. The 
clerk wrote: 
As our power in this area is furnished by the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs, we do not feel it would 
serve any useful purpose to attempt to resist any 
rate increases. 
Bozeman, Montana's city manager, Oscar E. Cutting, 
wanted to know the attitude of the Montana Municipal League 
about the Consumers' Council before he would make any com­
ments,= After finding out that the League had failed to sup­
port the Consumers' Council and after working up a preliminary 
budget for the city, Cutting wrote Hunt that he found it 
necessary to inform the Bozeman City Commission 
that we would be completely unable to come up with 
a contribution along the line solicited by your let­
ter and the City Attorney also advised the Commission 
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that he felt there could be a serious question as 
to the legality of such an expenditure,-52 
Mayor McLaughlin of Great Palls said that Mayor 
Hunt's request for help from the city of Great Palls would be 
presented to the city council. But he did not think that it 
would help the request if he championed a resolution support­
ing a consumer movement. Despite the fact that a majority of 
the council is in the same political party as the mayor, he 
felt that they were an independent bunch and said, "I can­
not tell them what to do."^^ 
Butte equivocates,—In Butte, Montana, according to 
former mayor Thomas P, Powers, "A motion passed unani­
mously concurring with Mr, Hunt's request for ten (10) cents 
per person to form the . ,• , 'consumer coalition,'" Exactly 
what happened to this resolution is unclear because the 
Butte City Council has no taped or written record of the 
resolution,' Powers, however, said, "The rate expert 
/Dr, KoshZ proposed by Mr,' Hunt was already conducting such 
an investigation for the Railroad and Public Service Commis­
sion hence we would have been paying an exorbitant fund for 
a mere copy of a previous survey,This belief was 
•^^Letter from Oscar E, Cutting, city manager of Boze-
man, Montana, to William E, Hunt, president of the Montana 
Consumers' Council, June 20, 1968, 
•53interview with John J. McLaughlin, op., c i t .  
Letter from Thomas P, Powers, op. cit. 
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erroneous, but apparently it was enough to convince the 
Butte Council not to donate to the Consumers' Council,' The 
resolution, if ever passed, was apparently rescinded. And 
Butte's city attorney, William N. Geagan, was sent to pro­
test the rate raise at the Helena hearing, Geagan questioned 
only one Montana Power witness and did not file a brief in 
protest. It is also possible that the donation at this time 
of $100,000 to build Butte's first public swimming pool by 
Montana Power's board chairman, J, E, Corette, might have 
generated enough good feeling toward the Company to prevent 
effective opposition to the rate increase request. 
Montana bank examiner questions contributions to the 
Council.—One of the main obstacles the Consumers' Council 
had in getting contributions was the questioning by different 
sources of the legality of such contributions. This question 
came into the open July 11, 19^8, when Albert E. Leuthold, 
Montana's State Bank Examiner, wrote Mayor Hunt asking, 
"By what authority do you feel the municipality can legally 
make a contribution to this organization?" Leuthold said 
that "if there is a legal question involved we would be 
glad to request an Attorney General's Opinion." The Bank 
Examiner's allegations of impropriety were carried widely 
by the press. 
Mayor Hunt said he thought the letter from the Bank 
Examiner's office was inspired by the Montana Power Company 
and was an attempt to discourage the collection of money by 
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his consumers' protection association. 
Leuthold, however> said that his inquiry was a matter 
of routine investigation^ "office received an inquiry 
from the Meagher County Commissioners about the propriety of 
Mayor Hunt's request for funds," said Leuthold, "One of 
our field auditors also noticed a donation to the Consumers' 
group while going over the Deer Lodge city books and asked 
us if it was acceptable," He said that other than these two 
requests, nobody has asked for clarification of the issue and 
that to his knowledge no one from the Power Company or Governor 
Babcock's office had prompted the requests. The auditor 
who called the donations to Leuthold's attention said that 
no Montana Power Company representative had asked him to do 
so, but that he had done it on his own.^^ Leuthold had 
written Hunt on July 11, 1968, that he did not take "issue 
with the merits of the cause for which you work or ques­
tion Municipal officials personal and private activities , , . " 
Two months before the Bank Examiner had questioned 
donations to the Consumers' Council, Hunt had anticipated a 
challenge. He wrote to the Montana Trial Lawyers Association 
and asked them to help prepare a brief if the matter came up 
in court. The trial lawyers never did prepare a brief, but 
•^•^Interview with A.' E. Leuthold, Montana State Bank 
Examiner, August l6, 1968. 
^^Telephone interview with Basil Kennedy, auditor for 
the Montana State Bank Examiner, August l6, 1968. 
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some of them talked with Hunt about the legality of the pro­
posed contributions.^? 
On July 16, 1968, Mayor Hunt replied to Bank Examiner 
Leuthold that : 
Contributions were made on the theory that towns 
and cities could join together for a common good in 
the same manner they could join the Municipal League 
to further the needs of municipality, , . , 
When Montana Power Company advised the cities and 
tovms to increase their budget for gas and electri­
city by 15/0 it became a matter of concern to the 
cities and tovms and I believe it was incumbent upon 
the cities and towns to investigate the need for the 
rate and to furnish evidence of the results of the 
investigation to the Public Service Commission, , , , 
Because the hearings required special experience 
and training, the municipalities, instead of sending 
their own town or city attorney to the hearing, 
pooled their resources and under the authority of 
Section 11-811 RCM 19^7» . . , made contributions 
to a single organization. 
That section of the law provides in part; 
Nothing herein shall be taken or construed as 
preventing the city council from employing other 
and additional counsel in special cases, and pro­
viding for the payment of such services. 
Hunt did not tell Leuthold about another law, Section 
11-989 RCM 1947, which states: 
The council of any incorporated city or town shall 
have power, by ordinance, to provide for and regulate 
the inspection and the measurement of gas, electric, 
or other light, and electric or other power, sold 
within its limits or brought into or carried through 
any such city or town. 
^^Letter from Hon, William E. Hunt to Wade J, Dahood, 
Anaconda, Montana, president of Montana Trial Lawyers Associ­
ation, April 23, 1968, 
•^^Montana, Revised Codes (1947), sec, II-989. 
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Hunt said he felt this section confirmed the legality of 
contributions to the Consumers' Council, but wanted to 
reserve its mention as an ace in the hole in case he had to 
defend contributions in court. 
Hunt also had an informal discussion with the Attorney 
General's office about the legality of the contributions and 
concluded that he did not "know what the result of an 
Attorney General * s opinion would be but ... it appears 
69 that they would conclude the same thing that I have done," 
Mr. Leuthold did, in fact, request an Attorney 
General's opinion on the matter. Attorney General Forrest H.' 
Anderson assigned the opinion to a lawyer who went on vacation 
shortly after he received the assignment. Whether or not 
the Attorney General did this to purposely cause a delay in 
the opinion cannot be ascertained for sure/ But the delay 
did give the Consumers' Council additional time to collect 
money without having such a collection declared illegal 
until after the Consumers' rate experts and lawyers were 
paid. 
The delay in the Attorney General's opinion may have 
had a detrimental as well as a beneficial effect upon the 
fund-raising efforts of the Consumers' Council. The fact 
^^Letter from Hon. William E. Hunt, president of the 
Montana Consumers' Council, to C. W. Leaphart, Jr., Leo C. 
Graybill, Jr., and Oscar Hendrickson, attorneys for the 
Montana Consumers' Council, July 17, 1968. 
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that contributions to the Consumers' Council were not declared 
legal by a high state authority gave local governments such 
as the Bozeman City Commission a convenient excuse not to 
donate for fear of doing something illegal,' Such was the 
case in Cascade County, Montana, 
Cascade County commissioners ignore Council request 
for funds,'—When Mayor Hunt's June 18 letter asking for aid 
arrived in the office of the Cascade County Commissioners, 
only Republican Commissioner Chan W.' Ferguson was present. 
The other two commissioners, Democrat Edward L, Shubat and 
Republican John St,' Jermain, were out of town. Commissioner 
Ferguson filed the letter without acting on it. An August 12, 
1968, investigation in the commissioners' office produced 
the finding that Shubat and St, Jermain had not been made 
aware of Mayor Hunt's letter, Ferguson was asked if he had 
purposely buried the letter because of favoritism to the 
Montana Power Company or fear of it. Commissioner Shubat 
interrupted rather heatedly before Ferguson could answer 
saying, "I don't think Chan would purposely keep anything 
from us." He preferred to credit the commissioners' inaction 
on the letter to bureaucratic inefficiency rather than dis­
honesty. Shubat said he would refer the letter to Cascade 
County Attorney Gene B, Daly for an opinion on the legality 
of donations to the Consumers' Council and make the 
commissioners' final decision available. Notice of any 
further action by the commissioners, however, was not made 
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available. It would be erroneous to conclude from these 
facts, however, that Mayor Hunt's request for aid had 
been thwarted by pro-Montana Power county commissioners. 
Both Shubat and St, Jerraain are on record as having given 
personal contributions to help the Cascade County Consumers' 
Association fight Montana Power's 196I gas rate raise. 
It is likely that bureaucratic inefficiency such as 
that in Cascade County had its toll on Mayor Hunt's request 
for support,' On April 22, the date Hunt sent notice of 
Chester's resolve to hire an expert to the cities, J, H, 
McAlear of Red Lodge wrote Hunt, "The copy of the re­
solution should be mailed to the City Clerk of each muni­
cipality rather than to the mayor in order to be sure that 
it is called to the attention of the respective city coun­
cils," Hunt replied the next day, "I had thought of 
sending the resolution to the clerk , ,• but decided against 
it because I wanted to make it personal to the mayor, I was 
going to send one to each member of each council and to the 
newspaper editor but ran out of time and money," The mayors 
in some cities probably failed to relay Hunt's request for 
aid, and since no one else in the city government received 
a copy of the resolution, it was effectively buried. 
Few Governments Determine 
Effect of Raise on Budget 
The Chester Town Council had resolved to report to 
the people on an act that would raise taxes in the state. 
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county, or tovm. They knew that a 15 per cent increase in 
energy rates would require a concurrent tax increase of one 
dollar for every person in Chester if an increased city 
energy bill was to be paid,' Pew other public officials, 
however, tried to ascertain the effect of the proposed rate 
increase before acting upon Mayor Hunt's request to join 
in hiring an independent rate expert, Choteau, Montana, 
made estimates about what the increase would mean to it, 
Missoula City Council acts without knowledge of the 
effects of the rate increase.—Before any estimate had been 
made on how much the increase would cost Missoula taxpayers, 
the Missoula, Montana, City Council voted 9-1 not to join 
the Consumers' Council, 
According to the Missoula City Council minutes, before 
the vote, "Mayor Shoup commented that the Montana Municipal 
League had denied this request at the executive session 
last week, " A motion was then made by Alderman J, J,^ Howe 
that Hunt's request for financial aid be denied. It was 
seconded by Alderman James P," Nugent, a Montana Power 
employee, Nugent, now deceased, and Lamar Jones, another 
Montana Power Company employee, were among those voting 
against Hunt's request. 
Neither Mayor Richard G, Shoup nor the City Clerk 
of Missoula could estimate how much a 15 per cent increase 
in the electricity bill would cost the city of Missoula, 
^^Minutes of the Missoula City Council, May 13, 1968, 
p.' 6, 
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If they had researched it, they would have found that 
Missoula pays 25 different gas and light bills averaging 
about $10,000 every month, or $120,000 every year, to 
Montana Power,' The City Clerk did not know precisely which 
rate schedule each of these different light bills was 
figured under so this researcher had to estimate that a 
15 per cent increase in power rates would cost Missoula at 
least $18,000 a year.' A 25 per cent increase would cost 
$30,000 a year. On the basis of this estimate, the Missoula 
City Council was asked to reconsider its action and support 
an independent rate investigation. The council refused. 
State officials procrastinate in determining effects 
of rate increase,—Commenting on data released by Jerry R. 
Holloron, columnist for the Lee Newspapers, The People's 
Voice wrote that "MPCo.'s proposed increase in electric 
and natural gas rates . .• will cost our strapped state 
treasury an estimated $180,000 a year. 
Until prompted by newsmen, the officers of state 
government had not attempted to determine how much the pro­
posed rate increase would cost Montana.' Governor Babcock said, 
"The Railroad and Public Service Commission is an elected 
body which preempts my jurisdiction over the conduct or 
decision of this rate hearing. It represents the state in 
this matter." He said he would not take a political stand 
^^The People's Voice, May 24, 1968, p. 1. See also 
Jerry R. Holloron, "New Group Opposes MP Rate Hike," The 
Billings Gazette, June 2, I968, p. 1.' 
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on whether or not the increase was justified, 
"No legislators have discussed the Montana Power Com­
pany rate raise in depth with me," said Donald L, Sorte, 
then executive director of the Montana Legislative Council. 
"Nor have they asked my staff to determine the effect the 
raise will have upon the state budget, 
On îiay 1, 1968, Montana state legislator, Russell L. 
Doty, Jr., asked Governor Babcock's budget director, 
Richard P.' Morris, to ascertain how much the proposed rate 
increase would cost the state of Montana,' Morris procrasti­
nated until August. This caused C, W. Leaphart, a con­
sumer lawyer, to remark that Morris would probably not come 
up with the data because his uncle was the head accountant 
for the Montana Power Company, Morris said he had never 
been in contact with his uncle on the matter nor had he been 
told by the Governor or anyone else to stall the information 
64 or prevent its release. 
Finally, Morris had Ralph C, Kenyon, the Montana 
State Controller, get a computer printout of all of Montana 
Power's claims against the state for a period of one year, 
Kenyon obtained 58 11 x 17-inch pages of raw data at a cost 
^^Interview with Hon, Tim Babcock, governor of Montana, 
August 8, 1968, 
Interview with Donald L, Sorte, August 8, 1968, 
All 
Conversation with C, W, Leaphart, Jr,, lawyer for 
Montana Consumers' Council, August 7, I968, Interview with 
Richard F, Morris, Montana state budget director, August 8, 
1968. 
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of about $200 for computer time. Morris said this cost was 
one of the reasons for the delay,' 
Kenyon asked William M/ Johnson, the overworked Public 
Service Commission auditor, to apply the rate schedules to 
this data, Johnson said he would do this when he had time. 
But except for helping a few state agencies figure new bud­
gets, Johnson never did have time to determine what the raise 
would cost the entire state government. Instead, state 
officials accepted Jerry R. Holloron's $180,000 estimate of 
what the increase would be,' 
Holloron's early estimates seem low,' The computer 
printouts of utility bills released three months after 
Holloron's original research, revealed that the University 
of Montana at Missoula spent about $220,000 a year on gas 
and electricity.- If that bill were to increase 15 per cent, 
the additional cost would be $33,000. But in addition to 
the University of Montana, Montana Power serves five other 
state colleges, 10 state institutions, the deaf and blind 
school, the state highway department and highway patrol 
installations, the capitol complex in Helena, and state 
liquor stores. It is likely that the combined total of 
increased utility bills from all of these state departments 
was considerably higher than $180,000, Certainly high 
enough to offset the increased statewide property tax 
Montana Power will have to "pay" on improvements made 
with its increased revenue. 
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As has been mentioned, the Consumers' Council was 
aided by many existing interest groups in its quest for an 
independent rate investigation. The next chapter will be 
devoted to a discussion of that aid. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE îffiCrîANICS/OP GROUP MOBILIZATION 
"No group can be stated, or defined, or valued 
. . . except in terms of other groups."^ 
Rural Electric Cooperatives 
Organization and Staff 
Twenty-five rural electric cooperatives (RECs) serve 
2 
53,970 Montana families. To promote their common interests, 
21 of these cooperatives have affiliated with Montana Asso­
ciated Utilities, Inc. (MAU), a non-profit corporation, 
3 which consists solely of electric utilities. All of Mon­
tana's RECs as well as Montana Associated Utilities belong to 
the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association (NRECA). 
Nationally, the NRECA lobbies for low-cost power generation 
and rural transmission and distribution projects. It 
^Bentley, 0£. cit., p. 21?. 
2 
Letter from Ray W. Penton, editor, Montana Rural 
Electric News, March 23, 1970. 
3 Montana Associated Utilities, I968 Directory ; 
Montana Rural Electric and Telephone Cooperatives (Great 
Palls, Montana: Montana Associated Utilities, Inc., I968), 
pp. i and 63. (Includes Glacier Electric Cooperative, which 
recently joined so the membership does not show in the 
Directory.) 
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participated in court proceedings to protect the interests 
of electric cooperatives, coordinates cooperative activi­
ties, and conducts training schools on management, account­
ing, engineering, maintenance, etc, for its members. Mon­
tana Associated Utilities performs these same services on 
a smaller scale for its Montana members. 
To coordinate its statewide efforts, MAU has hired 
a fulltime executive secretary, Riley Wm, Childers, and 
a staff assistant (office secretary), Earlene Lee, It also 
retains the Great Falls auditing firm of Artz, Clark, 
Stevens and Deming, and until recently, Hubert J, Massman of 
Helena acted as attorney. Working from MAU headquarters on 
the second floor of Great Palls' Rainbow Hotel, Childers 
attends district cooperative meetings and coordinates the 
work of 11 standing committees that include: publications, 
power use, legislative, retail rate, advertising, insurance, 
water resources, job training and safety, and three others. 
Cooperative staff members and customers serve on these 
committees, 
Public Relations 
Print media,—Each month Ray W, Fenton of Public Rela­
tions Associates in Great Falls edits the Montana Rural 
Electric News (IffiEN), It is a 20-30 page, two-color magazine 
comprised of editorials, columns from officers and staff, a 
section for teenagers and housewives, and full-page reports 
with pictures on the activities and problems of MAU's member 
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cooperatives. 
The Montana Rural .Electric News ( MREN) is distributed 
to 29,671 subscribers, libraries, and schools each month. 
It claims a readership of 150,000 and has the largest circu-
4 
lation of any rural publication in the state. It gave 
sparse coverage to the Montana Power Company rate raise 
request and to the Consumers' Council opposition. These sub­
jects were not mentioned in nine of the 12 MREN issues pub­
lished from March of 1968 through March of 19^9. The March, 
1968, issue carried six column inches of news telling that 
the Montana Public Service Commission planned to hire an 
expert in the case. The June issue included a reprinted 
editorial from The Billings Gazette and a news story, all of 
which totaled only 18 column inches. Over half of the 
attention given the Consumers' Council by MREN came after the 
rate hearing was completed and too late to aid organizational 
efforts. In September's 24-inch "Watts' from Washington" 
column, Vic Reinemer pleaded for money to finish paying the 
expert. Dr. David A. Kosh, who had testified for the con­
sumers. This issue also carried an illustrated feature 
describing the Consumers' Council July organizational meeting 
in Missoula. 
Sound media.—Montana Associated Utilities also spon­
sored a radio broadcast over 20 Montana stations for its 
^Montana Rural Electric News, XVII, No. 3 (November 
1969), 26. 
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members and the general public. Commencing in April of 
1968, MU and the Montana Farmers Union presented a five-
minute radio editorial commentary each weekday at noon. The 
Farmers Union sponsored the program Monday through Thursday, 
and 14 MAU cooperatives sponsored it on Friday. 
The cooperatives used their five minutes each week 
primarily to inform the urban public on what rural electrics 
accomplish. The program also championed "territorial 
integrity" and municipal power and counteracted investor-
owned utility propaganda. The total yearly cost to the rural 
electric cooperatives for this program was #12,000. The 
total promotional budget of MAU for all expenditures in­
cluding MEM was 1^7,000 for the year 1968,^ 
Even though the expense of radio time was shared, the 
Friday MAU program was not intentionally related in content 
to the Farmers Union program. According to Ray W. Fenton, 
the REGs did not even use the voice of Farmers Union 
announcer, Clyde T, Jarvis, because they were "afraid that 
political association would cause membership complaints."^ 
^Interview with Ray W. Fenton, editor, Montana Rural 
Electric News, Great Falls, Montana, August 8, 1968. 
^Ibid, The radio program was dropped on April 17, 
1970, just two years after it began. The cooperatives that 
sponsored the program felt it was good and that it should be 
continued. But that everybody should pay for it since every­
body benefited from it. Some cooperatives that had pre­
viously refused to sponsor the program continued to refuse, 
however. And some eastern Montana cooperatives became afraid 
that the program would raise the ire of Montana-Dakota Utili­
ties, a private utility that they often buy power from. So, 
Ill 
fhe diversified political views found among the mem­
bers of electric cooperatives hinder the formation of 
cooperative and non-cooperative policy decisions. Most 
rural folks, regardless of political belief, benefit from 
rural electrification. But not everybody supports it. Con­
servative John Birch and Farm Bureau types join liberal 
Farmers Unionites at monthly meetings to form the policies 
of their cooperatives. And these people of widely differ­
ing views are not always in accord.' Often the policy coming 
from the monthly board meetings is a compromise between 
these polarized views. And, as in the case, of the 11 
cooperatives that chose not to sponsor the five-minute 
radio program, compromised policy is no policy, 
MAU's continuing inability to articulate its own 
interest will cause a decline in the political punch the 
rural electric cooperatives are able to muster as a counter­
vailing force to Montana Power, That political punch has 
already been "pulled" by reapportionment and by the decline 
in rural population. The loss of electric patrons in rural 
areas conceivably could be offset if the cooperatives are 
allowed to sell electricity to people who move to coopera­
tive service areas in the suburbs. 
since some of the cooperatives were not cooperative, the pro­
gram was stopped. 
The Montana Power Company requested tapes of all 
Montana Associated Utilities' broadcasts. The Intermountain 
News Network sent the tapes and, presumably, the Company 
monitored what its competitors were saying. 
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Territorial Integrity 
Through the years, however, the Montana Power Company 
has initiated and successfully prosecuted lawsuits to estab­
lish the Company's right to serve customers in electric 
cooperative areas that were once rural but that have become 
urban or suburban because of population growth or migration. 
State courts have granted Montana Power the right to construct 
facilities in these areas and serve them even though service 
lines may already exist there, and even though consumers have 
elected to receive cheaper electricity from the coopera-
7 tives. To counteract this "skimming of the cream" from 
their most profitable service areas, the cooperatives have 
sought "territorial integrity" legislation. If this legis­
lation passes, existing service areas will not be subject 
to raiding and the numerical and political strength of the 
cooperatives will increase as suburban areas grow. Other­
wise, the influence of rural electric cooperatives will 
dwindle because cooperatives will be growing at a slower rate 
O 
than Montana's other electric utilities, 
^Montana Rural Electric News (April, 1968), pp. 12-21, 
(January,1969), pp, 12-13. 
^Even though the number of families served by rural 
electric cooperatives may dwindle in Montana, the amount of 
electricity marketed will double every seven to 10 years. 
This will be due to the increased use of irrigation systems, 
pumps, milking machines, and other electrical innovations, 
according to projections made by the Federal Power Commis­
sion, 
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MAU and the Consumers' 
Council 
Montana Associated Utilities did not use the power it 
now has to countervail Montana Power's influential request 
for increased rates. William Hunt, the president of the 
Montana Consumers' Council, spoke at a MU board meeting on 
July 18, 1968, Mayor Hunt's speech produced little overt 
help from the cooperatives. And they took no public stand 
supporting the Consumers' Council investigation of the rate 
increase request. 
Cooperatives not affected by rate increase.— A com­
mercial and residential electric rate increase has no effect 
upon the cooperatives that buy only wholesale electricity 
from Montana Power. Therefore, they had little reason to 
oppose the increase. As Eugene P, Pike told members of the 
Missoula Electric Cooperative, "The only effect any Montana 
Power Company rate increases would have on your cooperative's 
rates is that it would make them look just that much better,"^ 
Cooperatives buy wholesale electricity from Montana 
Power,—Other reasons for cooperative non-support of the 
Consumers' Council can be deduced from the following state­
ment by Riley Wm, Childers, executive secretary of Montana 
Associated Utilities. He said, "Support of our Association 
^Montana Rural Electric News, June, 1968, p. 9. Pike, 
incidentally, fought the rate increase even though it had 
no effect on the coop, he manages. 
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becomes somewhat more complicated because of the nature of 
the /rate raise/ petition and existing contracts , . , 
/between/ various rural electrics and the power company. 
In 1965, Montana Power charged the cooperatives a lower 
wholesale rate—4.72 mills per kilowatt-hour—than any 
investor-owned utility in the United States. Only the 
Bonneville Power Administration and the Tennessee Valley 
Authority, both government projects, had lower wholesale 
r a t e s , T w e l v e  o f  t h e  1 ?  r u r a l  e l e c t r i c  c o o p e r a t i v e s  t h a t  
are located within or adjacent to Montana Power's service 
12 area buy wholesale electricity from the Company. These 
cooperatives may not have wanted to oppose the rate increase 
request and risk Montana Power reprisals in the form of 
higher wholesale rates or refusal to sell power to the 
cooperatives. 
^^Letter from Riley Wm,' Childers, executive 
secretary of MU, to William E, Hunt, April 29, I968. 
11 The Montana Power Go,, Serving YOU is Our Bus­
iness , 1966, p. 10. 
1 ? Smith, Barney & Co., and Kidder, Peabody & Co., 
Preliminary Prospectus, The Montana Power Company First 
Mortgage Bonds Series Due 1974, February 9, 1970, p. 11. 
Cooperatives purchasing electricity from Montana Power 
include: Big Flat Electric, Hill County Electric, McCone 
Electric, Missoula Electric, Park Electric, Sun River Elec­
tric, Tongue River Electric, Yellowstone Valley Electric, 
Beartooth Electric, Big Horn County Electric, Fergus Elec­
tric, and Vigilante Electric. 
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Cooperative board members are not financially inde­
pendent .—At least two other reasons exist to explain why 
rural electric cooperatives did not overtly support the 
Consumers' Council,' First, some of the cooperative board 
members are as financially interested in the welfare of 
Montana Power as they are in the welfare of their coopera­
tives. For example, Charles E. Sweeney, president of the 
board of directors of the Big Horn Electric Cooperative, is 
vice-president of the Big Horn City State Bank in Hardin, 
Montana, which does business with Montana Power. Because 
he wears two hats, Sweeney is vulnerable to implicit or 
explicit pressure from Montana Power. An anti-Company 
position by the Sweeney-led cooperative board might 
jeopardize the bank's business with the Company, This may 
be one reason the board has often acted in a pro-Company 
manner as it did when Yellowtail Dam was built near the 
cooperative's service area. As a cooperative. Big Horn 
Electric was offered the opportunity to hook onto the 
Yellowtail Power network and buy low-cost federal power 
directly from the Bureau of Reclamation. Big Horn Electric's 
board of directors turned down this government offer and 
chose instead to continue buying electricity at wholesale 
prices from Montana Power, which purchased electricity 
from the Bureau of Reclamation. 
Like most major corporations in the state, Montana 
Power does some business with most all of the banks in its 
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service area. This public relations policy prevents the 
officers of one bank from becoming irate because a competitor 
is getting all of the Company business. The policy also 
creates a "live and let live" attitude that effectively 
neutralizes opposition to many Company positions. 
Another example of where the conflicting financial 
interest of a cooperative board member destroyed united 
cooperative policy occurred at the Glacier Electric Coopera­
tive in Gutbank, Montana. Glacier Electric's I968 board 
president, G. S. Frary, owned Montana Power stock and demon­
strated repeatedly that he was not likely to favor any 
cooperative action that would not enhance his investment. He 
did not favor Glacier Electric opposition to a Montana Power 
built transmission line which, when completed, would aid the 
Company in serving a large cooperative customer. And he 
opposed and helped prevent Glacier Electric's affiliation 
with Montana Associated Utilities, the statewide cooperative 
organization. Glacier Electric became a member of MAU 
after Frary resigned his board position in I969. 
Cooperative board members are elderly.—Another expla­
nation of why the rural electric cooperatives did not overtly 
support the Consumers' Council lies in the attitude of their 
elderly board members. 
The average age of cooperative board members is that 
of the men who pioneered rural electrification in Montana— 
over 65. The attitude of these conservative-thinking elders 
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discourages the more liberal "young turks." The result iJ 
conservative policy. Perhaps these older men are tired of 
"locking horns" with Montana Power, Public relations man, 
Bay W, Fenton, believes 
they have the notion that "If we leave the Montana 
Power Company alone, it won't get riled and will 
leave us alone," Also, they are afraid that if they 
help publicly, it will hurt the rural electrification 
movement. Therefore, it the co-ops do help, it will 
be from behind the scenes to keep the heat off. Some 
rural electric personnel and patrons will donate indi­
vidually in an attempt to keep Montana Power occupied 
so it won't have time to fight them.^3 
Clandestine donations?—Indeed, the help that the 
Consumers' Council did get was from behind the scenes. One 
cooperative, which does not want to be mentioned by name, 
donated $200 to the Consumers' Council. The money was 
donated because it was thought that the Council investigation 
would prevent the Montana Power Company from getting money 
to extend its facilities into the cooperative service area. 
Mayor Hunt thought that another |1,000-|l,500 may have been 
donated anonymously by MÂU members. 
ACRE! The Cooperative 
Political Action Arm 
In times past it has been difficult for a cooperative 
to donate to a political cause. Cooperatives may allocate 
five per cent of their net margin (what is left after 
patronage rebates) for educational purposed such as advertising. 
But they are subject to the "no-political-contribution" laws 
^^Interview with Ray W, Fenton, o_£. cit, 
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that govern the actions of any business. Recently, MU 
has set up a political action group called Montana Action 
Committee for Rural Electrification (Montana ACRE) so that 
it can support candidates and causes in the political arena, 
ACRE is asking for minimum dues contributions of |10 from 
individuals (no corporations) who want to support the 
political friends of rural electricity. Preliminary 
indications are that ACRE will be a successful program. 
Donation booths set up at the annual meetings of the Sun 
River and Sheridan Electric Cooperatives each produced about 
300 ACRE members. 
The Montana Farmers Union 
Organization and 
Membership 
Agrarian interests were slow to oppose the corpora­
tions in Montana. The policies espoused by the Farmers 
Alliances did not reach the state until 1914', after they had 
penetrated the rest of the country. In that year, the Montana 
Society of Equity was organized. It quickly mushroomed to 
maturity with 15,000 members by 1917. And, in 1918, it was 
succeeded by the Nonpartisan League. The members of this 
organization tried to raise the price of farm products and 
lower the price of goods farmers bought. These goals brought 
it into conflict with the corporations that controlled the 
^^Interview with Ray W. Penton, editor, Montana Rural 
Electric News, November 28, I969. 
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railroads, grain elevators, and large general stores 
like the Missoula Mercantile. Many of the League's mem­
bers thought the corporations controlled Montana^s politi­
cal machinery, too, and they gathered frequently to hear 
men like Burton K. Wheeler vehemently condemn the Company, 
The most long-lived of the progressive farm organi­
zations is the Montana Farmers Union. It started in Montana 
when 21 farmers formed Ronan Local No. 1. Following four 
years of organizing, the Montana Farmers Union was chartered 
in Great Falls on April 3, 1916, during the first annual 
convention. 
The Farmers Union represented 2,000 farm families 
back in 1916 and grew steadily until 1958 when 15,9^0 families 
dispersed in all of the state's 56 counties professed member­
ship,^^ The Farmers Union, like the other liberal farm 
organizations, has often opposed Montana's corporate in­
terests. Maintaining its prior opposition to the Company, 
the Farmers Union became the most influential pressure group 
to support the Consumers' Council in its quest for an inde­
pendent evaluation of Montana Power's I968 electric and gas 
rate increase request. 
In past journalistic analyses of Montana politics, 
too often the influence of the Farmers Union has been over 
or underestimated, and almost always such analysis has been 
^^What Is Montana Farmers Union (Great Falls, Mon­
tana: Montana Farmers Union, rev. 1966), p. h. 
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too simplistic. To avoid these mistakes and more thoroughly 
evaluate the influence of the Farmers Union and its ability 
to muster countervailing power against Company forces, it is 
necessary to examine mathematically the actual support the 
Farmers Union can claim. 
Approximately one-third of Montana's 26,000 farm 
families belong to the Farmers Union. About one-sixth of 
the state's farm families belong to the Farm Bureau, the 
Farmers Union's largest competitor. Farmers Union member­
ship dwindled from a peak of 15,9^0 families in 1958 to 
8,500 families in 1969. Although some of this decline in 
membership undoubtedly is due to the fact that seven thousand 
Montana farms have ceased operation since 1958, much of the 
decline in membership is also due to other factors such as 
leadership problems, market conditions, and the doubling of 
membership dues in 1966. The Farmers Union has about the 
same number of member families now as it had in 1952 when 
Montana had 10,000 more farms than exist today. The payment 
of #10 dues by each of these 8,500 farm families entitles 
the husband, wife, and all children over l6 to voting member­
ship in the Montana Farmers Union. So the actual voting 
membership of the Farmers Union is in the neighborhood of 16,000^ 
^^Montana, Department of Agriculture, Montana Agri­
culture Statistics, XII (Helena, 1968), 19. Also What Is 
Montana Farmers Union (Great Falls, Montana: Montana 
Farmers Union, rev. I966), p. 4. 
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These 16,000 people have formed nearly 200 Farmers 
Union locals. Three or more locals in a county can consti­
tute a county union of which there are 4-1. Locals usually 
meet monthly. County Farmers Union organizations convene 
monthly or quarterly and are composed of delegates from the 
county's locals. Both locals and county unions send dele­
gates to an annual convention of the state Farmers Union, 
At this meeting the state president and vice president are 
elected. Delegates also select people to serve on the five-
member board of directors—two directors being elected during 
one year and three the next. 
The Farmers Union has three basic functions: it pro­
motes education, cooperation, and legislation. The union 
conducts educational projects such as summer camps, work­
shops, citizenship encampments, lobbying trips to state and 
national legislatures, and conventions, which in a recent 
year attracted more than 1,200 youth and 1,200 adults. 
Public Relations 
In the past, the Farmers Union has utilized a cir­
culating library, pamphlets, action letters, a national leg­
islative newsletter, three organizational newspapers and radio 
to reach its adult members. Also, about 3,000 copies of the 
National Farmers Union Washington Newsletter are distributed 
^^What Is Montana Farmers Union, loc. cit., p. 10. 
122 
in Montana, according to Thomas Ryan, former secretary-
treasurer of the Montana Farmers Union. This newsletter 
does not deal with Montana affairs and did not carry stories 
concerning the Montana Power rate raise request. 
Print media.—The Pilot, a monthly one-page news­
letter mailed to about 300 Farmers Union officers, carried 
two stories concerning the rate raise request. 
About 15 column inches of print were devoted to 
opposing the rate raise request in the Montana Farmers Union 
News, a four-page monthly, which was mailed to 10,000 farm 
families until it suspended publication in the fall of 1969 
because of inadequate financing. The Pilot is now being 
mailed to the general membership of the Farmers Union in 
place of the suspended Montana Farmers Union News. Clyde T. 
Jarvis, then director of public relations for the Montana 
Farmers Union, said that he had included Consumers' Council 
material in a Farmers Union mailing to about 10,000 families. 
To educate the general public the Farmers Union spon­
sored radio commentaries. It also joined the labor movement 
in support of the cooperative newspaper. The People's Voice. 
The People's Voice, edited between 19^6 and I969 by 
independent-minded Harry L. Billings and his wife, Gretchen, 
18 Interview with Thomas J. Ryan, former secretary-
treasurer of the Montana Farmers Union, August 10, 1968. 
^^Interview with Clyde T. Jarvis, director of public 
relations, Montana Farmers Union, Great Falls, Montana, 
August 9, 1968. 
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devoted much space each week to vigorous opposition of the 
rate raise request. During a time in the 194^8 and 1950s 
when most of Montana's other papers were Company-dominated, 
The Voice led the opposition to Montana's corporate interests 
But by 1968, that once-potent opposition was waning. Gret-
chen G. Billings, who had reported Company maneuvers clearly 
and accurately, was beset with back trouble and was unable to 
do much reporting, Harry L, Billings was struggling to keep 
the paper, which did not take commercial advertising, 
financially solvent. And Patricia Scott, The Voice reporter, 
frankly admitted her lack of knowledge about public utility 
regulation. Despite these handicaps, Voice editorials 
continued to be thought-provoking. For example, Harry L. 
Billings compared electric rate raises with tax increases 
in understandable layman's terms--a comparison not to be 
20 
found in other statewide newspapers. And Gretchen G. 
Billings entertained a lively discussion in her column 
"What Do You Think?" advocating that the terms of all three 
Public Service Commissioners should expire at the same time 
in order to make the Commission responsible to the electorate, 
The Voice was no longer as alone in its anti-Company crusade 
as it had once been, however. Other newspapers were taking 
over the editorial role that they had ignored during the 
^^The People's Voice, August I6, I968, p. 2. 
^^The People's May 31, 1968, p. 4. 
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period when they were owned by the Anaconda Copper Mining 
Company. The Missoulian. which in 19^4 had not even mentioned 
the existence of the Federal Power Commission hearings in 
Butte, was now editorializing for a more competent Public 
p p 
Service Commission, And The Billings Gazette, also a former 
Anaconda Copper owned newspaper, editorialized against the 
1968 raise and in favor of public utility districts (PUDs).^^ 
Weekly Voice accounts of the rate hearings did increase 
the public's knowledge, and some of these accounts were more 
comprehensive than those carried by the daily press. But the 
daily press often outreported The Voice. And, at times, Harry 
L. Billings reprinted daily press articles causing Montanans, 
who once relied on The Voice as the state's most reliable non­
corporate source of information to realize that the Lee News­
paper and Great Falls Tribune state bureaus were reporting the 
facts as independently and more rapidly than The Voice. The 
Voice's financial support dwindled as its function of independ­
ent reporting and editorializing was assumed by the daily press. 
The death knell of The Voice sounded when Harry L. 
Billings favored Eugene J, McCarthy for president while op­
posing the labor-supported Lyndon B, Johnson Vietnam policy. 
Billings also favored Harriet Miller and LeRoy Anderson, Demo­
cratic candidates for congress and governor, instead of Arnold 
01sen and Eugene Mahoney,who had the sympathies of many in the 
labor movement. Billings had opposed Voice supporters before— 
The Missoulian, June 5> 19o8, p, 6, 
23 
The Billings Gazette, March 25, I968. 
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he endorsed Henry A. Wallace in 1948—a!nd retained sufficient 
financial backing to publish, but the situation was different 
in 1968. If The Voice folded, some laborers and farmers be­
lieved they could turn elsewhere to have their stories told. 
And they would not be perplexed by an editor who occasionally 
criticized them as well as corporate interests. Some cooper­
atives and unions continued supporting The Voice, but others 
gradually took their printing jobs elsewhere and thereby cut 
off revenue that helped support the paper in the absence of 
advertising that was accepted only on a limited basis. Since 
his supporters did not need his independent voice as badly as 
in 1948, Harry L. Billings could not now be as independent in 
his thinking as he had been then. Reacting to Billings' inde­
pendence, members of the Montana Carpenter's District Council 
forced a labor convention resolution censoring and chastizing 
a voice report. The resolution did not eliminate API—CIO 
union financial backing of The Voice. But this insult to his 
free newspaper drained the last drop of enthusiasm from Harry 
L. Billings, who had devoted his life to labor's cause. He 
resigned. A short time later the paper folded. 
It is ironic that that which Harry L. Billings sup­
ported most—an independent press in Montana—forced his 
paper out of business. Not all of the countervailing power 
of independent reporting that The Voice once offered Mon­
tana's corporate interests died when The Voice ceased to 
publish weekly. Rather, The People's Voice ceased to publish 
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partly because an alternative countervailing power could 
be provided by a large and independent, but competing, 
daily press. 
Whether or not that daily press will remain indepen­
dent now that The Voice's example is gone remains to be seen. 
Certainly, the countervailing power of the uncensored 
reporting in The Voice and daily newspapers combined to give 
Montanans the clearest picture of a utility rate hearing 
that they have ever had. Now that The Voice has closed, 
that countervailing power has dwindled. 
Sound Media 
In 1968, the Montana Farmers Union Insurance Agency, 
an independent tax-paying corporation, was sponsoring a 
noontime commentary on Montana affairs by Clyde T. Jarvis, 
director of public relations for the Montana Farmers Union, 
The program was aired weekdays over 26 stations located in 
21 Montana towns and cities, Jarvis said that the program 
included references to the Consumers' Council and the rate 
raise controversy in about 20 broadcasts between April 15 
and August 8, I968. 
At one time during these broadcasts, Jarvis and other 
consumer advocates thought that the Montana Power Company or 
someone prompted by it was subtly pressuring the Inter-
mountain News Network to have the Farmers Union program 
removed from the air, Jarvis said he thought that the 
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network had been threatened with a libel suit, and that 
equal time had been demanded to rebut some of the things 
oh 
he had said. 
Jack Paige, executive vice president of the Inter-
mountain Network, Inc., responded when questioned on this 
matter, "We have never been asked by Montana Power or any 
other organization to remove the Montana Farmers Union 
Program, 
Prior to Mr. Paige's letter, however, another net­
work official intimated to Bay W. Penton, public relations 
man for the rural electric cooperatives, that D. A. Davidson 
Company and Power-Tovmsend Company were unhappy about the 
Jarvis broadcasts. They sponsored stock and weather reports 
that were aired adjacent to the Farmers Union program over 
station KBLL in Helena. They threatened to go off the air if 
the views expressed by Jarvis were not disassociated from 
their programs, KBLL offered to move the Farmers Union 
program and to follow Jarvis' broadcast with a disclaimer 
saying that views expressed by him were not those of the 
station or its other sponsors. Also, Socs N. Vratis, a 
lobbyist for the Montana Retail Association, was unhappy 
^^Interview with Clyde T. Jarvis, director of public 
relations for Montana Farmers Union, Great Falls, Montana, 
August 9, 1968. 
^•^Letter from Jack Paige, executive vice president of 
Intermountain News, to author, August 13, 1968. 
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with statements that Jarvis had made about an initiative his 
organization was placing on the ballot to have the inventory 
tax removed from Montana merchants, Vratis said, "I asked 
Helena station KBLL, not the network, for free equal time to 
counter Jarvis's statements. It was granted, but I never 
used it. I could have cared less about getting Jarvis off 
the air." He said that Montana Power personnel had not 
prompted him to seek equal time. 
In addition to disseminating information concerning 
the Consumers' Council, Farmers Union personnel personally 
solicited money and support for the Council. The Farmers 
Union leadership got together after the rate increase 
request was announced and decided to oppose it because it 
would increase their office budget. Then at about 20 meet­
ings around the state, Clyde T, Jarvis gave an informal talk 
on the subject that concluded with the question, "Is anyone 
in favor of the increase?" 
Jarvis said, "Nobody needed convincing. The leader­
ship's stand was wholeheartedly endorsed by the rank and file. 
As far as I know, nobody quit the Farmers Union because of our 
position, 
Financial Aid to the 
Consumers' Council 
"We used all of our staff and public contacts to help 
Z^Interview with Socs N. Vratis, Helena, Montana. 
March 27, 1970. 
27interview with Clyde T, Jarvis, 0£. cit. 
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the Consumers' Council," said Gordon R, Twedt, Farmers Union 
president. The staff distributed anti-rate raise petitions 
to its members and asked signers to contribute, Twedt said 
he thought they were "averaging one dollar for each signa­
ture. " 
Jarvis estimated that "over $0 per cent 2_$o7 of our 
members contribute—even from beyond Montana Power's service 
area—because they want to keep the general rates down so 
P P 
Montana-Dakota Utilities won't seek an increase." 
Thomas J. Ryan thought that 33 per cent of the Farmers 
Union members would contribute, many of them because of the 
general publicity on the Consumers' Council and not because 
29 of direct solicitation by the Farmers Union. 
Other than individual member contributions, there is 
no record of Farmers Union donations to the Consumers' 
Council.Mayor Hunt used the long distance phone "WATS" 
line that the Farmers Union has, but he left money to cover 
the cost of his usage. 
Contrary to rumor, the Montana Farmers Union does not 
28 Interview with Gordon R. Twedt, then president of 
the Montana Farmers Urfion, Great Falls, Montana, August 12, 
1968, Interview with Clyde T. Jarvis, 0£. cit. 
29 Interview with Thomas J. Ryan, 0£. cit. 
^^The Farmers Union political corporation is not to 
be confused in this case with the Farmers Union Grain Termi­
nal Association (GTA), a grain-marketing cooperative that 
supports the political corporation and that gave $300 to the 
Consumers' Council. 
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donate as an organization to any political campaign fund. 
In 1968, the Farmers Union had a budget of about $l60,000. 
Approximately $95»000 of this was garnered from organization 
dues and most of the rest from Farmers Union gas stations, 
elevators, and hardware dealers. The elevators, gas stations, 
and hardware dealers, as cooperatives, may allot five per 
cent of their net margin (what is left after patronage re­
bates) for educational and advertising purposes such as 
carried on by the Montana Farmers Union, In addition, the 
Montana Farmers Union receives $2,000 to $3,000 each year 
in gifts and grants. These monies support the many programs 
already mentioned, but none supports partisan politicians. 
The Farmers Union does not even allow candidates to use its 
mailing list. Rather, individual Farmers Union members sup­
port politicians of their choice. For example, Leonard 
Kenfield, the past president of the Farmers Union, campaigned 
in his own voting precinct for years for candidates he 
favored. And Thomas J. Ryan was instrumental in organizing 
several ad hoc non-partisan committees to screen and endorse 
liberal candidates for political office. 
The Farmers Union As a 
Future Countervailing 
Influence in Montana 
In 1969, because of dwindling resources and declining 
membership, the Farmers Union cut back its budget by approxi­
mately $30,000. When public relations director, Clyde T. 
Jarvis was elected president, his position was not refilled. 
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The full-time secretary-treasurer position was changed to a 
non-paying part-time post. And the Montana Farmers Union 
News stopped publication. The funds saved from the cutback 
are to be used to increase the group's membership. 
Clyde T, Jarvis, the new Farmers Union president, has 
also adopted a policy that he says 
will be a totally new approach for us, Down through 
the years we have opposed quite a few things and quite 
a few organizations and groups. But we can't do this 
any longer. The reality of the situation is that fam­
ily farmers and ranchers are a dwindling sector of our 
economy. This fact is most evident when we attempt to 
get agriculture legislation passed. We're going to have 
to work with those people now.31 
He said the Farmers Union will probably find itself coopera­
ting with other farm groups, commodity groups, civic clubs, 
service organizations, and Chambers of Commerce. He said he 
believes it is imperative to the life of a small town that 
the Chamber of Commerce in every community in Montana 
is enlisted in the battle to bring equitable income 
to farmers and ranchers. Without this income, these 
people can't be good customers and without good cus­
tomers the small town businessman is out of business,^2 
Does this new attitude on the part of Farmers Union 
leadership mean that the Farmers Union will be less of a 
countervailing force to Montana Power the next time the 
Company seeks a rate increase? Maybe so. Farmers will be 
reluctant to be as involved as they were during this rate 
raise fight—especially since not many of them are customers 
31 Great Falls Tribune (Montana Parade), November l6, 
1969, p. 2, 
132 
of Montana Power. 
Unless Montana Power Company policy changes, however, 
the Company will continue to be a natural enemy of the 
Farmers Union, The Company, for example, will have to change 
the alliance with the railroads that it has had since John D. 
Ryan, a Milwaukee and St. Paul Railroad board member, started 
the Montana Power Company. The farmers want lower freight 
rates and will continue to fight the situation that now 
exists whereby it costs more to ship freight from Montana to 
the west coast than it does to ship freight originating in 
North Dakota or Canada. John E, Corette sits on the board 
of directors of Burlington-Northern Railroad and on the board 
of trustees of the Committee for Economic Development, The 
Committee advocates procedures that would put agriculture into 
the hands of a very few. The Farmers Union, of course, has 
always advocated the virtues of family farming and disagrees 
with the policies of the Committee for Economic Development, 
Consequently, if the Farmers Union and Montana Power are to 
reach a conciliation, Montana Power will have to stop donating 
to and participating in the affairs of the Committee for 
Economic Development. In addition, Montana Power will have 
to stop its raiding of electric cooperative service areas. 
The Farmers Union has always supported electric cooperatives 
and it is unlikely that this support will stop. 
As long as the interests of the Farmers Union members 
and the Montana Power Company remain diametrically opposed, 
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it is not likely that they will cooperate to any extent. But 
given the present weakened, position of the Farmers Union, it 
is unlikely that there will be any extensive countervailing 
opposition to Company policies either, Jarvis has said of 
the Farmers Union's new conciliatory approach that the group 
had "better not become a political organization or it will 
be dead."33 Yet the Farmers Union has always been a political 
interest group in the sense that it has tried to effect the 
allocation of Montana's resources for the benefit of its 
members. Abrogation of that function will destroy the 
Farmers Union's reason for being. 
Montana AFL-CIO 
Farmers Union leaders believe they must form coalitions 
with urban forces in order to get favorable legislation in 
Montana, and leaders of the Montana American Federation of 
Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) 
believe that labor unions must continue their alliance with 
rural forces. "We couldn't get the time of day out of the 
legislature if it wasn't for the farmers," says James S. 
Umber, past executive secretary of the AFL-CIO. But he 
also concedes that rural organizations such as a few elec­
tric cooperatives could better solidify the farm-labor coali­
tion if they would organize their workers under a union 
^^Interview with Clyde T. Jarvis by Don Weston of 
KGVO television, Missoula, Montana, January 21, 1970. 
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contract. This would change International Brotherhood of 
Electrical Workers' (IBEW) membership and interests enough to 
temper its support of utilities on most all non-contract 
issues. 
Group Cohesion 
As it is, the APL-CIO suffers internal dissension 
if it goes on record opposing a utility rate increase. The 
Montana APL-CIO is comprised of about 25O local unions and 
labor councils that have a membership of 27,000 to 30,000. 
Some of these locals belong to the IBEW, a national affiliate 
of the APL-CIO, According to James S. Umber: 
IBEW officers scream if we /APL-CIOZ oppose a rate 
increase. They say that their electric or phone 
workers will not get a wage increase if the utility 
is not granted a rate increase. They say we should 
be organizing cooperatives instead of fighting a 
union employer. Sometimes we get heat from the 
building trades unions too, because they anticipate 
more jobs for their members if a utility is planning 
a construction program.^ 
An example of IBEW support for a utility rate raise 
was verified by a personal letter to public service com­
missioner, Ernest C. Steel, from Stanley E, Thompson, an 
international vice president of the IBEW, The letter, which 
Steel took from home to the office to make part of the file, 
asked "that the Mountain States Telephone Company in Montana 
^^Interview with James S. Umber, past executive 
secretary, Montana APL-CIO, September 1, 1968, 
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be granted a rate increase."^5 During the 1968 Mon­
tana Power Company rate raise request hearing, the IBEW did 
not express support- for the utility position. Indeed, be­
cause of a late-arriving resolution submitted to the mal-
apportioned twelfth annual convention of the Montana APL-
CIO, the IBEW was forced to give tacit approval to the 
Consumers' Council, Under the rules of parliamentary 
procedure, all resolutions to be considered by the conven­
tion must be submitted 30 days ahead of time. Permission 
to introduce late resolutions must be given unanimously by 
all of the convention delegates present. If the IBEW 
delegates had opposed the introduction of the anti-rate 
raise resolution, the pressure begrudging such opposition 
from the other convention delegates would have been over­
whelming. If the resolution had been introduced on schedule, 
it would not have required a unanimous vote to be considered. 
Then the IBEW delegates could have avoided peer pressure 
35 Letter from Stanley E. Thompson, international 
vice president, International Brotherhood of Electrical 
Workers, to Public Service Commissioner Ernest C, Steel, 
November 9> 196?. 
^^Montana State APL-CIO conventions are malapportioned 
because voting delegates to them are allotted on the basis 
of a formula that gives a local union with 100 or less mem­
bers one voting delegate and a local union with 4,^01 to 
5,500 members 10 delegates. This formula makes it possible 
for a small local to have at least times more voting 
power than a large one. And although the courts have not 
yet had to decide the question, it is possible that in 
"union" and "closed shop" states sufficient state action 
could be shown to require the State APL-CIO to comply with 
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution, 
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and abstained from voting. Such an abstention would have-
denied labor the public relations advantage of being able 
to claim internal cohesion—a "united front" against the 
Montana Power Company rate raise, 
APL-CIO Aid ^ the 
Consumers' Council 
A resolution.—The resolution opposing the Montana 
Power rate increase request passed by the APL-CIO state 
convention was not accompanied by a donation of money to the 
Consumers' Council. And the resolution came in August— 
after the rate hearings—too late to give the delegates much 
of an opportunity to ask their local unions for money to 
support the position of the state labor organization. Other 
than passing the resolution opposing the rate increase, the 
APL-CIO did little to aid the Consumers' Council. The APL-
CIO staff was hindered from extensive participation in Con­
sumers' Council affairs by personal and family illness, im­
pending labor negotiations, and the planning of COPE (Com­
mittee on Political Education) participation in the I968 
political campaign.37 Despite these handicaps, the state 
APL-CIO did appeal to its affiliates for funds and passed on 
all Consumers' Council correspondence to member union locals, 
COPS.—The political action committee of the APL-CIO, 
37 Interview with James W. Murry, former Montana COPE 
director, presently executive secretary of the Montana APL-
CIO, September 1, I968. 
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COPE, registers voters and gets out the voters dur-ing elec­
tions, It also interviews and endorses candidates it feels 
will favor labor legislation. COPE is supported partly by 
voluntary donations from union members and partly from a 
yearly sixty-cents-per-member assessment made on each local 
union. The funds garnered from the assessment go to pay staff 
and to educate the union membership concerning union issues. 
The voluntary contributions are used to assist candidates for 
federal political offices. Contributions to candidates in 
state and local races can be legally made from local union 
treasuries. The total COPE budget for voter registration in 
1970 was about $16,000. This did not include money expended 
for staff salaries. COPS did not donate to the Consumers* 
Council. 
James W. Murry, executive director of the Montana 
AFL-CIO, said his organization could compete with Montana 
Power as a countervailing power in some situations. He 
said, "We don't have as much money as the Company, but we 
have a field organization of people, who knock on doors and 
vote, that money cannot buy."^^ This organization was 
effective in 19^3 when the AFL-CIO thwarted the campaign of 
a "right-to-work" committee that Robert D. Corette, Montana 
Power lobbyist and board member, served on. 
^^Interview with Ernest Post, director of Montana 
COPE, Missoula, Montana, August 25, 1970. 
^^Interview with James W. Murry, September 1, 1968. 
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Informing the Membership 
The AFL-CIO and its member unions communicate with 
their members via "house" organs that are usually published 
monthly. But the state organization has not had a general 
membership paper recently. The People's Voice used to 
promptly articulate labor's position on matters before it 
ceased publication in 1969. But after The Voice folded, labor 
was a year and one-half late in publishing a legislative vot­
ing record. Labor now relies on the commercial media to reach 
its member. In this way it also reaches Montana's ^0,000 to 
55,000 workers who are not affiliated with the AFL-CIO. 
This haphazard communication with its membership does 
not fulfill the requirements of a good public relations pro­
gram. Such a program requires that labor build a constant, 
continuing reservoir of opinion and understanding that is 
favorable to labor's position. Unless a reservoir of favor­
able opinion is maintained, Montana Power will be able to more 
easily embark at some future date upon a successful anti-labor 
public relations campaign. And then labor's position as a 
countervailing force to Montana Power will have been weakened. 
This chapter has been a discussion of the support that 
existing interest groups gave to help the Consumers' Council 
countervail the power of the Montana Power Company. The next 
chapter will detail the extent of the Montana Power monopoly 
and its influence in Montana. 
chapter y 
THE EXTENT OP MONOPOLY POWER 
While those who would oppose the corporate interest 
were struggling for support from the people, the 
opposition has been unified, and ready for action. 
The alliance of mining, finance, ranching and mercan­
tile interest has been able to go forth to battle as 
a unit. Almost always in Montana political life this 
natural alliance has been able to confuse and divide 
the progressive forces before they assembled. 
An Energy Monopoly 
Montana Power is a governraentally protected electric 
and gas utility monopoly. Today it sells to 79 per cent of 
Montana's population in the largest service area, 96,000 
2 square miles,of any public utility in the United States. 
As Figure 1 illustrates, Montana Power supplies energy to 182 
communities in 4l of Montana's ^6 counties. In addition, it 
energizes 440 miles of electric railway. 
Jules Karlin, "Progressive Politics in Montana," 
Vol, I of A History of Montana, eds. Merrill Burlingame 
and K. Ross Toole (3 vols.; New York: Lewis Historical 
Publishing Company, 1957), P. 279. See also, Joseph P. 
Kelly, "A Study of the Defeat of Senator Burton K. Wheeler 
in the 1946 Democratic Primary Election" (unpublished 
Master's thesis. Department of Political Science, University 
of Montana, Missoula, 1959), p. 2. 
2 Montana Power Co., Serving YOU Is Our Business (I966), 
PPe 2-3. 
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Electric Utility Monopoly 
As early as 1922, Montana Power claimed it was the 
third largest hydro-electric enterprise in the United States 
with an annual output of 1,100,000,000 kilowatt hours. It 
led the nation in per capita consumption of electricity--
each of its customers using an average of 2,06l kilowatt 
hours a year. Because of Montana's slow population growth 
rate, Montana Power's position among utilities has declined. 
By 1967, the year of a nationwide copper strike that de­
creased electricity consumption, 63 of the 22^ U.S. electric 
k-utilities sold more electricity than did Montana Power. 
The Company remains dominant within Montana, however. 
Montana Power owns 11 of the 1? electric-producing 
facilities in the state and has petitioned as a partner 
with three other companies to build another project or two 
on the Snake River between Idaho and Oregon. Other investor-
owned utilities own two generating plants in Montana and the 
federal government possesses the remaining four. The govern­
ment sells some of its electricity to Montana Power. The 
Company purchases about 825,000,000 kilowatt hours a year from 
the Bonneville Power Administration—enough to satisfy the 
electricity needs of all of the Company's residential cus­
tomers . 
^The Daily Missoulian (souvenir edition), Montana 
Power Co. advertisement, July 20, 1922, p. 22. 
^"The Top 100 Electric Utilities," 0£. cit., p. 83. 
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In 1967, Montana Power owned more than 4,686 miles of 
electric transmission lines in its service area.^ With a 
few exceptions, these are the only transmission lines in the 
area. And Montana Power used them to transmit or "wheel" 
438,285,569 kilowatt hours of electricity for other distri­
butors in 1967.^ This did not include power the Company 
transmitted for itself. Transmission lines carry electricity 
from the production facilities to the distribution facili­
ties. They are the inter-city lines that carry electricity 
at high voltages. The intra-city lines that carry electricity 
to homes and businesses at lower voltages are called distri­
bution lines. 
Montana Power had more than 9»773 miles of electric 
distribution lines serving l67,06l customers in 1967.^ 
oince Montana is one of two states in the nation that does 
not have public utility districts, the only competition the 
Company has in electric distributions comes from the rural 
electric cooperatives. In 1967, the Montana cooperatives 
^Montana Power Co., I967 Report to Stockholders 
(System Map updated for Applicant's exhibits in Montana Rail­
road and Public Service Commission Docket No. 5698), p. 21. 
In 1969, the Company had 5,348 miles of transmission line, 
^Montana Power Co., I967 Form 1 Report to the FPC, 
pp. 425 A and B. 
^Montana Power Co., I967 Report to Stockholders, 
pp. 10 and 21. In I969, the Company had 10,031 miles of 
distribution line. 
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had a combined total of 35,173 miles of transmission and 
distribution line that served 52,783 customers.^ Since the 
cooperatives operate in sparsely populated areas, they have 
fewer customers—only 1,5 per mile of line—than the Montana 
Power Company, which has 11.6 customers per mile of line. 
Because they have fewer customers to pay for more utility 
plant, the cooperatives are not in a strong financial 
position to offer much countervailing power to the Company. 
Coal, Oil and 
Other Ventures 
In addition to its electricity ventures, the Montana 
Power Company is also developing other forms of fuel. 
Western Energy Company, a wholly owned subsidiary of Montana 
Power, controls 850 million tons of coal reserves in 
9 Montana. Most of this coal will be used by Montana Power 
to fuel steam-electric generating plants like the one 
recently constructed in Billings, Some of the coal is being 
sold to utilities in the Midwest, Recent technological 
developments have made it possible to produce pipeline gas, 
gasoline, and other synthetic fuels from coal. So it is 
possible that some of Montana Power's coal will be marketed 
for these purposes. But, to date, negotiations with companies 
^Montana Associated Utilities, 1968 Directory, op. cit., 
p.  63 .  
^Some of these coal reserves are controlled by the Com­
pany through leasing at a low price. For example, on March 1, 
1964, the Montana Po".'er Company leased 1,198 acres of coal 
land in Big Horn County for one dollar a year per acre. 
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interested in using coal in this manner have ground to a 
halt.10 
Montana Power had ^2,537,688 worth of oil properties 
in Montana in 1967. It also participates in Canadian oil 
ventures through its wholly owned subsidiaries, Altana 
Exploration Company and Canadian-Montana Gas Company, Ltd. 
The Company owns city water systems in Missoula and 
Superior. 
Gas Utility Monopoly 
Montana Power also monopolizes gas energy production. 
When the Cut Bank field developed in 1931> the Company con­
structed a 20-inch pipeline from the field to Helena, Ana­
conda, and Butte.And in 1954, Montana Power bought the 
northern Montana gas distribution facilities from Montana-
Dakota Utilities. 
Montana Power owned 1,657 miles of gas transmission 
line in I969—the only gas transmission pipeline in western 
Montana. It also owned 1,304 miles of gas distribution mains. 
With minor exceptions, Montana Power is the sole source of 
supply for all domestic, commercial, and industrial consumers 
of natural gas in the western two-thirds of Montana. The 
l^Montana Power Co., 1967 Report to Stockholders, 
p. 4. 
l^Montana Power Co., Serving YOU Is Our Business 
(1966), p. 2. 
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exceptions include three gas distribution companies in Great 
Falls, Shelby, and Cut Bank, which buy gas at wholesale 
prices from Montana Power. These three companies serve 
about 21,400 customers. Montana Power sold at retail to 
12 84,791 natural gas customers in 1969. The percentage of 
people using natural gas in cities served by Montana Power 
ranges from 79 to 91 per cent,^^ 
Montana Power has 475,000 acres of gas leases in 
Montana and produces approximately 40 per cent of the state's 
natural gas. It sold 50,200,000 Mcf of gas to Montanans 
in 1968.^^ One Mcf equals 1,000 cubic feet. The other 
major producer in the state is Montana-Dakota Utilities, 
Independent  p roducers  have  been  ab le  to  se l l  about  3 to  3.5  
billion cubic feet of gas (3,500,000 Mcf) to Montana 
Power each year, but the Company has relied on gas imports 
1S from southern Alberta, Canada, for 75 per cent of its gas. 
Monopoly Pricing Advantages 
High Crest Gas 
Sale Offer 
In 1966, because of its monopoly position, Montana 
^^Montana Power Co., 1969 Report to Stockholders, 
p. 8, map. 
13 ^Montana Power Co., 1967 Report to Stockholders, p. 6 
l4pigured from Moody's Investor Service, Inc., op. cit 
August 1969, p. 5^+1 Î Montana, Oil and Gas Conservation Comm'n. 
Annual Review for the Year 1967: Relating to Oil and Gas,II, 
Lynn R, Coleman, High Crest Oils, Inc., Brief, Re The Montana 
Power Co., Docket No. 5698 (Montana R.R. & Pub. Serv. Comm'n., 
Kovember 25, 1968), pp. 4,5,8. 
^•^Coleman, o^. cit.. p. 9. 
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Power was able to buy gas from independent Montana producers 
at an average wellhead price of 8,3 cents per Mcf. In the 
rest of the United States, the I966 wellhead price averaged 
15.46 cents per Mcf—approximately double the price in Mon­
tana.' In 1968, High Crest Oil Company offered to sell gas 
to Montana Power for 12& cents per Mcf at the wellhead. This 
was nine cents less than the border price Montana Power paid 
for Canadian-produced gas. The Company refused the High 
Crest offer saying that it would require "more than |2 million 
during the first four years" to gather the gas, store it, 
and deliver it to the line at useable pressures and in regu­
lated amounts. 
Undaunted, High Crest offered to deliver gas to the 
Montana Power Company in Great Palls for 27§ cents per Mcf— 
l4§ cents less than the wholesale price Montana Power was 
charging the Great Palls Gas Company, Montana Power still 
refused the High Crest gas saying that it preferred to con­
tinue buying Canadian-produced gas because the reserves there 
were proven. 
J, E. Corette, Montana Power's board chairman, told 
the Great Falls Rotary Club that High Crest claimed a proven 
reserve of 260,000,000 Mcf. But he said that PPC geologists 
had estimated the reserve at 95,000,000 Mcf and that independent 
l^Great Falls Tribune, February 18, 1968, p. 17; 
telephone interview with L. S. Stadler, vice chairman of 
the board and chief operating officer of the gas and oil 
department of the Montana Power Co., July 13, 1970. 
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geologists hired by Montana Power calculated that 180,000,000 
to 190,000,000 Mcf of proven gas were in the field. 
High Crest said that the Montana reserves connected 
to the Montana Power system in I969 totaled only 
121,000,000 Mcf, It said that a conservative 333,000,000 Mcf 
estimate of proven and probable reserves in the High Crest 
field would exceed the existing Montana Power reserve. And 
that the Bear Paw area that contained the High Crest field 
was an "excellent prospect" that "may contain as much as 
one to two trillion cubic feet of gas (1,000,000,000 Mcf)." 
Even if the Montana Power estimate that the field contained 
only 180,000,000 Mcf was correct, this would be sufficient 
to supply the Company in excess of 30,000 Mcf per day for 
18 
12 years. And Montana Power was only requesting permission 
to import two-thirds that amount—20,000 Mcf per day in two 
increments—from Canada to satisfy increasing demand for gas 
and to augment the 50,000 Mcf already being imported each 
day.19 
After further exploration in its field, High Crest 
released the estimates of an FPC geologist who said the 
l^Great Falls Tribune, February 18, 1968, pp. 1, 7. 
^^Coleman, op, cit., pp. 8, I5. 
l^stadler, 0£. cit. See also Montana Power Co., I969 
Report to Shareholders,p. 5» for information regarding an 
additional 10,000 Mcf per day that Montana Power seeks to 
import. 
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reserves were in excess of ^^4,000,000 Mcf. Northern 
Natural Gas Company of Omaha, Nebraska, thought the field 
contained more than 700,000,000 Mcf of gas and offered to 
buy it from High Crest for 15g cents per Mcf paid at the 
wellhead. This price is 4^ cents per Mcf higher than the 
final Montana Power offer and 3 cents per Mcf higher than the 
sell price High Crest had been willing to agree on. Northern 
Natural Gas Company plans to pipe the High Crest gas 130 
miles from the Tiger Ridge field near Havre, Montana,to 
20 Swift Current, Saskatchewan. There it will meet a line 
which Northern Natural wants to build across Canada. The 
gas will eventually be marketed in the midwestern United 
States. 
The new Northern Natural pipeline will undoubtedly 
introduce competition and higher prices into the natural gas 
market, all of which will be good for the independent gas 
producers in Montana. But the consumers will not benefit 
from the introduction of this new countervailing power. 
Montana Power officials say, "These increased prices must 
of necessity be reflected in our sales rates, and sooner or 
later either cause an increase in the price of gas to our 
21 customers or prevent any possible decrease in such prices." 
20 Coleman, op. cit.. pp. 11, 16-18; Great Palls 
Tribune, March 2, 1970, p. 1. 
^^Great Palls Tribune, March 2, 1970, P» 1. 
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This prediction is no consolation to consumers who watched 
Montana Power let lower prices slip through its hands. 
Explaining the Refusal 
to Buy 
Cost-plus contract.—An explanation of why Montana 
Power refused to purchase High Crest gas was suggested by 
High Crest attorneys who thought that Montana Power might 
have Canadian arrangements that would enable it to receive a 
double or more return on its own investment in Canadian gas. 
Montana Power buys Canadian gas under a cost-of-service plus 
seven and one-half per cent contract with Alberta & Southern 
Gas Company, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Pacific Gas 
Op 
and Electric Company. Alberta & Southern buys its gas for 
resale from several Canadian producers including Altana 
Exploration Company, a wholly owned subsidiary of Montana 
Power, After these transactions, the gas is piped to Mon­
tana by the Canadian-Montana Pipeline Company, which Montana 
23 Power owns jointly with three other utilities, 
High Crest attorneys said that "Montana Power apparently 
includes its Canadian reserves in its rate base" and receives 
a return on that investment from Montana consumers. In 
^^Montana Power Co,, Applicant's Exhibit No. 14, 
Re The Montana Power Co., Docket No. 5^98 (Montana R.R. & 
Pub. Serv. Comm'n,, May 2, I968), pp. 17-22, 
^^The other companies sharing ownership of Canadian-
Montana Pipeline Co. are Washington Water Power Co., Pacific 
Power & Light Co., and Portland General Electric Co. Montana 
Power Co. , 1967 Form Report to the FPC, p. 103. 
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addition, 
however, the border price of gas purchased from Alberta 
& Southern is included as an /operating/ expense in 
Montana Power's cost of service. This could result in 
a situation where Montana Power could earn a return on 
Altana's reserves, obtain unregulated income from the 
sale of gas from those reserves at the going Canadian 
producer price, and then /repurchase its gas supplies 
from Alberta & Southern . . . and recover this expense 
in its cost of service.2^ 
L. S. Stadler, chief operating officer of Montana 
Power's gas and oil department, said the High Crest supposi­
tion was "totally and completely false." He said that the 
only Canadian gas reserves that Montana Power includes in 
its rate base were those of the Canadian-Montana Gas Company, 
Ltd., which does not sell gas to Alberta & Southern but which 
pipes gas directly to the Canadian-Montana Pipeling Company. 
Altana reserves are not included in Montana Power's rate 
base and apparently Altana sells gas to Alberta & Southern 
and to Trans-Canada Pipelines, Ltd. only because its reserves 
are located too far north to be reached conveniently by the 
24 
Canadian-Montana Pipeline Company. 
Montana Power does not sell as much gas—a few billion 
cubic feet a year—through Altana to Alberta & Southern as it 
buys from Alberta & Southern via the Canadian-Montana Pipeline 
Company. Montana Power has not, however, negotiated a separate 
2k J. Evans Attwell and Lynn R. Coleman, High Crest 
Oils, Inc., Initial Brief of Intervener, Re The Montana Power 
Co., Docket No. G-I737I (Federal Power Comm'n., March 25, 
1968), pp. 7, 8. 
^%tadler, o^. cit. 
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contract with Alberta & Southern to pay only transportation 
charges on that portion of gas that Alberta & Southern handles 
for Montana Power, Instead, Montana Power pays for all the 
cost of service (including Alberta & Southern's cost of pur­
chasing, storing, and transporting gas) plus seven and one-
half per cent for all gas, whether purchased or repurchased, 
from Alberta & Southern. The contract between the companies 
does not have to be approved by any regulatory agency. It 
was negotiated in I96I when the interest rate on utility 
bonds was about four and one-half per cent, but it allows 
Alberta & Southern an unregulated seven and one-half per cent 
profit,This profit is well above the six to six and one-
half per cent return generally accepted as adequate by 
utility regulatory commissions. 
The money that Montana Power receives from the sale 
of Altana gas is not recorded in the Company's books as 
"operating revenue," Bather it is labeled "nonoperating 
income," This means that the money Montana Power received 
for the sale of Altana gas is not used to help the consumers 
pay for the repurchase of that gas. Instead the money is 
held aside and paid to the stockholders as dividends. The 
stockholders probably should be allowed a return on the money 
that they have invested in Altana, either through including 
Altana's assets in the rate base or through income obtained 
from Altana*s sale of gas (as is now the case). But under 
^^Moody's Investor Service, Inc., op. c i t . ,  I 9 6 7 ,  
p. 26. 
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the present system, Altana sells to Alberta & Southern for a 
price higher than the average wellhead price of natural gas 
in Alberta. Indeed, Altana now sells its gas for between 
13i and 18 cents per Mcf gathered and "sweetened" depending 
on the contract situation. The average wellhead price in 
Alberta was 15.37 cents per Mcf in 1969. 
Under the present setup, Montana Power could have 
offered to accept the cost plus seven and one-half per cent 
contract if Alberta & Southern would agree to "adequate" 
compensation for Altana's gas. Such an agreement, even if 
it was not arrived at through a conspiracy to set prices, 
(and J. E, Corette said it was not), but through a tacit 
understanding of the mutual benefits to the companies involved, 
militates against the consumer. He has to pay for it all in 
a higher gas bill. 
High Crest attorneys postulated another reason why 
Montana Power might have refused to buy gas at High Crest 
prices. They said, "Evidently Montana Power hopes to use 
its dominant position in the gas business to acquire the 
High Crest gas at a distressed price, or perhaps buy the 
27 reserves themselves." 
Lawyers for the Great Palls Gas Company were present 
at the Montana Power Company rate increase hearings, but they 
did not intervene on behalf of the consumers. In fact, 
27 Attwell, 0£, cit., p. 82. 
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instead of urging Montana Power to accept the low price 
offered by High Crest, they waited until the Public Service 
Commission increased the wholesale gas price paid Montana 
Power from ̂ 2.5 cents per Mcf in 196? to 4̂ .3 cents per Mcf 
in 1969. Then Great Falls Gas petitioned the Public Service 
Commission for an increase of its own rates based on the 
increased cost of gas purchased from Montana Power. Only 
two protestants, State Senator Richard G. Dzivi and Cascade 
County Treasurer Clarence 0. Lindseth, appeared in opposi­
tion to the Great Falls Gas Company request, which was unani­
mously granted by the Commission, 
Interlocking personnel.—John Kenneth Galbraith 
states that, "retailers /Tike the Great Falls Gas Company/ 
are required by their situation to develop countervailing 
28 power on the consumer's behalf." 
It is difficult to explain why the Great Falls Gas 
Company did not act in accord with Galbraith's hypothesis by 
trying more vigorously to obtain lower rates. The Gas 
Company had a contract with Montana Power that did not ex­
pire until 1979) but High Crest offered to sell to Montana 
Power at Great Palls, as well as to the Gas Company. According 
to Montana Power, the rates charged Great Falls Gas were to 
be renegotiated in 1969. Why the existing contract could not 
have been changed at that time to reflect the lower price of 
High Crest gas is not made clear by the companies, however. 
^̂ Galbraith, 0£, cit.. p. 117. 
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It is possible that the relationship between the 
owners, directors, and personnel of the Montana Power and 
Great Palls Gas Companies is closer than meets the eye. 
Information on this relationship is very difficult to ob­
tain, however. Attempts to obtain such information from 
witnesses at the Montana Power Company rate hearing met 
repeated objections from Robert D, Corette, the Company 
counsel. The information that is available follows. 
Montana Power retains the law firm of Jardine, 
Stephenson, Blewett and Weaver in Great Falls. Samuel B. 
Chase was with this firm before he became a lawyer for 
and director of Montana Power, John H. Weaver is the present 
designate in the firm and does most of the legal work for the 
Company. But Alex Blewett, Jr., a Montana Highway Commis­
sioner and former majority leader of the Montana House of 
Representatives, is also a member of the firm. Blewett is 
a stockholder in the Great Palls Gas Company. 
Blewett said, however: 
The only thing I knew about those gas rate negoti­
ations is what I read in the papers and I read quite 
a lot. This is the truth and I could say it under 
oath. I never consulted with anyone in either the 
Great Palls Gas Company or the Montana Power Company 
on this matter.29 
He added that he had not communicated with Samuel B. 
Chase for some time and said that he thought Chase had re­
tired from the Montana Power Company. He did not know that 
^^Telephone interview with Alex Blewett, Jr., attorney 
with Jardine, Stephenson, Blewett and Weaver, July 15, 1970. 
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although Chase had retired as a vice-president and lawyer, 
he still held his position as a director. 
Montana Power recently appointed Melvin M. Ryan to 
its legal staff in Butte. He was previously affiliated with 
the Great Palls law firm of Church, Harris, Johnson, 
Williams and Allen. Two members of that firm, I. W. Church 
and Carter Williams, are on the board of directors of the 
Great Falls Gas Company.Ryan represents Montana Power when 
it negotiates with Great Palls Gas.̂  ̂
Lines of Monopoly Influence 
Interlocking Personnel 
Having interlocking or common personnel is not un­
common among many Montana corporations. For example, 
John D. Stephenson, another attorney in the firm of Jardine, 
Stephenson, Blewett and Weaver, is on the 10-man board of 
directors of the First National Bank of Great Palls. Harold 
K. Dickinson, a retired division manager of the Montana 
Power Company, is also on that board. And Errol P. Gait, 
chairman of that board, was on the Montana Power board of 
directors until I969, when he was succeeded by Adrian 0. 
McLellan, president and board member of the First National 
^̂ Other directors include; J. Patrick Lannan, H. M. 
Saubert, Earle Garrison, R. V. Dehon, and Forrest C. Hedger 
(who donated $100—more than anybody else—to the primary 
campaign of Democrat J. Anderson, an unsuccessful candidate 
for the Public Service Commission in I968). 
^̂ Transcript of Hearings, Re The Montana Power Co., 
Docket No. 5698 (Montana H.R. & Pub. Serv. Comm'n.), p. 75o. 
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Bank of Great Palls. The Pirst National Bank of Great Palls 
is a member of the Pirst Bank Stock Corporation of which 
J. E. Corette, Montana Power board chairman, is a director. 
Other Montana member banks of the Pirst Bank Stock 
Corporation include: Westside Pirst National Bank, Great 
Palls; Western Montana National Bank and Southside National 
Bank, Missoula; Valley State and Midland National Banks, Bil­
lings; First Metals Bank, Butte; Pirst National Banks in 
Helena, Havre, Bozeman, Lewistown, and Miles City; First 
State Bank, Forsyth; Pirst National Park Bank, Livingston; 
Pirst Choteau County Bank and the First Trust Company of 
Montana. John E. Tenge, president of the Midland National 
Bank, is a Montana Power director. And Pete Hamilton, Havre 
mayor who promised help to the Consumers' Council but who 
never did is an employee of the First National Bank of Havre. 
J. E, Corette is also a director of the Pacific Gas 
Transmission Company, which is 50 per cent owned by Pacific 
Gas and Electric Company and which buys gas from Alberta & 
Southern and transports it to the Pacific Gas and Electric 
Company in California and to the El Paso Natural Gas Company. 
Before he died, Walter H. McLeod, Montana president 
of the Missoula Mercantile Company, was a co-director with 
J. E. Corette of the Northern Pacific Railway and Montana 
Power Companies. Former Montana Power director, W. J. 
Jameson of Billings, and present director, R. H. Robinson, 
have done legal work for Northern Pacific. J. E, Corette has 
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become a director of the Northern Pacific's successor, the 
Burlington-Northern Railway Company, a consolidation of four 
railroads. He is also a charter member of the Upper Midwest 
Research and Development Council, an economic research group 
that sends its reports to legislators and other Montana leaders, 
Montana Power donated $10,500 to this Council between 196̂  
and 1967. 
Consumer Solicitor Confronts 
the Web of Influence 
The extent of the Montana Power Company's connections 
can easily be illustrated by relating the experiences of a 
Consumers' Council fund raiser. Rather than rely exclusively 
on interviews for information about the problems encountered 
by Consumers' Council solicitors in July of I968, I engaged 
in a day of soliciting to get first-hand information on the 
reaction of businessmen to the consumers' cause. 
The Missoula Mercantile.—Wayne L. Grow, controller 
for the Missoula Mercantile, was contacted first. The case 
against the rate raise was explained and Grow was invited to 
attend a meeting with Consumers' Council president William 
E. Hunt to gain further information, or to donate to the 
Council. 
After consulting others in the store, Grow declined 
the invitation to attend the meeting or to donate. At the 
time, he gave no explanation other than, "We don't think we 
would be interested in this at this time." 
2 58 
A year and one-half later, in January of 1970, it 
was noticed that Montana Power's stockholder reports named 
Walter H, McLeod, Montana president of the Missoula Mer­
cantile Company, as a former director of the Montana Power 
Company. The Mercantile has recently been sold to the 
Bon Marché chain and McLeod has died. But it is conceivable 
that people who are still employed by or who invest in the 
Mercantile are also directly interested in Montana Power's 
welfare. When directors of the Montana Power Company die 
or retire, members of their firms are often nominated to 
fill the vacancy. For example, Arthur P. Lamey of the Billings 
law firm Coleman, Lamey and Crowley succeeded W. J. Jameson, 
a senior partner in the firm, on the Montana Power board of 
directors. And R. H. (Ty) Robinson, a lawyer in the Missoula 
firm of Garlington, Lohn and Robinson, succeeded Harry C. 
Pauly as a Company director, Pauly was a member of the 
Garlington firm when it was called Murphy, Garlington and 
Pauly. Also, a Helena attorney, Newell Gough, Jr. of Weir, 
Gough and Matson, took the place of Taylor B. Weir on Montana 
Power's board of directors, 
Wayne L. Grow said he thought the hypothesis that the 
store did not donate because of its affiliation with Montana 
Power was not correct. He said the store had not been 
affiliated with McLeod since 1959 when the Allied Chain had 
bought it from the Montana Mercantile. In further explaining 
why the store had not donated to the Consumers' Council, he 
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said, "We can't give to everybody who comes in here with his 
hand out or we'll be banJcrupt in no time." When asked if 
the store would donate to an organization that would help 
keep its costs doî , he said that it was true that the 
store's utility bill had risen substantially. 
But, there is not much we can do about an increase. 
That is all set by the government, the Federal Power 
Commission or the Federal Trade Commission or one of 
those agencies. They and the utilities keep it pretty 
quiet until the raise is announced and once it is 
granted you can't do much about it. 
It could be concluded from this interview that the 
reason the Mercantile did not donate to the Consumers' 
Council may be more due to Grow's misunderstanding of the 
utility rate-setting process than to the influence of inter­
locking financial interests. 
The First National Bank of Missoula.—After con­
tacting the Mercantile management, I ventured across the 
street to the First National Bank of Missoula, an indepen­
dent bank not affiliated with the First Bank Stock Corpora­
tion. A former schoolmate, Martin L. Mikelson, was asked 
if bank president Randolph Jacobs was in. Mikelson said that 
Jacobs was not expected back that day and asked why Jacobs 
was being sought. After it was explained that Jacobs was 
going to be asked to donate to the Consumers' Council, 
Mikelson replied, "I don't think Mr, Jacobs would be inter­
ested in anything like that. Besides I'm not a very good 
^̂ Interview with Wayne L. Grow, controller of the 
Missoula Mercantile, July 13, 1970. 
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person to be talking to about this. I married Bob Corette's 
daughter, Susan, and we own quite a bit of stock in the 
Power Company," Robert D, Corette is an attorney and direc­
tor of Montana Power. 
The Florence Hotel.—The quest for funds was continued 
at the Florence Hotel, Missoula's largest. Robert C. Lemm, 
the hotel's general manager, said that he did not believe 
the Florence Hotel would want to oppose the Montana Power 
Company's rete increase request even though a raise would 
add to the costs of running the hotel. He said, "The Com­
pany does a lot of business with us and we would not want 
to do anything to make them mad." A month later, in August 
of 1968, while scanning a Montana Power Company report to 
the Federal Power Commission, it was noticed that the Com­
pany had acquired in August of 1940 250 shares of Hotel 
Florence Company stock. It sold the hotel stock in 196?, 
but perhaps the vestiges of Company influence could have 
remained. Table 5 contains a list of investments that 
Montana Power is involved in. From this list the reader 
can ascertain who is not going to be inclined to oppose a 
Montana Power rate raise request. 
St. Patrick Hospital.—Since hospitals use a lot of 
gas and electricity and since St. Patrick Hospital in 
Missoula had been an active contributor against a previous 
Montana Power Company rate raise, the hospital's administrators 
were solicited for a Consumers' Council donation. After 
I6l 
TABLE 5 
SELECTED 196? MONTANA POWER C0I4PANY INVESTMENTS^ 
•Investment Worth 
Butte Brass & Controls Co, stock $25,000 
Downtown Parking Inc. stock 10,000 
Economic Development Corp. stock 500, 
Hotel Florence Co, stock 25,000 
Grizzly Peak Inc. stock 1,500 
Lewistown Community Hotel Co. stock and deben. 10,000 
Missoula Development Corp. stock 600^ 
Missoula Snow Bowl stock and deben. 16,000 
Montana Hotel Corp. stock 1,000 
Pacific Northwest Power Co. stock 5,000 
Park & Shop, Inc. stock 6,000 
Pacific Gas Transmission Co, stock 663,000 
^Source: Montana Power Co., 196? Form 1 Report to 
the FPC (account 124), p. 202. 
^Disposed of in I967 at a net loss of $21,875 to 
Montana Power. 
^Disposed of in 196? at a net gain of |16 to Montana 
Power. 
being referred to two different people in the hospital, 
the solicitor was told to contact the patients' accounts 
manager, Dennis L. Ryan. Ryan said that his brother, Melvin, 
was an attorney for the Montana Power Company and that he 
would not approve a contribution to oppose something his 
brother was fighting for. 
None of the Missoula businessmen contacted accepted 
an invitation to an evening meeting with Consumers' president 
William E. Hunt. The meeting netted nearly $30 in small 
contributions from housewives, teachers and workers. Thinking 
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that some Missoula businessmen woulâ want to donate even 
though they had not desired to attend the meeting, Hunt sent 
a follovmp letter requesting funds. The response was negli­
gible. One businessman who had actively opposed the Com­
pany's 1962 gas rate increase request and who did not want 
to be quoted by name said that he was not going to become 
active in the consumer effort or donate this time because 
the effort he had extended in 1962 had little effect on the 
Public Service Commission's decision. 
This chapter has detailed the extent of Montana Power 
Company activities and suggested lines of political influence 
that might be in effect because of the alliances of Company 
personnel. Some of the tactics that Montana Power uses to 
influence public and group opinion will be elicited in 
chapter six,' 
CHAPTER VI 
THE TACTICS OP GROUP INFLUENCE 
If the twins /Montana Power and Anaconda Mining Companies/ 
dislike candidate or project, tlie chances of either usu­
ally have been very slim indeed.-̂  
Political Action Groups Support 
Company Policy 
In 1961, after being addressed by Robert D. Corette, 
the Kalispell Chamber of Commerce urged its members to write 
the Public Service Commission favoring a Montana Power gas 
rate increase request that Corette said was necessary to 
provide capital for expansion of natural gas service into 
the area. The Chamber's communication to its members said 
"that the Commission had received very little support from 
the Valley requesting gas, and since the Commission is a 
2 political body, this interest is very important." Twenty-
five letters from 37 Kalispell Chamber members were received 
by the Commission, The Chamber's prodding drew editorial 
criticism from The Daily Inter Lake because the introduction 
of natural gas would replace a 1350,000 fuel-trucking industry 
Ĥoward, op.. cit.. p. 33̂ . 
2 Letter from Kalispell Chamber of Commerce to its 
members, November 28, I96I. 
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with a $80,000 gas industry and thereby leave 50 men un­
employed.̂  Since Montana Power did not serve Kalispell with 
either gas or electricity, its personnel were not members of 
the local Chamber as were some of the fuel truckers. Yet, the 
Kalispell Chamber stood in direct opposition to its truck-
line members in favor of the non-member utility. 
As in the aforementioned example, the Chambers of 
Commerce and the Montana Taxpayers Association have often 
represented interests that are compatible with Montana. Power's 
interests, such as more utility service, a retail sales tax, 
lower unemployment compensation benefits, or opposition to a 
19̂ 9 proposal of the Department of Interior to build electric 
transmission lines for Port Peck and Hungry Horse Dams. So 
consumer advocates like William E, Hunt and Harry L, Billings 
speculated that these two interest groups would favor the 
rate raise request. In order to evaluate this speculation, 
it is necessary to look at the nature and function of these 
groups. 
The State and Local 
Chambers of Commerce 
The Chamber of Commerce, which is not related to the 
Junior Chamber of Commerce, is a three tiered organization. 
The Missoula Chamber, for example, had 85O members in I968, 
including 650 business and professional firms. Some of these 
firms are among the 1000 business affiliates of the Montana 
T̂he Daily Inter Lake (Kalispell), December 3, I96I, 
p. 4. 
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Chamber of Commerce. The Missoula Chamber is among the 
100 association affiliates to the Montana Chamber. Asso­
ciation affiliates include local Chambers of Commerce, 
Rotary, Lions, Kiwanis, and other service clubs; and in­
terest groups such as the Montana Stockgrowers or the Wool-
growers. The Montana Chamber affiliates with the United 
States Chamber of Commerce. 
The Montana Power Company belongs to the Montana 
iL 
Chamber of Commerce and to about 32 local Chambers. It paid 
dues of $4,844 to the Montana Chamber in 19̂ 7 and a total of 
15,089 to the Billings, Butte and Great Palls Chambers. In­
formation on 1967 dues payments to other local Chambers was 
not released, but from past information, it can be estimated 
5 that dues are near $5,000 in total. Executive vice pres­
idents, Norris E. Johnson, of the Missoula Chamber and Del 
H. Siewert of the Montana Chamber say their associations are 
not subordinate to Montana Power. 
Missoula Chamber of Commerce.—Johnson said that 
Montana Power had not asked the Missoula Chamber to support 
the rate raise as the Company had asked it to support the 
L̂etter from the Montana Power Co. to the PPC, 
November 6, 1964, quoted in The People's Voice, September 30, 
1966, p. 2. 
M̂ontana Power Co., Form 1 Report to the PPC. 1962-
1967, p. 427. These organizational dues payments are in­
cluded as a cost of service in an "above-the-line" account 
and are charged to the consumer. They are not like charitable 
donations which are included in a "below-the-line" or non-cost 
of service account and charged to the stockholders. 
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lighting of Missoula's streets. He said, "We would support 
the Company on a legislative issue, but it is not in our in­
terests to take a position on an issue of this type." Would 
the Missoula Chamber oppose the rate increase? Johnson 
answered, "Probably not. How do you stand against people 
who are members?" Would the increase be opposed if Montana 
Power were not such a large dues payer ($1,060 in 1965)? 
Johnson said dues are of little consideration because "it 
wouldn't bother our $70,000 yearly administrative budget if 
the Company cut off funds." He said that Chamber functions, 
like the coordination of boxcar pools to gain low freight 
rates, would continue to be performed for other members if 
the Company quit. He said that tourist and convention pro­
motion such as the paying of -$1,000 to the Amateur Athletic 
Union to entice the skibob races to the Snow Bowl (see Table 5) 
would also continue. He said his organization could not be 
controlled by one segment of business as investor owned util­
ities because it welcomed members with other views such as 
cooperatives. But Johnson also said that 100 per cent member­
ship of all of Missoula's businesses was not his organization's 
goal. He thought there were 200 potential Chamber of Com­
merce members in Missoula, but that "many can't afford mem­
bership; some don't believe in the free enterprise system; 
and some we wouldn't want as members because they use bad 
business practices. 
Înterview with Norris E, Johnson, executive vice 
president, Missoula Chamber of Commerce, August 21, I968, 
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Only one local Chamber of Commerce—Musselshell 
Valley—wrote the Public Service Commission opposing the 
1968 rate raise. This may not be significant since only two 
Farmers Union locals and five labor union locals wrote the 
Commission. 
Montana Chamber of Commerce.—Del H. Siewert said it 
was difficult for the Montana Chamber to get involved in the 
rate raise controversy because "even experts disagree on 
rates." He said, "Maybe I'm naive, but I don't think that 
the outside consultants the Power Company has hired are a 
bunch of crooks who have sold their souls." Siewert, whose 
appointment as executive vice president was suggested by 
Robert D. Corette, said the Company was in a difficult sit­
uation because some of those who wanted utility rates re­
duced were "the same people who want the Company to spend more 
to reduce thermal pollution or to increase recreation facili­
ties at Hauser Dam." 
He said that the Chamber's newspaper, The Montana 
Citizen, would probably not editorialize on the rate raise 
request for its 13,000 subscribers in the state and local 
Chambers unless Chamber committees or boards decided it 
should. And that was unlikely because "quite frankly, we 
try to create a back-scratching situation," he said. "That 
way, if a member has to raise money for the community chest, 
he gets help from others who know that the favor will be 
returned when they need help." 
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Siewert said that most of the Chamber's policy is 
formulated in committees or from tabulation of a membership 
referendum, as that taken on the sales tax. Committees, 
working in the general areas of community development, ed­
ucation, taxation, agriculture, transportation, travel, in­
dustry, and public affairs are appointed by the Chamber 
president and approved by 15 elected directors. Appointment 
to committees is made after polling the members about their 
interests. A member may be appointed to as many committees 
as he cares to serve on.̂  
Montana Power officials are involved in this committee 
structure. The 196̂  budget and finance committee contained 
four Montana Power directors. At least four of the 11 Company 
directors have been president of the Montana Chamber. And 
Robert D. Corette is the second Montanan to become a director 
of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Walter G. Kelley, division 
manager of Montana Power, was elected 1969-70 president of 
the Missoula Chamber, but resigned to accept a promotion. 
The 1968-69 Missoula Chamber president, Dr. C. P. Brooke, 
is a Montana Power stockholder. Other Company stockholders 
who are active in chamber of commerce affairs include C. H. 
Rittenour, Plains banker, and Robert G. Arnot, Sr., Conrad 
furniture dealer.® 
Înterview with Del H. Siewert, cit. For analysis of 
Company influence on the Chamber see Chap. I, pp. 14, I9, 20. 
T̂his list of relationships of Company personnel and 
stockholders is not complete,but rather a sample to illustrate 
that which is true in many localities. 
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Explaining the Raise 
to Stockholders 
On February 13, 1968, Montana Power sent a letter to 
its 13,295 Montana stockholders explaining the rate increase 
request. Similar communications have been sent to stock­
holders explaining past policies. Therefore, because they 
receive special information and because of their financial 
interests, Company stockholders should be inclined to favor 
rate raise requests. There are exceptions, however. 
Senator Lee Metcalf owns 10 shares of Montana Power 
and State Senator William H, Bertsche is a stockholder. 
Bertsche, when manager of the Great Palls Brewery, testified 
against a proposed I962 Montana Power rate increase. He said, 
"the proposed rate penalized industrial customers of the Great 
Falls Gas Company. And the Brewery was a customer." He was 
asked if he had compared the dividends he earned as a Mont­
ana Power stockholder with what the rate increase would cost 
him as manager of the Brewery and decided that a rate increase 
would not be offset by increased stock earnings? "No!" he 
said, "Maybe I'm not like others, but I never compared the 
dividend income to the Brewery expense. I merely bought 
9 Montana Power stock as a good investment." 
Apparently stockholders other than Bertsche do not 
compare their Montana Power dividend income to what their 
utility costs would be after an increase. Assuming, as Senator 
Înterview with William H. Bertsche, Jr., state sen­
ator, Great Falls, Mont,, August 10, I968. 
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Metcalf claims, that Montana Power charges each customer an 
average of |60 a year more than would be necessary for the 
Company to earn a "fair" six and one half per cent return on 
an original cost rate base;!̂  and assuming that each share 
of common paid the 1970 yearly dividend of #1.68, one would 
have to own 36 shares of Montana Power to gain enough 
dividend income to cover the unnecessary utility bill outgo. 
And, an Investment of $1,008 would be needed to purchase 36 
shares at current prices near $28 a share. 
Furthermore, assuming that the electric bill for 
using 500 KVJH of electricity each month increased $l̂ u48 a 
year as a result of a rate raise and that the resultant in­
crease in dividends was eight cents per year a share (Mont­
ana Power's average for the last decade), a shareholder 
would have to om 19̂  shares of common for seven years to 
make up in increased dividends what he would lose in the 
payment of a higher utility bill for the rest of his life 
(28 years). An investment of $5,̂ 32 is required to purchase 
194 shares of stock at current prices. 
While Montana consumers will pay an extra $8,700,000 
in 1970 because of the utility rate raise, Montana Power's 
Montana common stockholders will only earn an extra $78,116 
in dividends in 1970 (based on eight cents per share per year 
increase in dividends). Since a large number of Montana 
Congress, Senate, "lOU No. 18: The Montana 
Power Company," Congressional Record. Vol. 110, No. 5̂ » 
March 23, 1964. 
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Power's Montana shareholders do not receive enough in 
dividends to "break even" after a rate raise, one could 
theorize that they would oppose any rate increase if they were 
acting strictly in their oxvn economic interests. Stock­
holders, however, rarely oppose utility rate increases. 
Their "maximum propensity to oppose (MPO)" the Company is 
low. 
Maximum Propensity 
to Oppose 
The maximum propensity to oppose, illustrated in 
figure two, is the maximum part of a dollar that might be 
spent in opposition to a utility rate raise by the consumer 
for each extra dollar raise requested by the utility. The 
amount of resources a consumer would lose (RL) yearly because 
of- a rate raise is plotted on the right half of the horizontal 
axis. The amount of resources a stockholder, company man­
ager, charity, electrical or labor union member, or company 
patronized business would gain or retain yearly because of 
a rate increase is called resources gained (RG). These an­
ticipated gains promote a low maximum propensity to oppose 
the utility because they might be lost if the increase is not 
granted or the patronage might be revoked by the utility if 
the recipient openly opposes the rate raise. The several 
factors which compose the maximum propensity to oppose are 
derived from resources lost and resources gained. 
The dollar value of an individual's time, donations 
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or other resources which he is willing to expend (RE) in one 
year either opposing a utility rate raise (ESQ) or supporting 
one (RES) is plotted on the vertical axis. Resources ex­
pended in opposition (REO) will be equal to the resources 
lost (RL̂ ) plus alpha—alpha being a loading factor to ac­
count for long run expectations and emotional willingness 
to contribute more in opposition in one year than would be 
lost because of a utility rate raise. REO=RLi + a. Consumer 
leaders have high alpha loading factors. 
Resources expended in support (RES) will be equal to 
the resources gained (EG) plus beta—beta being a loading 
factor to account for long run expectation of gain and for 
emotional willingness to give more in support in one year 
than would be gained in that year because of a rate raise. 
RES=RG + b. Utility officials have high beta loading factors. 
The alpha and beta loading factors will usually be zero un­
less the individual to which the formula is being applied is 
anticipating long run (more than one year) loss or gain re­
sulting from the increase. Resources expended will equal the 
resources expended in opposition minus the resources expended 
in support, RE=REO - RES=(RL]_ +a) - (RG + b). The maximum 
propensity to oppose the utility is obtained by dividing 
the resources expended (RE) by the resources lost plus one 
one-hundredth (RL + .01). MPO=RE/(RL + .01 )=/""(RL̂  + a) -
(RG + b}7/(RL + .01)=ĝ EO - RE$/(RL + .01). The ,01 is added 
to the denominator to prevent division by zero (undefined) in 
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eases involving the utility company employees who get special 
utility rates as part of their employment benefits and so 
therefore are not as affected by a rate raise as ordinary 
consumers. If the maximum propensity to oppose is positive, 
there will be a tendency for the individual to act against 
the utility; if the maximum propensity to oppose is negative, 
there will be a tendency to favor the utility. If the minus 
sign is dropped from a negative maximum propensity to oppose, 
the result is a positive percentage which is called the 
maximum propensity to support (MPS). 
Examples of MPO. •—If the rate raise would increase 
a consumer's yearly utility bill $15.̂ 8 (RL) it would be 
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plotted at point L on figure two. If the consumer was willing 
to expend $1̂ .48 (REO) in donations or organizational time 
allotted to the Consumers' Council, it would be plotted at 
point L̂ . The maximum propensity to oppose the utility would 
be + 100 per cent plotted at point C (MPO=RE/(RL + .01)= 
$15.48/|15.49). If, however, the consumer anticipated that 
the increase would cost him more in years to come, he might 
be willing to expend more than $15.48 to support the Consumers' 
Council during the year of the rate hearing. This would de­
pend upon his financial ability to donate from current 
disposable income. If he donated $25 (REO plotted at point 
A), his alpha (a=L̂ A=RA - RL̂ ) would be $9.52 and his MPO 
would be + l66 per cent plotted at point Ĉ . MPO= (#15.48 + 
9̂.52)/($15.48 + .01). 
A stockholder, however, has a lower maximum propensity 
to oppose the utility than a non-stockholder because he makes 
up in increased dividends and appreciated stock prices, part 
of what he loses as a consumer from increased electric rates. 
For example, a shareholder with 100 shares of Montana Power 
common stock who was anticipating an eight cent per year di­
vidend increase as a result of a rate raise would expect to 
gain $8 a year dividends. This would lower his resources 
expended to $7.48 (RE=$15.48 - #8=RL2 - RG=GLi). In this 
case, MPO would equal 48 per cent ($7.48/̂ 15.49) and unless 
emotional factors affected his decision, this man could 
afford to donate to the Consumers' Council no more than 48 
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cents out of each dollar his utility bill increased. A 
larger donation would cause him to lose money. 
If this stockholder determined that he would receive 
eight cents extra dividends during the first year of the in­
crease and 16 cents a share during the second year, 24 cents 
during the third, and so forth, he might decide income would 
exceed increased utility bill outgo. So, his beta would 
increase in anticipation of future profits and ICPO would 
shrink to zero or become negative. In this case, the man 
might conceivably invest some money to help the utility get 
a rate raise because his RES would be at point B, In the 
following example, alpha and beta are the losses and gains 
figured for the second ajid third years a rate increase is 
operative. 1̂P0=/J'RL̂  + a) - (EG- + bj7/(EL + .01)= + 
130.96) - ($8 + #4017/(̂ 15.48 + .01)=-|l.16/115.49=-?̂ . Since 
liPO is minus, it becomes the maximum propensity to support 
(ICPS=7̂ ) plotted at C2. 
Donations Reduce MPO 
The Company is able to reduce the maximum propensity 
to oppose of groups in the society other than shareholders 
by restoring to them in charitable contributions or Company 
patronage, part of the money which is lost because of rate 
increases. It was mentioned in Chapter V that hospitals 
would naturally have an interest in low utility rates because 
they use large amounts of energy. Hospitals, however, have 
a conflicting interest because, as Table 6 illustrates. 
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TABLE 6 
DONATIONS POE RELIGIOUS, CHARITABLE, SCIENTIFIC, LITERARY OR 
EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES CHARGED TO MONTANA 
POWER STOCKHOLDERS 1964-196? 
RECIPIENT AMOUNT 
St, Peters Hospital Building Fund, Helena $18,000 
St. Johns Hospital Building Fund, Helena 6,035 
Mary Swift Tumor Foundation, Butte 2,500 
4-H Program, Bozeman 11,035 
YMCA, Butte 8,600 
Boy Scouts of America, Butte 1,500 
Montana School of Mines Alumni Fund, Butte 12,300 
Rocky Mountain College, Billings 6,000 
College of Great Palls 3,900 
Carroll College, Helena 3,̂ 50 
University of Montana, Missoula 3,225 
Montana State University, Bozeman 1,170 
Harvard University Graduate School, Boston, Mass. 1,000 
Community Chest, Great Palls 15,750 
Community Chest, Butte 12,400 
United Givers, Missoula 8,250 
United Neighbors, Billings 7,700 
United Givers, Helena 1,000 
American Red Cross, Butte & other cities 3,̂ 09 
Upper Midwest Res, & Dev. Council, St. Paul 10,500 
Western Governors Conference, Helena 5,000 
Helena Chamber of Commerce 1,500 
American Legion, various cities 1,380 
Freedom's Foundation, Valley Forge, Penn, 1,100 
Montana Safety Foundation 1,000 
Island Development Committee, Missoula 2,000 
Sleeping Buffalo Recreational Assoc., Malta 1,000 
Russell Gallery, Great Falls 3,333 
J.P. Kennedy for Performing Arts, Omaha, Neb. 1,000 
Miscellaneous other donations (915) many of which 
may have been received by the same benefactor at 
different times. The Company refuses to release 
the names of these benefactors, 60,100.92 
TOTAL $215,137.92 
Source: Montana Power Co,, Form 1 Report to the PPC 1964-1967, 
(account 426,1), p, 304, " 
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Montana Power frequently donates to hospital building funds, 
A hospital will have higher utility bills if the rates are 
raised, but it might lose Company donations if the increase 
is opposed. So, donations reduce the maximum propensity to 
oppose of hospital administrators. Similarly, a rate raise 
will increase substantially the electrical costs of the 
University of Montana computer center, but the Company's 
donation of money to help get the last computer will lower 
the maximum propensity to oppose of the chairman of the com­
puter science department, especially if he needs a new com­
puter and hopes the Company might donate again. If the 
"charity" or recipient group has trouble funding itself, the 
maximum propensity to oppose will be lowered by Company dona­
tions more than would be the case if the group could depend 
on funds from someone else. 
Utility donations are rarely given with an overt 
"gun-at-the-head" do not oppose us or lose the donation at­
titude. The object of donations is to evoke good feelings 
toward the Company which will help overcome detrimental 
sentiments. The trick in giving is to help the recipient 
rationalize that he has not accepted a bribe, and keep him 
thinking that he is still a free agent. If he were pressured 
by Company officials to pull his punches, his reaction would 
probably cause much detrimental sentiment toward the Company. 
On the other hand, since the donations are to build good 
will for Company positions, the Company does not finance 
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projects which conflict with its policies. Montana Power, 
for example, did not respond to a League of Women Voters' 
request for funds to publish Know Your State, a booklet 
that presented factual material on state taxation and legisla­
tive reform, Montana Power has in the past supported numerous 
innocuous publications such as high school band programs or 
University of Montana theater programs. 
The other Company sponsored projects include: Boys 
State, the Thomas Alva Edison Foundation Science Institute 
for 350 educators at Bozeman, field trips to the Company's 
offices in Butte for University of Montana business students, 
Rose Bowl Parade floats, and the Screen News Digest, a current 
events film series which is said to have reached 150,000 
11 Montana students. 
Sometimes Montana Power officials are invited to 
speak before groups to which the Company donates. Montana 
Power also belongs to the Montana Taxpayers Association, an 
organization which maintains a speakers bureau to espouse the 
business community's philosophy. 
Montana Taxpayers Association 
Organization and Purpose.-—Montanans often confuse 
the 49-year-old Montana Taxpayers Association (MTA) with 
temporary local groups such as the Cascade County Taxpayers 
Association. S, Keith Anderson, executive vice president of 
^̂ The Montana Power Outlet, July, I968, p. 12. 
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the Montana Taxpayers Association, says that his group has 
individual members in all of Montana's $6 counties, but does 
12 not allow local organizations to affiliate with MTA. There­
fore, he says he is irritated when some local organizations 
oppose the legitimate needs of government and the MTA gets 
blamed for it. These ad hoc organizations generally have no 
staff and do little research on their programs. Anderson 
says that his organization has a yearly budget of $57,̂ 75 to 
support a staff whose main function is to audit school dis-
13 trict, county and local budgets. These audits uncovered 
errors which saved Montana taxpayers from $1,100,000 in 
excess levies between i960 and 1967.̂  ̂ MTA also conducts 
budget and tax schools for association members and government 
officials. 
Publications.—In conjunction with this seminar, it 
publishes a pamphlet entitled Property Tax Laws, the Montana 
Levy Book, which compares property tax levies by governmental 
unit for each county, and the Property Tax Budget Guide, de­
signed to aid officials in the analysis and preparation of 
budgets. 
^̂ The M'A does, however, publish a booklet entitled 
Good Government Begins at Home : A Guide to Forming and Op­
erating a Local Taxpayers Association. Apparently, MTA en­
courages the formation of local groups even though it dis­
courages affiliate members, 
l̂ Montana Taxpayers Ass'n., 1967 Annual Report 
(Helena), p. 2. 
^̂ Ibid., p. 4, 
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Lobbyists for the more than 2,000 individual members 
of the MTA oppose increased taxes and budget proposals the 
MTA considers unnecessary and legislation it believes will 
"hamper" business or increase the functions of government. 
It publishes the Legislative Bulletin to inform members on 
these activities. 
MTA recently acquired an offset press which it uses 
to publish the Montana Taxpayer, a bi-monthly newspaper with 
a 1967 circulation of 2,818 for association members.The 
MTA has obtained very good press coverage of its programs. 
It mails frequent press releases to all of Montana's daily 
and weekly newspapers. In addition, MTA has a mailing list 
of 5>000 individuals to which it can disseminate information. 
Structure.—The membership of MTA is very loyal says 
S.. Keith Anderson. "Once we get a member, we keep him even 
though he may sell his ranch or go out of business.Since 
most adults pay taxes, IfPA has a very broad based membership, 
and.a larger potential membership than any other Montana 
interest group. MTA's board of directors is selected from 
27 different business classifications including: transportation, 
banking, legal, medical, utility, lumbering, agricultural, 
tourist, insurance, mercantile, manufacturing, mineral, and 
real estate. According to Association literature, membership 
^̂ ontana Taxpayers Ass'n. , Montana Taxpayer, XII, 
No. 9 (October, 196?), p. 2. 
^̂ Interview with S. Keith Anderson, executive vice 
president of the Montana Taxpayers Ass'n., August 13, I968. 
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includes "an unusually large number of out-of-state business 
firms.One-third of the members are farmers and ranchers 
and they pay about one-third of the "voluntary" dues, 
.Finances,—The amount of dues payment to the As­
sociation is said to be "voluntary," but the directors have 
established minimum memberships and other guidelines for 
maintaining the "voluntary" levels of support. 
MTA and Montana Power,—In 196?, the Montana Power 
Company paid $3,413 in dues to the MTA—one-twentieth of the 
1 R Association's total revenue, Emmett P, Buckley, manager 
of Montana Power's tax and insurance department, serves as 
one of the MTA's 2? directors. 
The MTA took no stand regarding Montana Power's 
rate increase request. Company personnel and S. Keith Anderson 
all said that Montana Power officials never asked the I4TA to 
pass a resolution favoring the rate increase. Neither were 
MTA members urged to write letters to the Public Service 
19 Commission supporting the increase, 
Anderson said, "The Montana Power Company has never 
been on my back in an attempt to exercise undue influence on 
me. And if it did, the board would not stand for it." He 
Montana Taxpayers Ass'n., Citizen Action. 
^̂ Montana Power Co., 196? Form 1 Report to the FPC.p. 4-2/ 
^̂ interviews with Colin W. Raff, financial vice pres­
ident of Montana Power Co., Owen E. Grinde, publications depart­
ment, Montana Power Co., and W.H. Coldiron, vice president & 
counsel, Montana Power Co., Butte, Mt,, June 18, 1970. Tele­
phone interview with Emmett F. Buckley, tax and insurance de­
partment manager, Montana Power Co., June 19, 1970. 
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said he felt that the MTA board was comprised of individuals 
who are "highly independent in thought and action," He said 
the board is non-partisan (but there were at least twice as 
many Republicans as Democrats on it). And he felt it was 
well balanced because it was comprised of "directors from 
27 different segments of the community to insure that no in­
terest dominates," Board members usually are not so heter­
ogeneous that they destroy Î4TA policy, however. Anderson 
said board members are chosen partly on the basis of per­
sonality to minimize the possibility that a board member 
would continually oppose the executive secretary or the pres­
ident, The directors are elected at the annual meeting of 
the MTA and meet two or three times a year as the need arises 
to formulate policy and to approve the work program. Be­
tween board meetings, a seven member executive committee, 
composed of the president, three vice presidents and three 
directors, transacts necessary business. 
It was estimated that Montana Power's proposed in­
crease would raise state and local taxes, so Anderson was 
asked if MTA would oppose the increase because of the tax 
increase. He said the MTA "could not become involved in 
attacking its own members because factions would rip the 
group apart," He said he envied single-occupation organiza­
tions like the stockgrowers or bankers because he thought they 
did "not have the problem of walking a tightrope over con­
flicting policy interests" (they sometimes do), Anderson did 
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say, however, that he thought it was "clearly illegal for 
municipal governments to donate to the Consumers' Council." 
He said, "This would be like a unit of government donating 
to a political party."̂ 0 
Emmett P. Buckley, Company tax and insurance depart­
ment manager, said MTA did not take any stands for or against 
a utility raise "whether it be gas, light, or water, because 
the raise should be granted on the basis of need demonstrated 
to the Public Service Commission and not because of political 
pressure," (Compare this statement with the one made by the 
Kalispell Chamber of Commerce on page I63.) 
Company Patronage Increases Resources Gained and 
Lowers MPO.—Carl E, Dragstedt, a Missoula merchant and for­
mer HTA director who was not on the board during the increase 
request, said he imagined that the MTA did not oppose the 
raise because the directors were personally sold on the idea 
that a tax increase resulting from the utility rate increase 
was necessary since the utility needed more revenue to con­
tinue the service it had given in the past. He said the 
Company had always been fair in its dealings with him and so 
he had no need to doubt the need for the rate increase. He 
said that during the 52 years he had done business in Missoula, 
the Company had engendered his good will by buying "gloves, 
22 work clothing, and certain types of boots" locally, from him, 
20 Interview with S, Keith Anderson, ô . cit. 
21 ̂Interview with Enimett P. Buckley, 0£. cit. 
29 Telephone interview with Carl E, Dragstedt, Missoula, 
Mont., June 19, 1970, 
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Dragstedt is not the only merchant who has reason to 
appreciate Montana Power's patronage. The Company "buys cars 
and trucks from Montana merchants to update its 56O vehicle 
fleet. The Company's advertising claims, "One of our poli­
cies is to purchase locally, either from a Montana dealer or 
from a national representative who maintains offices in the 
State, all of the equipment, materials and tools that can be 
obtained," In 19̂ 5 it spent $6,274,000 within Montana on 
23 such items. 
Cordial employee relations increase beta emotional 
factors and lower the MPO.—Dragstedt said the Company had 
always treated his brother-in-law, who was a Company account­
ant, fairly. He said that when his brother-in-law retired a 
few years ago, "the Company rented him a cottage at Kerr 
Dam for $75 a month. Utilities, lawn care, and garbage dis­
posal were provided for that price. And when his wife had 
a heart attack, the Company remodeled the cottage for free 
so she wouldn't have to climb stairs," He said that about 
eight of 12 cabins at Kerr Dam are occupied by retired Com­
pany employees. At one time, the cabins were occupied by 
workers at the Dam. But because of increased productivity, 
pix 
it no longer requires that many workers to operate the Dam. 
The Montana Press 
Ẑ Montana Power Co., Serving YOU is Our Business, 
1966, p. 7. 
^̂ Dragstedt, 0£, cit. 
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Information Management 
Montanans have not mobilized more opposition to 
Montana Power partly because they have lacked accurate in­
formation about Company activities. It costs between 70 
cents and five dollars to produce a page of transcript from 
a utility rate hearing (depending on overtime paid for 
overnight transcribing). The transcript of Montana Power's 
1968 rate hearing contained more than 1,200 pages. Early 
in the hearing, Glen E, Mahoney, the Commission reporter said 
that a transcript copy would cost about $200—a prohibitive 
price for any consumer interested in probing the validity 
of an increase request.At one time in Montana history it 
was necessary to examine the hearings transcript to obtain 
an impartial picture of the proceedings because Montana news­
papers did not report hearings objectively. 
Reporting the 19̂  ̂hearings.—As has been stated in 
Chapter I, the Anaconda Copper Mining Company did not sell 
its daily newspapers until June 1, 1959. Pour Montana Power 
directors were on the boards of directors of these papers 
during the 19508.̂  ̂ One ACM paper. The Daily Missoulian. 
completely ignored the 19̂  ̂PPC-held hearings in Butte, The 
Capitol Press in Oregon gave the hearings more publicity 
•̂̂ Interview with Glen E. Mahoney, hearings reporter 
for the Montana R.R. & Pub. Serv. Comm'n., Helena, July 19, 
1968. 
^̂ The People's Voice. May 14, 195̂ , p. 1. 
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27 than most Montana papers, ' 
The independent Great Falls Tribune ran Associated 
Press (AP) accounts of the testimony on page four during 
22 of the 35 days of hearings. But these accounts were 
written for the AP by E. G, Leipheimer, publisher of the 
Company-owned Montana Standard; Colin W, Raff, Standard 
reporter who has since become a Montana Power vice presi­
dent; and Ira K, O'Malley, AP reporter who replaced the 
Standard's correspondents or "stringers." Publisher 
Leipheimer reported the hearing only during the testimony and 
cross-examination of Cornelius P. "Con" Kelley, ACM's board 
chairman and a counsel to Montana Power's first president, 
John D. Ryan, Leipheimer's accounts praised Kelley and Ryan 
for bringing electricity to Montana. The following is his 
report of PPC attorney, Reuben Goldberg's cross-examination 
of C. P. Kelley: 
"I am not an expert. I couldn't answer that," 
Kelley told him. 
"Neither am I," Goldberg replied. po 
"That's apparent to both us /sic/." Kelley quipped. 
The People's .Voice said the Butte courtroom was 
packed with Anaconda Company employees and "finely dressed 
women, who laugh and applaud at Kelley's attempts to be humorous 
. . , and then snicker and sneer at the federal power 
^̂ See The People's Voice, May 26, 1944, p. 2, for 
reprint of Capitol Press editorial. 
^̂ Great Falls Tribune, April 6, 1944, p. 4. 
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attorneys."29 it reported that when Kelley was under cross-
examination by his own lawyers, he could 
apparently recall the slightest detail of a trans­
action occurring away back in 1909. ... It seems to 
be a different story when the power commission counsel 
prod him in cross-examination and ask him to recall 
some large transaction perhaps involving millions of 
dollars which he and Ryan manipulated in 1912 and 1913. 
He slumps dejectedly in the witness chair; he can re­
call nothing; his memory has failed him completely. 
However, the power commission staff then go to the 
four large trunks of letters, documents, minutes, and 
exhibits which they have compiled . . . and bring out 
a letter, usually ivritten by Kelley himself, or to 
Kelley by Ryan, and refresh the ACM official's memory, 
much to his disgust and embarrassment, and over the 
heated objection of the utility company's counsel . . . 
The AP stories contained lengthy explanations of 
Montana Power's expert's reasons for classifying the Company 
31 property differently than the PPG accountants. But, not 
once did the AP stories give a detailed, understandable ac­
count of the PPG position which was labeled "highly tech­
nical," The usual method of portraying PPG witnesses is 
illustrated in the following description of testimony by 
Charles W. Smith and Russell C. Rainwater: "Their testimony 
mainly described the PPG staff's position on accounting pro­
cedures, on interpretation of the commission's uniform 
system of accounts and on items in the accounts of the Mon-
32 
tana Power Company." These stories were full of details 
^̂ The People's Voice, April 7, 19̂ 4, p. 4. 
^̂ Ibid.. p. 1. 
^̂ Great Falls Tribune, April 14, 1944, p. 4. 
^̂ Ibid., May 6, 1944, p. 4. 
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about how long the PPG witnesses had dealt with power com­
panies, but did not relate what the PPG staff's position 
actually was. These stories included only one relevant 
PPG figure, saying on numerous occasions: "The hearing was 
on an order to show cause why the Company should not adopt 
the PPG staff report . . . and write approximately 
$50,000,000 off the Company's books.The $50 million 
figure was wrong. The PPG wanted $53 million stricken from 
the Company's rate base, 
Joseph Kinsey Howard, then editor of the Great Palls 
Leader, sent a stack of AP releases on the hearings to high 
officials of the Associated Press with his comments. The 
head of the Montana AP Bureau, Hugh Thompson, was released 
for letting such important material written by "Company 
stringers" go out over the AP wire. Thompson then became a 
reporter for The Montana Standard before leaving Montana a 
short time later. 
Consumers denied advertising space.—During the 
1944 hearing, the Butte Miners Union had attempted to adver­
tise the holding of a mass meeting to support the PPG. 
Both The Montana Standard and the Butte Daily Post refused 
the advertising, adding to the blackout on consumer infor-
mation. The blackout had been lifted slightly by the 
33ibid.. May 13, 1944, p. 5. 
^̂ The People's Voice. April 28, 1944, p, 1, 
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Company press on the coverage of consumer activities by 
195̂  when a group of 400 people from around Montana met in 
Helena to protest the granting of the Montana Power gas and 
Mountain States Telephone increases. The Independent Record 
announced the holding of the meeting in a two-sentence 
story. 
Montana Power advertising,—After ACM sold its 
newspapers, Montana Power found other means of getting pub­
licity, The Company more than quadrupled its advertising in 
the Great Falls Tribune-Leader, placing 728 column inches 
of ads in 1957 and 3,44̂  column inches of ads in I966. The 
most advertising was done in the year the ACM papers were 
sold (1959) when 6,995 column inches of advertising was 
placed in the two papers (roughly pages at 168 column 
inches per page). In I966, Montana Power spent at least 
1336,338.52 advertising products—gas and electricity— 
which no one else could sell in that service area because 
the Company has a legally granted monopoly. This increased 
each customer's utility bill $2,03 since advertising expense 
is charged to the customer as an operating cost,̂  ̂
Montana Power advertising often features electrical 
and gas appliances and offers incentive light bulb packets, 
^̂ The Independent Record. March 11, 195̂ . 
^̂ Data figured from Montana Power Co., I966 Form 1 
Report to the FPC (accounts 913, 930, 2930, 2913); iHT" 
Report to Stockholders. p. 8, 
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etc., free to appliance purchasers. Since Montana Power 
does not sell appliances, they must be purchased from local 
merchants who are allowed to display their wares in the show­
room of Company offices around the state. This policy en­
genders the good will of appliance dealers in Montana. 
Putting the "press" 
on the Press 
Hot Springs Sentinel.—Some Montanans believe that if 
Montana Power does not get the treatment it wants in the 
state's newspapers, it sometimes retaliates by canceling 
advertising or printing contracts. Richard C. Shirley, 
editor-pyblisher of the now defunct Hot Springs Sentinel said 
that he was visited in the middle 1950s by Owen E. Grinde 
who was concerned about Shirley's editorial position on the 
Paradise Dam issue. He said that Grinde told him that the 
purpose of Montana Power advertising was to promote good will 
and if Shirley did not have good will Grinde implied that 
there was no point in advertising in the Sentinel. Shirley 
continued editorializing and lost his advertising for the 
several years until he ceased being editor and moved to a 
paper in Eureka, Montana, in June of I96O. Once under a 
new editor, the Hot Springs Sentinel regained Montana Power 
advertising.Shirley said that Montana Power has placed a 
37see for example, the last issue of the Hot Springs 
Sentinel before it combined with The Plainsman on August 4, 
i960. 
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small amoimt of anti-cooperative advertising in his Eureka 
paper, but only because it was the only way to reach people 
in that area. He has not received the general Company ad­
vertising usually sent to other papers each week. He is in 
a rural electric cooperative service area where the Company 
does not advertise unless they have to in order to maintain 
a favorable climate. 
Editor Pears Advertising Loss.—K. A, "Doc" 
Eggensperger, the editor of the Sanders County Ledger. a 
western Montana weekly, intimated that he was approached at 
a Helena meeting by a Company official who delivered a "polite 
hint reminding me that Montana Power was a good advertiser, 
and saying that it was not in the Company's interest to give 
as much publicity as had been given by my paper to the Committee 
for Paradise Dam." Eggensperger said he would not have 
changed his policy, but that he did not have to in order to 
avoid losing Company advertising because "the issue died down 
shortly after that meeting." 
The Western News.—Hamilton's Miles Romney said that 
he had fought with the Missoula Light and Water Company from 
the time he took over The Western News from his father in 1922 
until Montana Power bought it. Soon after the fight was 
continued with Montana Power, and according to Bomney, 
"several different firms, oil and tire distributors (Conoco), 
ceased to advertise with me." He said that friends of his 
^̂ Telephone interview with Richard C, Shirley, editor-
publisher, Tobacco Valley News (Eureka), August 24, 1970. 
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who were local agents of these firms told him that his paper 
was blackballed on a list circulated by Montana Power. He 
was careful to say that he could not prove, beyond what he 
had been told,, that such a list ever existed. Romney dis­
counted the theory that the local distributors were just 
"passing the buck" to the Company as an excuse for not wanting 
to advertise in The Western News. He said they advertised 
with his competitor who at that time had a smaller circulation 
than his paper. The Western News still has comparable to 
cheaper advertising rates than the Hamilton daily paper. 
Romney said he leased The Western News to his printer, 
Walter B. Rothe, for seven years when he and his father 
worked for the federal government. Rothe, who had no political 
viewpoints, obtained Montana Power advertising. Romney re­
turned in 1937 and resumed running the paper. Within two 
weeks, Montana Power advertising stopped. Since that time 
The Western News has received Montana Power advertising only 
39 when Montana Power brought gas to Hamilton. 
Advertising Revenue Important.—Montana Power advertisin 
is an important revenue source for several weekly newspapers. 
Thirty-six per cent of the total advertising in the October 6, 
1966, Belt Valley Times was Montana Power sponsored (70 
column inches—two ads). Throughout most of the I966-I967 
period during which the paper was examined, the Company ran 
30 
^̂ Telephone interview with Miles Romney, editor-
publisher, The Western News (Hamilton), July 24, 1970. 
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weekly 30 to 40 column inch ads that accounted for 10 to 
36 per cent of the total advertising placed in the Belt 
Valley Times. 
Despite this advertising dependence, most editors of 
Montana weeklies have never been threatened with loss of 
Company advertising. And they feel that their newspapers are 
free from Company domination. Donald R. Coe, editor of The 
Plainsman, and Campbell C. Calvert, editor of the Laurel 
Outlook, have both taken editorial stands against Montana 
Power and say they have not been pressured by the Company 
40 because of it. 
Independence is of little consequence if editors' 
views are the same as the Company's.—Some editors have never 
been threatened with loss of advertising because their view­
points rarely differ from that of the Company. Some of them, 
like Livingston publisher, Fred Martin, own Montana Power 
stock. Publishers are free enterprise businessmen and many 
of them compare their independent situation to that of the 
utility whose ads say that American totalitarian influences 
desire a government-owned press and a government-owned utility 
business. 
This independence has a long tradition in Montana as 
is illustrated in the following research printed in 193̂  by 
kA 
Telephone interview with Donald R. Coe, editor of 
The Plainsman (Plains), and Campbell C. Calvert, editor of 
the Laurel Outlook. July 24, 1970. 
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Daniel Whetstone, archetype frontier editor of the Cut Bank 
Pioneer Press ; 
Jerry O'Connel / s l c j  of Butte, democratic / s i c 7  can­
didate for Public Service Commission, ... is loudly 
attacking the electric rates charged by Montana Power 
and telling his hearers it is robbery .... A comparison 
of rates here and those charged by companies serving 
San Francisco, Los Angeles, Denver, Port Worth, and 
Salt Lake is interesting. The rate charged by the Mon­
tana company is lower than any of them. 
Ten years previous to this editorial. Whetstone had 
vehemently denounced Company opposition to Governor Joseph 
Dixon's reelection. He detested the Company press as a pro­
stitution of the function of a newspaper. And he said 
Montana Power was paying too little for federal land leased 
on Flathead Lake. But on the utility rate issue, he sided 
with the Company which did not supply electricity to his town. 
This editorial position fit well his philosophy that the 
value and pride of the press in a democracy was its indepen= 
42 dence. 
Some weeklies were not as independent as the Pioneer 
Press. The Phillips County News, for example, reprinted a 
Company submitted editorial on the Knowles Dam issue in 
1962.4̂  
Ĉut Bank Pioneer Press, October I9, 1934, p. 3. See 
page 59 for discussion of material similar to that presented in 
this editorial, 
42 Janet R. Doty, "Dan Whetstone of the Cut Bank 
Pioneer Press," (unpublished senior paper. School of Jour­
nalism, University of Montana, May 9, I968), pp. 9-20, 
4T ̂Phillips County News (Malta), August 30, 1962; U. S., 
Congress, Senate, "IOU No, 20: Montana Power Puts the Grass 
in the 'Grass Roots' Papers," Congressional Record, 88th Cong,, 2d 
Sess,, Vol. 110, No, 88, May 4, 1964, pp, 9625-28, 
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"Conventional" public relations,—Montana editors are 
annual guests at a Montana Power sponsored dinner at the Mon­
tana Press Association convention. In between times, Company 
officials drop in to chat with editors or explain Company 
activities, Samuel G, Reynolds of The Missoulian and Edward 
P. "Daz" Furlong of the Great Falls Tribune said they re­
ceived such visits from Company officials during the spring 
of the 1968 rate hearing. Owen E. Grinde said he delivered 
the February release announcing the rate raise request to the 
AP and The Montana Standard because he "happened to be in 
Helena and Butte that day," 
Once at the hearings, Grinde wrote one to seven pages 
of press releases each day concerning the 1968 hearings. The 
consumers had no paid staff to write releases for them. Over 
50 per cent of the material used in AP stories on eight of the 
13 days of the hearing came from Company press releases. The 
AP is the only statewide news agency subscribed to by the 
Montana daily newspapers. United Press International (UPI) 
and Intermountain News Network (IMN), whose reporters attended 
the hearings, release stories primarily to radio and television 
stations. Independent reporting by the Great Falls Tribune 
and Lee Newspaper state bureaus, however, counterbalanced 
the AP reports somewhat. And the press coverage was better 
than it had been in 1957 when Gretchen G. Billings and Owen E, 
Grinde were the only "reporters" at the Montana Power electric 
^^Grinde, op, cit. 
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rate increase hearing. 
Asking who for what, when and how.—When figuring the 
maximum propensity to oppose, there is an apathy factor or 
zone of tolerance which must be accounted for. The more 
resources lost (RL), the more likely that the individual's 
zone of tolerance to the increase will be exceeded. And the 
more likely that he will oppose the rate increase, especially 
if MPO is also high. Two consumers may both have MPOs of 
100 per cent, but the consumer with a potential resource loss 
of $1,000 a year will be more inclined to oppose the rate raise 
than a consumer with a potential loss of $15» Therefore, 
utilities sometimes try to nullify opposition from large 
industrial users by negotiating separate contracts with them 
which do not impose as large a percentage increase on them as 
on small residential or commercial customers, 
Montana Power had negotiated a three per cent in­
crease in rates with several large industrial customers prior 
to seeking its 15 per cent 1968 rate increase from other cus­
tomers. The industrial customers were able to keep their in­
crease small because they can switch to other forms of 
energy if electric rates get too high. And since their bills 
were not increased 15 per cent, they had no interest in op­
posing the increased rates sought from other consumers. By 
negotiating separate industrial contracts, Montana Power 
avoided the impact of an opposition from coalition between 
Ilk 
The People's Voice, November 15, 1957. 
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industrial and other consumers. 
The 1968 example is not the first time that Montana 
Power has prevented a consumer coalition from reaching its 
full strength (see Table 2, note a). In 1948, the Company 
requested to increase the electric bill for only those cus­
tomers who used over 1,000 KWH of electricity a month. The 
small number of customers in this category were unable to 
mount effective opposition to the increase. 
Conclusions about the effects of Montana Power's 
tactics on the political system will be drawn in Chapter VII. 
CHAPTER VII 
THE EQUILIBRATION OF GROUP INTERESTS 
We have to shield ourselves not only from State auto­
cracy but also from group autocracy or particularism. 
In rebuttal to French sociologist 
notion that three tiered society 
(individual group, primary group, 
and nation) protects primary group 
members from being overwhelmed by 
the nation,1 
Equilibrium Not Attained 
The hypothetical equilibrium—that the rate raise 
would be prevented—did not materialize. The Public Ser­
vice Commission allowed Montana Power to raise its rates 15 
per cent.2 The Commission did not grant everything the 
Company asked for. But it cannot be positively stated that 
there was much give and take or compromise between the Com­
pany and the consumers. The Company, it will be recalled, 
apparently did not expect to get more than 15 per cent, 
since that is the per cent by which it told the cities to 
increase their budgets. It may have asked for a 25 per 
Ĝraham Wootton, "Pressure Groups: The Despair of 
Patriots," Spectator, CCXII (February 28, 1964), p. 273, 
quoting Angus Maude. 
R̂e The Montana Power Co., Docket No. 5698, Order No. 
3295 (Montana R.R. & Pub. Serv. Comm'n., January 30, I969). 
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cent increase—more than it needed—to give itself some 
bargaining leeway. If this was the situation, rather than 
being compromise on Montana Power's part, it was all take and 
no give. 
Some compromising did take place between the Public 
Service Commissioners when they made their decision on how 
much to grant the Company, Commissioner Boedecker moved that 
the Montana Power Company be allowed an amount of revenue 
which would in effect deny the rate raise request. The 
motion died. Commissioner Smith then moved to allow the 
Company a greater amount of revenue. Smith's motion passed 
with Smith and Steel voting in favor and Boedecker voting 
against. 
The raise was not more effectively opposed because 
some real barriers exist to hinder mobilization of effective 
countervailing power to Montana Power, These are the barriers 
of legal precedent and governmental inefficiency, interlocking 
directorates and allied interests, the Company's economic 
power, and the public's lack of knowledge about or indifference 
to existing exploitation. These real barriers sometimes create 
imagined barriers to mobilization. The most common of these 
is the belief among consumers that the Company is so omni­
present and omnipotent that it does little good to attempt 
opposition to Company policies. The rest of this chapter 
is devoted to the discussion of these barriers and to sug­
gestions on how they might be overcome. 
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The Commission Does 
Not Balance Conflicting; 
Interests 
As it is presently constituted, the Montana Public 
Service Commission does not properly fulfill its role of 
balancing conflicting interests. It is forced by inadequate 
financing to be more of a court than a regulatory agency. As 
was pointed out in Chapter II, Montana Power spent $82,91̂ .20 
in 1968 pursuing the $8,700,000 revenue raise. That was 39 
per cent of the Commission's total budget for regulating over 
858 utilities and carriers. The combined Consumers' Council 
and Public Service Commission expenditures for the entire 
preparation of the case amounted to roughly $39,000—half of 
what the Company spent in I968. And Robert D. Corette said 
that Montana Power had spent $300,000 on its case which ap­
parently included preparatory work the Company had done 
prior to 1968. 
The consumers were unable to pay Dr. Kosh more than 
they did (|5,000). And since he thought he deserved more 
($15,000), it is not likely that he will represent them again. 
Consumer experts often lose money fighting rate cases. The 
Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen backed out of the consumer 
effort during the 1957 Montana Power rate hearing and did 
not pay its legal representative $600. And William E. Hunt 
said he received $750 to cover his expenses as president of 
the Consumers' Council, but that he lost 50 days away from his 
legal practice while working on Council affairs. 
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If because of lack of finances, regulatory bodies take 
on the function of courts, adjudicating upon the merits which 
public utilities and consumers place before it, the market 
forces of monopoly power will be operative and regulation 
will be a sham. The utilities, because they can finance 
their rate case out of earnings and pass the cost of preparing 
the rate case on to the consumers, will be able to present 
a much larger case. The consumers, who must finance their 
case from donations, will be limited in their efforts. 
Consumers Have 
Difficulty Mobilizing 
The consumers will have difficulty organizing even if 
the press is free and does a credible job of reporting a rate 
hearing. The consumers will have difficulty organizing and 
the great mass of them will remain inert even in the face of 
substantial alleged overcharge because their maximum propensity 
to oppose and their resources expended in opposition are 
lowered because of their perception of the situation. 
Consumer interests are obscured by utility press 
releases.—A consumer's willingness to expend resources in 
opposition to a rate increase are lowered by the way the 
utility announces the request—saying it will cost only pen­
nies a day instead of dollars a year. This helps prevent the 
consumer from realizing his own interests. The free press 
publishes parts of utility press releases almost verbatim— 
partly because its reporters are rushed and partly because 
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the reporters lack expertise with which to interpret tech­
nical data. If reporters do try to interpret such data and 
make a mistake, like Jerry Madden did in phoning an article 
to the Great Falls Tribune, the Montana Power people go to the 
publisher and criticize the mistake. The nationwide wire 
services might remedy this problem if they hired a public 
utility reporter to travel the United States and be an 
expert in interpreting the utility data. 
Mobilization is difficult if consumers believe 
regulation is effective.—Another consumer attitude which 
hinders consumer mobilization and lowers the resources ex­
pended in opposition is the belief that the regulatory agency 
is capable of examining the merits of a case and judging on 
them. As Mayor Shoup said, "Why should Missoula contribute 
to the Consumers' Council and pay double for the job the 
Public Service Commission is supposed to do?" Commissioner 
Boedecker concurred saying, "It is a waste of money to hire 
a consumer expert if the Commission is doing its job,"^ 
Consumers expect something they are not getting, however. 
The Commission is not carrying out its balancing function 
partly because it is underfinanced. 
Mobilization is difficult if consumers believe 
regulation is ineffective.—While some consumers believe the 
Commission is doing its job others are disillusioned and 
^Interview with Louis G. Boedecker, public service 
commissioner of Montana, Helena, September 4, I968. 
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experience feelings of impotence which are increased by-
suspicions that public service commissioners take bribes. 
These suspicions are unfortunate. Only one of the three 
commissioners said he had been offered a bribe or pressured 
by a representative of a utility appearing before the Com­
mission. He said the bribe offer came from a utility of­
ficial (not Montana Power) who was transfered from Montana 
when the utility was informed of his activities. The Com­
missioner said that during this same hearing a consumer 
representative had told him to vote against the utility or 
he would use his organization's influence to beat him during 
the next election. These efforts did no good since they made 
the Commissioner quite indignant with some persons involved 
in both sides of the controversy. 
Another rumor, that Elizabeth Holmes, once a wife of 
the late public service commissioner, John Holmes, was re­
ceiving more alimony than the commissioner's salary, is un­
founded. The rumor spreaders said that the alimony check came 
directly from the telephone company. Another said it came 
from Montana Power. Elizabeth Holmes, an opponent of high 
utility rates who recently changed apartments because of 
them, said "John paid the alimony himself. It amounted to 
$400 a month for a short while. But he got it reduced to 
$300 a month during the last part of 1959 because he could 
II 
not afford the higher payments." 
T̂elephone interview with Elizabeth Holmes, Helena, 
July 24, 1970. 
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Simplistic interpretation of economic trends hinders 
consumer mobilization.—Consumer protection groups have 
trouble organizing when consumers are satisfied with service 
and believe that they never had it so good. They know that 
the cost of doing business is going up and assume that costs 
must be going up for utilities too. Therefore, they reason 
that some increase is justified. Also, in times when people 
are prosperous, they do not mind paying more for something 
as long as it is available when they want it and as long as 
there is no trouble connected with getting it. Service and 
convenience are important. 
Multiple memberships "short circuit" consumer 
organization.—Multiple and overlapping group memberships 
do little to restrain the activities of organized groups. 
But, they do act as a check on consumer mobilization, A 
prevailing philosophy of "live and let live" or "if you let 
us make a dollar, we will let you make a dollar" was abun­
dantly exhibited by the Chambers of Commerce, the Montana 
Taxpayers' Association, the Montana League of Towns and Cities, 
the Montana Press, bankers, merchants, lawyers, auto dealers, 
and even the rural electric cooperatives and some labor 
unions. In this connection, Mayors John J. McLaughlin and 
Thomas Powers may get more from the Montana Power Company 
in donations and "gifts" for the cities of Great Palls and 
Butte than they could by opposing the Company and advocating 
lower utility rates. 
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Interlocking directors and shareholders are not dis­
posed to oppose Montana Power. As David Truman has said, 
"An individual's group affiliations largely determine his 
attitudes, values, and the frames of reference in terms of 
which he interprets his experiences."̂  Also, Montana Power 
patronizing policies create conflicting interests in Montana 
businessmen and keep the maximum propensity to oppose low. 
During the last rate increase, the resources lost to Mon-
tanans equaled $8,700,000 and the resources gained (or po­
tentially lost if the merchants opposed the Company rate 
increase) were almost equal to the resources lost. Montana 
Power spends over #6,300,000 a year on local purchases not 
including advertising (roughly $200,000), donations, new 
jobs, increased dividends (about #78,000), etc. 
One of the reasons why multiple memberships do not 
act as a check on organized groups is because many consumers 
are not joiners. We know, according to Oliver Garceau, 
"that multiple memberships in a formal sense increase with 
education and socio-economic status."̂  Many consumers who 
have an interest in preventing a rate increase simply do not 
belong to organized political interest groups and so they 
cannot temper policy in those groups. Even if these people 
T̂ruman, ô . oit.. p. 505. 
Ôliver Garceau, "Interest Group Theory in Political 
Research," Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science, C'CGXIX (September, 1958), p. 108. 
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perceive their interests, as some of them do, they still 
remain inert. They are non-joiners who do not spontaneously 
act to further their own interests. It takes money and time 
to organize these potential groups. And the job is doubly 
difficult in Montana because of the distances between cities. 
Large group lethargy stifles the consumers' power 
base.—Even large groups, such as labor unions, or the 
Farmers Union have difficulty arousing their members to action. 
Mancur Olsen, Jr. says this is true because if one member in 
these large groups does or does not help support the Consumers' 
Council, neither he nor the other members will perceive the 
result. Therefore, nobody has incentive to act. In order 
for these large groups to function, group members must be 
forced to participate, says Olsen, So laborers vote the 
union shop, farmers vote to accept commodity controls, and 
citizens vote to sustain taxes. Each of these groups must 
invoke compulsion upon themselves, says Olsen, or individual 
members will "scab" on the system, enjoy the collective good 
(lower rates) without paying for it (hiring a consumer rate 
7 expert), and eventually destroy the group. 
Consumers are apathetic,—Consumer apathy in all 
groups is illustrated by the fact that the Public Service 
Commission received petitions in opposition to the I968 rate 
M̂ancur Olsen, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action: 
Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 19̂ ), p. 2. 
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raise which contained only 2p28 signatures. Only one letter, 
from E. L. Alexander, an elderly former stockbroker, was 
received by the Commission favoring the increase» The I968 
petitions can be compared with those submitted in 1959 and 196I 
which carried 2,800 and 1,800 signatures of consumers who 
opposed the rate increases. Other causes championed in 1968 
were more popular even though the rate increase meant a loss 
of #8.7 million a year. Eugene McCarthy for President 
people got 15,000 signatures in two months in support of 
their candidate. And the Montana Retail Association suc­
cessfully petitioned for 22,478 signatures to place the repeal 
of the inventory property tax on the ballot. 
Perhaps consumers do not sign petitions opposing the 
rate increase because they feel the Commission will be ob­
livious to this type of political pressure. In 1953; 78 
organizations, businesses and protestants were represented by 
16 lawyers at the Montana Power gas rate hearing., Leo 
Gallagher, manager of Elliston Lime Company, said a gas rate 
raise would increase his costs $3,400 and cause his plant to 
shut down.̂  The Commission granted Montana Power a 30 per 
cent increase in gas rates three months after the request was 
made despite the statements of Gallagher and others similarly 
situated. After rendering its decision, the Commission indicted: 
O 
Letter from Leo Gallagher, manager of Elliston Lime 
Co., to Harry L. Billings, no date. Elliston Lime continued 
to operate despite the increase. 
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the consumers who had fought this and another increase by 
stating: 
Certain individuals have used these two petitions 
to further their own political careers. ... It is 
anticipated that much to-do will be made or attempted 
by those whose political ambitions transcend their own 
good consciences. It is with the thought in mind that 
they will endeavor to cast an untrue light upon the 
facts in these two cases that this statement is issued." 
The Public Service Commissioners said that signed 
petitions have no effect because if a utility needs a raise 
whether or not to grant it is an economic decision and not a 
political one. Louis G. Boedecker said, "Petitions have a 
different effect on the Commission than they have on Congress­
men. Nobody wants an increase. But sometimes we have to go 
on record and grant one. 
Consumers and anti-Company politicians who confront 
Montana Power gain feelings of impotence after losing a 
grueling battle with the utility. They feel like the Missoula 
businessman mentioned in Chapter V (p. 162). They feel that 
they can do little in opposition to a monopoly utility before 
an unresponsive Public Service Commission, so why try? This 
is the self-fulfilling prophesy—the attitude that the 
Company cannot be beaten so why try to beat them which' results 
in the fact that the Company is rarely beaten because few 
people sustain their effort to beat it. 
T̂he Independent Record, August 14, 1953. 
l̂ Boedecker, ô . cit. Interviews with Ernest C. Steel, 
public service commissioner of Montana, Helena, September 
1968, and Paul T. Smith, public service commissioner of Mon­
tana, Helena, September 3» 1968. 
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Montana Power is not invincible.—It is in Montana 
Power's interest to maintain its invincible image because of 
the demoralizing effect it has upon opposition. But even 
Company officials contend that many machinations are wrongly 
attributed to the utility, such as the Montana Bank Examiner's 
questioning of Consumers' Council donations, or the complaints 
about Jarvis's Farmers Union radio program. W. H. Coldiron 
says, "If Montana Power did everything that everybody says 
we do, we wouldn't have time to run the utility business. 
After he headed the Consumers' Council, William E. 
Hunt was beaten by a former Montana Power employee in his 
race for mayor of Chester, But he will not give the credit 
for his defeat to Montana Power. Hunt says, "Why give them 
one more notch in their gun that they do not deserve and 
scare off somebody who might try to oppose the Company and 
succeed." Hunt said he was beaten because of a street 
paving controversy and other criticism of his administration 
which did not surface until the last issue of the Liberty 
County Times before the election. He also said that the 
conservatives got out their voters and he did not do the same 
with his. Hunt lost to Norman W. Harju by approximately 
60 votes. Hunt discounted Montana Power influence even 
though the Liberty County Republican Chairman had told him 
that he made to two trips to Butte, presumably to confer with 
llColdiron, 0£. cit. 
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Montana Power lobbyists about the election. Hunt said a 
Montana Power employee ran for the city council in ward one 
and was beaten. Harju resigned after one month as mayor to 
work for the Broivning telephone company. Before resigning, 
Harju asked Hunt to be Chester's city attorney. Hunt declined 
the job and moved to Helena where he is currently director of 
12 the Montana Aeronautics Commission. W. H. Coldiron said 
that Montana Power had not attempted to beat Hunt. 
Just as Hunt is not willing to give Montana Power 
credit for his defeat, Montana Power is not willing to give 
the consumers credit for the 6,550 vote primary defeat of 
Commissioner Paul T. Smith in 1970. W. H. Coldiron says 
that he does not know why Smith was defeated. But, because 
Smith beat Paul Cannon by 238 votes in Silver Bow (Butte), 
C^inon's home county and the hotbed of Montana consumerism, 
Coldiron did not believe in the "consumer rebellion" theory 
which AP capitol reporter J, D. Holmes had attached to 
13 Smith's defeat. 
Holmes pointed out that Smith had ten more years of 
exposure in elected office than Cannon and that Cannon had a 
Ik poorer won-loss record. Smith won only nine of Montana's 
56 counties—all but Musselshell being in the western 
^̂ Interview with William E. Hunt, Helena, March 17, 
1970. 
13 Coldiron, 0£. cit. 
1 il' 
The Missoulian. June 7, 1970, p. 23. 
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congressional district. And Smith spent $9,084 on his 
campaign—$7,201 more thsin Cannon. Concentrated campaign 
spending in Democratic Butte could have given Smith the edge 
there but not in other parts of the state where consumers 
recalled Commission decisions made from 196? to I969 to 
increase the rates of the Montana Power, Montana-Dakota 
Utilities, Mountain Bell Telephone, and Great Falls Gas 
Companies and to increase city water rates in Great Palls, 
Butte and Hamilton. 
Perhaps Smith was beaten because of the reason given 
by Arthur P. Bentley in his explanation of the Dartmouth 
College case. He said that "if the adjudicating agency 
decides against the majority will, the decision will soon 
be circumvented and the majority position substituted."̂  ̂
No one can say for sure what the majority feeling about the 
rate increase is since neither Montana Power nor the con­
sumers have sampled public opinion on the issue. But the 
rural electric cooperatives completed a statewide survey in 
the summer of 1970 which indicated that 6I.I per cent of 
Montana's people felt that electric rates charged by investor 
owned utilities were too high. Twenty-seven and one-half 
per cent said rates were about right, .9 per cent said rates 
^̂ Bentley, 0£. cit.. pp. 390, 391. 
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were too low and 10.5 per cent said they were not sure.̂  ̂
Assuming that the voters did want to circumvent the high 
rates the Commission set, in Montana, it would require six 
years because only one Commissioner stands for election 
every two years. 
Redressing the Balance 
Commission Reforms 
Shorter election terms,—If the Commission is not 
held immediately responsible for decisions it makes, the 
public tends to forget the unfavorable effects of decisions 
made several years prior to an election. To remedy this, 
two of the Commission seats should be up for election every 
two years as is illustrated in Figure 3® This would be 
accomplished if two Commission seats were elected for stag­
gered four year terms with one of the four year terms being 
open for election every congressional election year. The 
third Commissioner would be elected for a two year terra. 
This system of alternating terms would allow the voters to 
judge two of the Commissioners every two years, yet save 
two of the Commissioners the expense of having to campaign 
that often if they could win a four year seat. 
^̂ Montana Associated Utilities, Direction for the 
70's ; What Hontanans Say and Think About Rural Electric 
Cooperatives (Spokane. Wash.; Reid & Associates, 1970 ), 
 ̂6, question 10. Five thousand questionnaires were mailed 
randomly to heads of households in all of Montana's counties. 
Twenty per cent returned their questionnaires. Of those 
answering, 71,8 per cent were furnished electricity by 
investor owned utilities. 
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FIGURE 3 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSIONERS' SUGGESTED LENGTH OF TERMS 
Years in 
which elected 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 
2 year terra 2 2 2 2 2 
4 year term 4 holdover 4 holdover 4 
4 year term 4 holdover 4 holdover 
Larger salary.—Another barrier which tends to keep 
the Commission ineffective is the low salary paid Commissioners 
which does not attract the most competent people to seek the 
job. Consumer president William E, Hunt, for example, was 
urged to seek office as a Public Service Commissioner. He 
declined saying he could not afford to leave his legal prac­
tice for the Commissioner̂  salary if he was going to put 
his kids through college. A shortage of consumer-oriented 
candidates leaves the voters with little choice. More alter­
natives to the Commission's positions would be offered if the 
Commissioner's salaries were not lower than those paid by any 
other commission in the United States. 
Larger budget.—The salaries and budget of the Com­
mission could be expanded without a large tax increase. The 
Public Service Commission contributes about $2̂ 0,000 more to 
the state coffers each year than it spends. This is revenue 
accrued from fees and licenses. The Commission reported to 
the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations 
that its budget and staff were insufficient and should be 
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increased by 25 per cent.̂ ? Not all of the Commissioners 
agree with this, however, 
A larger budget was discussed before submitting an 
appropriation request to the I967 legislature. Commissioners 
Steel and Smith thought a small budget should be submitted 
and outvoted Commissioner Boedecker who favored a larger 
budget. Once the budget was submitted, Commissioner Smith 
told legislators the Commission would help keep costs down 
and would live with whatever was appropriated. So the leg­
islature cut the budget request even further. 
If a regulatory body is operating on a small budget, 
an "original cost" rate base is the least expensive method 
of determining utility value because it does not require as 
much time estimating complicated "trends" as does the re­
production cost new rate base method. 
Promoting Utility 
Competition 
In addition to invigorating the Public Service 
Commission, consumers can develop countervailing power to 
investor owned utilities by advocating competition. Com­
petition can be obtained by developing government ownership 
of some (not all) electric generating, transmission, and 
distribution facilities,Competition can be obtained by 
l̂ Senate, State Utility Commissions. I967, pp, I6 
insert, 22 insert, 
l̂ Note the low rates and consequent larger consumption 
of electricity near government-owned power plants in U, S,, Fed­
eral Power Commission, Typical Electric Bills. R-66, I965. 
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providing the customer-owned cooperative with territorial 
integrity so that their service areas cannot be raided at 
will by Montana Power. And competition can be developed by 
requiring the electric and gas divisions of Montana Power to 
become separate and competing energy companies, 
PUDs.—Montana is one of two states which does not 
allow public utility districts or municipal electric systems. 
In some places, such as Eugene, Oregon, where electricity is 
sold for one-third of the price charged Montanans, municipal 
electric systems provide a source of revenue for local gov­
ernments because they make in-lieu of tax payments. Yet the 
potentiality that public utility districts might emerge if 
electric utility rates were set too high did not act as a 
countervailing force and deter Montana Power from seeking 
higher rates. The balancing power of potential groups did not 
have the effect David B, Truman theorizes they should have 
(pp. 11, 12) because they are prevented by law from arising. 
State Senator John L. "Luke" McKeon introduced a bill to 
allow public utility districts into the I969 legislature. 
The bill died in committee after several utility lobbyists 
testified against it. McKeon was the only person testifying 
in favor, PUDs do not arise very often anywhere. Only three 
municipal electric systems started in the United States in 
19 1965, and seven others were sold to investor owned utilities, 
l^Edison Electric Institute, 0£. cit., p. 25. 
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Short term utility franchises aid competition.—Even 
if public utility districts were allowed in Montana, they 
would face other barriers which would make it difficult for 
them to be a potential threat to Montana Power. Montana 
Power has been granted franchises to serve many Montana cities, 
and legally, a city could not switch to a municipal electric 
system until its franchise expired. Also, once a public 
utility district is formed, it must obtain electricity from 
somewhere—probably from Montana Power generating and trans­
mitting facilities. 
Water conservancy districts aid competition. •—A 
municipal electric system could arise more easily if Montana 
had a water conservancy district law which allowed small flood 
control, reclamation, electric generation, and other con­
servation projects. But; Montana Power lobbyists have 
managed to kill water conservancy district bills introduced 
into the legislature. 
Federal generating and transmitting facilities aid 
competition.—Because Montana Power has a monopoly on most 
transmission facilities in Montana, it could control the 
supply and price of electricity to a municipal-owned 
utility. In fact, Montana Power did maintain a high price 
for wholesale electricity carried to rural electric cooperatives 
on Montana's "high line." It charged the cooperatives 8.77 
mills per Klffl until Congress appropriated money for a Havre-
Shelby transmission line, Montana Power's wholesale 
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electricity rate then dropped to 5.5 mills a KWH. At that 
time rural electric cooperatives bought electricity from the 
federal government for 3»5 mills per KWH and Montana Power 
bought electricity from the federal government for 2.5 mills 
per KWH delivered free to Great Palls via the government 
owned Port Peck-Great Palls transmission line. 
Consumer Advocate 
If a commission is not equipped to probe utility 
accounts extensively, its function will be like that of a 
court which listens to both sides of a story and decides on 
the basis of evidence presented. If a commission is going to 
function as a court, the consumers will need a competent, 
well financed advocate to express their side of the story. 
Such a proposal has been suggested by Lee Metcalf and ten 
other U.S. Senators who have introduced a bill to establish 
an Office of Utility Consumers' Counsel (S. 607). Besides 
requiring preparation of model regulatory laws and requiring 
more extensive reporting of utility operations, stock options, 
expenditures, and interlocking directorates, Metcalfs bill 
would establish an independent agency known as the United 
States Office of Utility Consumers' Counsel. Among other 
things, the presidentially-appointed head of this agency 
could make grants to state or local governments or to a 
combination of such governments which represent a population 
of 100,000 people or more. The grant would finance up to 75 
per cent of the cost of establishing local utility consumers' 
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counsels who would appear at utility rate-making proceedings 
on behalf of the consumer. After all, Metcalf said, "The 
public provides public utilities, through rates, with such 
experts as the public utilities may require to protect the 
utilities' rights, but the public, through taxes, does not 
20 provide adequate funds for its own protection." 
Will a U.S. Office of Utility Consumers' Counsel 
offer enough countervailing power to redress the "balance" 
between the Company and the consumers? It has been the 
hypothesis of this thesis that an equilibrium more favorable 
to the consumer can be more easily approached if the consumers 
have outside help. The Company has been beaten in controver­
sies involving the Broadwater County Water Users and the 
Havre-Shelby electric transmission line when federal 
21 agencies intervened on behalf of Company opponents. 
Will the federal government be able to shake loose 
an appropriation to finance an Office of Utility Consumers' 
Counsel? The PPC has had difficulty obtaining funds. Its 
staff is smaller now than it was in 19̂ 9» and it only has 
20piorida Public Service Commission statement 
quoted in a speech by the Honorable Lee Metcalf, U, S. 
Senator from Montana, to the Midwest Association of Rail­
road and Utility Commissioners, Bismark, North Dakota, 
June 21, 1968, 
21see Howard, 0£. cit., pp. 33̂ -3̂ 2. 
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enough money to audit utilities once every seven to ten 
years.22 The appropriation for the Office of Utility 
Consumers' Counsel will be subject to the same political 
pressures of investor owned utilities which have kept public 
service commissions inept and the FPC hamstrung. According 
to the philosophy of Arthur P, Bentley, what the new office 
"will get, if it survives, will be what the people it solidly 
represents are strong enough to make it get, and no more 
and no less, , , 
If the utilities thwart the Office of Utility Con­
sumers' Counsel proposal, outside help to aid in countervailing 
Montana Power's political influence will not be forthcoming. 
But even if the power of the utilities is temporarily 
countervailed by a consumer advocate and strong regulation, 
in the absence of competition, utilities could call an 
energy strike similar to the transit, postal, garbage, or 
teacher strikes recently witnessed in the United States. 
School systems cut programs when financing is not approved; 
utilities may do the same. Such a strike would redress the 
balance of power in favor of the utility. 
^̂ Lee Metcalf and Vic Reinemer, Overcharge (New 
York: David McKay Co., Inc., 1967), p. 22ÏÏ"I Staff size fig­
ures originally obtained from U.S., Congress, Senate, Appro­
priations Subcommittee on Independent Offices, Independent 
Offices Appropriations, 1966, May 17, 1965» testimony of 
Joseph C. Swindler, chairman of the PPC, pp. 373 et seg. 
^̂ Bentley, 0£, cit., p. 361. 
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And so, with all these possibilities in mind, group 
theorists are forced to re-evaluate their notion that the 
activities of interest groups will not hinder services neces­
sary in a democratic society. Utility, garbage, and transit 
services are extremely important to the health and safety 
of the nation. So are equitable and fair utility rates. 
Competing interests must be "balanced" so that these two 
goals of public policy are compatible. A start in this 
direction may be made by adopting some of the aforementioned 
proposals. 
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